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ELEMENTS
OF
RELIGIOUS LIFE
FATHER HUMPHREY, SJ.
I *7> • ^
7 / *f
F.ONDON AND LEAMINGTON
AR'J' AND BOOK COMPANY
NE\V YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO : BEX/IGER BROTHERS
1895
PREFACE.
IN 1884, I published in three volumes,
under the title of " The Religious State,"
a Digest of the doctrine of Suarez con
tained in his treatise De Statu Religionis.
That work was, on account of the length
of it, somewhat expensive. The present
volume contains the marrow of the larger
work, and is published at a price which
places it within the reach of all whom
the subject concerns.
WILLIAM HUMPHREY, S.J.
114, MOUNT STREET, LONDON, W.
Lent,
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I.
THE STATK OF PERFECTION.
The idea of a State i
The state of Christian life 2
The state of common life 3
The state of perfection 4
Perfection of charity - 6
Difference between holiness and perfection 7
Perfection, and the state of perfection 9
Five conditions of the state of perfection 10
Counsels as distinct from precepts 1 1
General or universal counsels 12
Particular counsels 13
Three degrees in perfection of charity 16
The state of perfection to be acquired i~
The state of perfection to be excrdscit 18
Perfection of P>ishops — Parish Priests ( Parochi ) 59, 20
CHAPTER II.
CONSTITUTION OF THE RELIGIOUS STATE.
Necessity of the counsels to this state 23
Necessity of vows to this state 26
Cenobitic and solitary religious life - 2S
Difference between a. promise and & donation 29
Donation and delivery of himself by a religious 30
Simple vows and solemn vows in general 97, 31
Simple and solemn vows of chastity 143, 34
Simple and solemn vows of poverty 118, 109, 37
Simple and solemn vows of obedience - 147, 38
vi Contents.
PAGE
Approbation of Religious Orders 40
History of Approbation .... 42
Pontifical Approbation— Episcopal Approbation 44
Religious Congregations. Diocesan Congregations 45
Method of procuring Approbation - 46
Necessity of Jurisdiction - 47
Jurisdiction — Dominative power 204, 48
The Bishop, as Superior of Religious who are not exempt - 50
The religious state of Divine origin 5 1
The Apostles, as religious - 52
Pious, and religious, but secular Congregations 53
CHAPTER III.
ENTRANCE INTO RELIGION.
Age, as requisite for entrance - 54
Parental oblation of children 56
Hindrances to entrance - 57
The case of Parish priests, and of priests in cure of souls 20, 59
Clerics and the Mission oath - 60
Obligation of a son towards his father 61
Obligation of a father towards his son 64
Letters : Testimonial from the Ordinary required for lawful
entrance - 68
Vocation to religious life — simply as such - 69
Vocation to clerical religious life 324, 73
Leave of parents 7()
Reception to religious life 77
Effects of entrance 79
Period of probation, or noviceship 80
Continuance and interruption of probation 82
Obligations, and powers, of novices - - 338, 85
CHAPTER IV.
RELIGIOUS PROFESSION.
The substance of religious profession -
Formal effects of religious profession - 89
External formalities in profession 90
Contents. vii
Conditional profession - 92
Extrinsic effects of religious profession 93
Commutation of previous vows - 94
The bond of religious profession 95
Dispensation from solemn profession - ~ 31* 97
Invalid religious profession 9&
Ratification of invalid profession 99
Effect of " Renovation of vows" - 101
Mode of Renovation of vows by Nuns - 102
CHAPTER V.
RKLIGIOUS POVERTY.
Voluntary and perpetual poverty - 103
Poverty, as a title for Ordination - 105
Remote and proximate matter of poverty - 106
Dominion, or ownership - - 108
Solemn and simple vows of poverty 31, 37> IO9
Usufruct. Use. Possession. Administration -no
Various sins against a vow of poverty - 112
Measure of a mortal sin against poverty - 113
Four possible modes of religious poverty - 115
Incapability of ownership - - 117
Solemnity of a vow of poverty - . 37, n&
Individual poverty — and Comnmnity poverty - 119
Which is the most perfect mode of religious poverty ? - 120
Acceptance — as an act of ownership - 122
Leave — express — presumed - 123
Retention — as an act of ownership - 124
Tacit and presumed leave - - I25
Unjust and unlawful leave - 127
Acceptance of a loan by a religious - 128
Distribution of alms by religious - 129
The making of gifts by religious - 130
Proprietary /*«///£ - - 131
Actual use, and right to use - 132
Superfluities - 133
Obligations of Superiors with regard to poverty - 134
viii Contents \
CHAPTER VI.
Is.Ki.ir.ious CHASTITY.
PACJK
Necessary chastity, and voln ntary chastity - 136
Matrimony, with a vow of chastity - 137
The implicit vow in Sacred Orders - 140
Conditions and effects of a solemn vow of chastity 34, 143
Dissolution of unconsummated matrimony - - 1 45
CHAPTER VII.
RKI.IGIOUS OBF.DIKNCK.
Obedience, as it is matter of a vow 38, 147
Power of Superiors with regard to obedience - 149
Precepts " in virtue of obedience " 164, 152
Obedience, in relation to the Rule - 153
Relaxation of Rule - 156
Limitation of obedience - 158
Subordination among Superiors - - 159
The Sovereign Pontiff, as pt incipal Superior of all Orders - 161
The Bishop's power in Congregations which are not exempt - 162
The power of a General Superioress - 163
Power to prescribe /// virtue of obedience - \ ^2. 164
The substance of actual obedience - 165
Perfection of obedience - 166
The motive of obedience - 167
The specific and formal character of obedience - 168
The virtue of obedience, as wider than the vow 171
Affections at variance with obedience - - 172
Affections in aid of obedience - - 173
Obedience as regards the understanding and judgment 175
" Blind obedience " - - 177
CHAPTER VIII.
TMK Oin.KiATioxs OK Ri.i.unors.
A religious Rule - 180
Religious Constitutions, and Statutes - 234, 181
The obligation of the Rule - - 183
Contents.
Four ways in which this may be declared - -185
Transgression of the Rule - - 186
Obligation to progress in perfection - -187
Contempt of the Rule " !^9
The obligation of the religious habit - I91
The law of religious Enclosure - - T94
Papal enclosure— Episcopal enclosure - 198
The enclosure of Nuns - X99
The enclosure of religious Missionaries - 200
CHAPTER IX.
RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS.
Necessity for the existence of Superiors - - 203
Dominative power — Power of jurisdiction - 48,204
@#oj/-episcopal jurisdiction in exempt Orders - 211.206
Supreme Prelates— Generals - • 207
Intermediate Prelates— Provincials - 208
Provincial : Vicaresses - - - 209
Local or Conventual Superiors - 210
Creation of Supreme Prelates - - 214
Solemnities of election - 216
Disadvantages of creation by election - 220
Election of Abbesses - 222
Perpetual Prelatures — Temporary Prelatures - 223
Advantages and disadvantages of both - 224
Directive power - 228
Power to make perpetual statutes - 229
The taking of counsel in making precepts - - 231
A General Chapter, as compared with a General Prelate - 232
Promulgation of laws and statutes • - 181,234
Coercive power - - - 236
Power of Superioresses of Nuns - - 238
" Manifestation of conscience " - - - 239
Leave for, and prohibition of Communion - - 240
Appeals by Religious - 242
Simple recourse to Superior Prelates - 243
Power of dispensation in religious Prelates - - 246
Power to absolve in religious Prelates - 249
Contents.
Power of reservation of sins in religious Prelates - 250
Power of administration of goods in religious Prelates - 251
CHAPTER X.
MINISTRIES ENTRUSTED TO RELIGIOUS.
faculty to preach the Word of God - - 255
Faculty to hear confessions - 257
Episcopal approbation of religious confessors - - 258
Faculty to administer the Eucharist - 263
Recitation of the Canonical Office - 266
Attention and intention in prayer - 267
CHAPTER XI.
DEPARTURE FROM RELIGIOUS LIIK.
Five degrees of sin in unlawful departure - - 270
" Flight from the monastery " - 271
Apostasy — internal and external - - 272
Duties of religious Superiors towards fugitives and apostates - 273
Obligations of apostates towards their Order - 274
Co-operators with apostates . 275
Expulsion of religious . 276
Obligations of expelled religious - . 278
Relation of expelled religious to the local Bishop - 281
Leave for a religious to live outside his monastery - 287
Departure from one religious Order to another . 290
In what way may one Order be reckoned to be more peifect
than another ? - ... 292
Three ways of modification of an Order from its first institution - 294
Reasonable cause for lawful dispensation to pass to a less strict
Order . 295
Pontifical Privileges which forbid departure to another Order - 297
Obligation of Superiors with regard to leave for departure to
another Order . 298
Twofold difference between the effects of Common Law and the
effects of a Privilege . 299
Departure as it affects ownership of goods -300
Obligations of religious who become Bishops - 303
Obligations of religious who become Cardinals - 305
Contents. xi
CHAPTER XII.
VARIETY OK RELIGIOUS LIFK WITHIN THE RELIGIOUS STATE.
PAGE
The advantages of this variety 3IO» 3°6
Variety of end, and variety of means - 3°7
Cenobites — Anchorites— Eremites - 311
Military Orders of religious men - 312
Contemplative Orders — Active Orders - 3*4
The mixed religious life - 3l&
Which is the more perfect life ? - 3*8
Two kinds of excellence in religious means - - 322
Austerity — Penance — Strictness of Rule - 323
The clerical religious state — The monastic religious state - 324
Mendicant religious Orders • 32"
Clerks Regular - - 32&
Canons Regular - 329
Orders of religious women - 54, 102, 163, 199, 209, 222, 238, 330
Conservatories. Tertiaries - - 333
Power to receive a Nun to religious life - 33^
Widows, and women who are not virgins - 337
The goods of Novices in Convents of women 85, 338
Obligations of religious women - - 34°
^sVV^^^>^^\
*{jm,^:)
ELEMENTS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE.
CHAPTER I.
The State of Perfection.
THE word State takes its meaning from stability. When
applied to a rational being, it always implies two things
(i) perfection in some condition of life, or manner of
living, and (2) stability therein.
In every state there must exist some bond of obligation
to continue in a particular condition of life, in order to
give to that condition of life the stability which is of the
idea of a state.
This obligation must, moreover, proceed from a perman
ent cause, or a cause which cannot easily be removed.
Possibility of change is not contrary to the idea of a
state. That idea does not demand a bond which is
necessarily and absolutely or physically indissoluble.
It is satisfied by a bond or cause of obligation which is
morally fixed and permanent.
All states of life among mortal men may be reduced
to the two general states of freedom and of bondage.
The stability of the state of freedom arises from natural
law, since man is created naturally free. This natural
freedom it is not so easy to undo. This difficulty of
2 Element!; of Religious Life.
undoing suffices for the idea of a state, although by the
will of the free man himself, or as a just punishment,
his freedom may be taken away.
The state of a religions, or regular, is a state of bondage,
inasmuch as it induces a subjection and obligation which
has a permanent cause. The state of a secular is a
state of freedom, of freedom, namely, from the religious
yoke and obligation. It has a stable and permanent cause
of freedom in the natural right of freedom, so long as
the free man has not voluntarily subjected himself to
the religious yoke.
The secular state is divided into the clerical state, and
the state of laymen.
The clerical state is a state of bondage, inasmuch as in
it a man is specially dedicated and consecrated to divine
ministries. This consecration is commenced by means
of a sacramental, namely, by the first tonsure, which is
permanent in so far that it cannot be reiterated. It is
gradually brought to its perfection by means of an im
mutable sacrament which imprints an indelible character.
The state of laymen is a natural state of freedom from
clerical obligations.
The state of wedlock is a state of bondage, which is
rooted in a permanent cause.
The state of Christian life is the state of men who are
members of one mystical body, or spiritual and super
natural commonwealth, the members of which are united
one with another by one common faith, by profession
of faith, and by sacraments, under one Head, and are
ordained towards the attainment of eternal life in
everlasting blessedness by fitting and sufficient means.
7 lie State of Perfection. 3
In this state of Christian life there is found great
stability. Its stability springs, in the first place, from
the stability of the Church of Christ ; secondly, from the
obligation of permanence in it which is induced by
baptism; and thirdly, from the unchangeableness of the
faith, and the aids to perseverance which the state
supplies.
2.
The state of Christian life is divided .into the state of
common life, and the state of perfection. Christian life
comprehends a state which is general and common to
all the faithful, inasmuch as it is necessary for the salva
tion of every one of them — and another state which is
more special, supplying, as it does, besides the necessary
means of salvation, many more.
In Christian life perfection has to be considered as it
is twofold. There is a perfection which is essential to
Christian life. This perfection consists in the life of
grace and charity. In order to at least this essential
perfection the Christian profession is ordained. This
profession brings within reach of all who embrace it
the necessary and sufficient means of essential perfection.
It is called the state of common life, not as if in that
life men may not do works of supererogation, and increase
in spiritual perfection as much as they please, but inas
much as this state of life does not of itself bind them to
such works or increase — it does not afford special means
and in it those works have no special principle of stability.
Man's perfection consists in union with his Maker,
and it is charity which unites men to God. Perfection
of Christian life consisting principally in charity, the
state of perfection is principally ordained in order to the
4 Elements of Religious Life.
attainment of perfection of charity. Charity is said to
suffice for perfection, not as excluding other virtues, but
inasmuch as these necessarily accompany it, and rest
upon it, and so contribute towards perfection. Perfec
tion of Christian life includes, therefore, not only perfec
tion of charity, but perfection of other virtues also,
charity being the end and crown, or complement of per
fection of all other virtues.
Chanty has regard immediately to God. Towards
God it tends as towards its last end. All works, therefore,
of other virtues are related by charity to this last end.
Charity gives to exercises of other virtues their life, and
their efficacy for merit, and the completeness of their
perfection. Charity is the one perfection and form
which constitutes all other virtues in the state of per
fection. Charity gives to them not only completeness
and perfection in order to their last end, and their power
of meriting, but it gives to them also stability. It supplies
to them a force which will be efficacious to resist all that
which is contrary to them, along with an ease and pleasure
in the practice of them. Virtues other than charity con
tribute towards perfection as they are themselves instru
ments of charity. To charity, as it is essential perfection,
these virtues add an accidental perfection.
Faith and hope are materially necessary to perfection
in this mortal life. They are not, however, necessary in
themselves. They are necessary only by reason of the
present imperfection of mortal men who are as yet in
the state of the way. Hence it is not so much for faith
and hope in themselves, as it is for the sake of charity
that they are required. In this sense charity alone is to
be esteemed the queen and essence of perfection. Faith
and hope are, nevertheless, to be regarded as wedded to
The State of Perfection. 5
charity, and as bound up therewith by a straiter bond and
necessity than are other virtues. Perfection of faith and
hope, therefore, is not so much an accidental as it is an
essential perfection. It closely approaches the essential,
and it in a manner belongs to its integrity. Faith is the
foundation, and hope is the support of charity.
A love of God which should be a love of infinite
perfection, and adequate to the divine loveableness, is
absolutely impossible to any mere creature.
A perfection of love such as should demand perpetuity
and unchangeableness in actual love without any intermis
sion, and such as should include a purity of heart which
is incompatible with any venial fault, or with the smallest
defect or difficulty in doing the will of God, belongs only
to the Blessed. To those who are still in the state of
the way, this perfection is — so far as the ordinary law of
spiritual life is concerned, and apart from special privilege
— impossible.
The essential perfection of charity consists in this, that
(rod is loved for Himself with the whole heart and mind,
or appreciatively above all things. God is really loved
in this way by every man who possesses habitual charity,
and who is therefore in the state of grace. If, besides
this habitual charity, a man's charity is also actual, this
actual charity adds a perfection to the habit of charity.
This perfection of actual charity lies, therefore, outside the
essence of charity.
Charity may be either remiss or intense. When charity
is intense, its intensity is a perfection which intrinsically
increases charity beyond that which the mere existence
of charity essentially demands.
6 Elements of Religious Life.
Charity may also be more or less extensive as regards its
object. It is more extensive when a man not only loves God,
but loves his neighbour also for the sake of God. A man
may so love God above all things as to have a steady
purpose never grievously to offend God, and never to turn
away from Him for the sake of any cause or creature.
This man, however, loves God with a greater limitation of
love, and with less extension of heart than does the man
who so loves God as for God's sake to have the purpose
to avoid the very smallest offence of God.
A still more universal love of God will be the love of
the man who resolves not only to keep all God's com
mandments, and to avoid all, even the smallest sins, but
also to follow the divine counsels, and to take those means
which lead to perfection of charity.
The perfection of charity, which is aimed at by the
state of perfection, consists in a habitual state, in which
a man is so disposed that he positively has power
promptly, and without hindrance from himself, both to
elicit and to command from himself acts of charity. He
may possess this power, even if no act of charity should
happen, as matter of fact, to be elicited.
This is the scope of the state of perfection, as that
state is a way towards perfection, or as it is a manner
of life which is adapted for the attaining of perfection.
A man tends, by means of this state, not towards any one
particular act, or even towards continuous operation, but
towards acquiring of virtues, and towards bridling of the
affections, and towards removal of all hindrances, so
that he may at length arrive at that permanent and stable
disposition in which he, as it were connaturally. should at
The State of Perfection. 7
some times make an act of the love of God, and should at
other times make other acts of virtue, and always, so
far as the frailty of mortal life will allow, avoid the very
smallest sins. This disposition and state of a man, when
it exists as a permanent habit, is — perfection of Christian
life.
There is no definite intensity of habitual charity which
is necessary in order to this perfection. Intensity itself
will not suffice, although, all else being equal, it very
much contributes thereto.
It might happen that a man was in the state of grace,
and that he had a habit of charity which was very intense,
and yet that man had not his passions mortified, and
did not frequently, and still less ordinarily, do heroic
or perfect acts of virtue, and even, and that very often,
sinned venially. Such a man no one could say was
perfect, or that he had attained to perfection of charity.
It might happen, on the other hand, that a man whose
charity was less intense had his affections so moderated
and under control that he should ordinarily and easily
avoid all venial sins, and constantly exercise himself in
virtues. Such a man would be in the state of the perfect.
There are many men who have really in them the fear
of God so as to avoid all mortal sins, and thus to live
in the state of grace, and who do the common works of
virtue, such as prayer, almsgiving, fasting and the like,
and who frequently receive the sacraments, and even say
Mass daily, and nevertheless, although short of grievous
offence of God, they live delicately, speak freely, or idly,
or impatiently, or conduct themselves with similar defects,
and are imperfect in their practice of works of super
erogation. In such men there may exist a very intense
8 Elements of Religious Life.
habitual charity. Their habitual grace has been the
result of a lengthened exercise of certain good and merito
rious works, or — and chiefly ex open operato — has flowed
from frequent and long-continued use of sacraments.
These men, nevertheless, cannot be regarded as men who
are studying perfection, nor are they perfect.
There are men, on the other hand, who within a shorter
time, and without so assiduous a frequentation of the
sacraments, but with greater diligence, have moderated
their passions, have avoided any frequency of venial sins
and other hindrances to progress in virtue, and have set
themselves free from occasions of imperfection. These
men have raised themselves to the state of the perfect,
although without so great an intensive increase of charity.
There is no certainly fixed degree, therefore, of intensity
of grace and charity which is necessary and which suffices
in order to this kind of perfection.
It follows that it may sometimes happen that a man
who had once arrived at the degree of the perfect should
fall therefrom. He might even become absolutely im
perfect, without having sinned mortally. Even in his
imperfection that man would still retain the same amount
of grace, since grace cannot possibly be lost apart from
mortal sin, nor is grace diminished by venial sins, or by
imperfect works. In order to fall from the state of the
perfect it may suffice that there should be voluntary
frequency of venial sins, with too great indulgence of the
affections and following of natural desires, along with
remissness or omission of perfect acts of virtue.
It follows also that one man may be more holy before
The State of Perfection. 9
God than is another man who is more perfect, and con
sequently that a man who is less perfect in this life, may
through his greater amount of grace, attain to a greater
glory in the life that is to come.
5-
Perfection and the state of perfection are two distinct
things. A man may be perfect who has never been con
stituted in the state of perfection. A man who is living
in the state of perfection may, on the other hand, not be
perfect. He may even possibly be living in the state of
sin. All religious are in the state of perfection, but all
religious are not perfect. Many secular and married men
and women may be perfect, and nevertheless these are
not constituted in the state of perfection.
Although the state of perfection is most excellently
adapted for the acquiring of perfection, that state is
nevertheless not a necessary means in order to the exis
tence of perfection. Outside the state of perfection a man
has it in his power to arrive at perfection. It is possible
for him to do works of counsel spontaneously, and apart
from any obligation, such as is that to which his voluntary
entrance on a state of perfection would bind him.
The state of perfection, when compared with perfection
itself, is as a means towards an end. It may be described
as — a profession of life, or a manner of living, which is
stable, and which has been instituted either for the acquir
ing, or for the exercising of a man's own individual
perfection in Christian life.
There are five conditions which are required in order
to the existence of the state of perfection.
i. The manner of living must be external and visible.
io Elements of Religious Life.
It must consequently be embraced by means of an
external act and profession. This is necessary, since this
state has relation not only to the invisible God, but to
God's visible Church. A man may bind himself by an
internal vo\v to some special manner of living, for the
>ake of his own spiritual good, and for the greater service
of God, and he may attain to perfection, but that will not
suffice to constitute such a state as will be an ecclesiastical
state. His state of life will not be a state of perfection
before God's visible Church.
2. The manner of living which is professed must
have added to it an obligation or bond of permanence.
This follows from the general idea of a state. A mere
purpose for the future is not sufficient as a source of
stability. Such a purpose may be changed, without either
fault or liability to punishment ; and such a purpose is not
confirmed by intervention of any law, either divine or
human.
3. The obligation to this manner of living must be
undertaken with some solemnity. There must be such
solemnity as is necessary among men for the establishment
of an obligation.
4. The state must be instituted for the doing of works
of perfection.
5. Lastly, the actions which belong to a state of per
fection must be external. The perfection towards which
the state is ordained should be in proportion with the
state itself, and that state is external and visible.
It does not follow that the state is ordained in order to
external actions only, and not to internal actions, except in
so far as these are necessary in order to external actions.
The state is ordained also in order to even such internal
acts as are completed within the mind alone.
The State of Perfection. 1 1
The distinction of counsels from precepts rests on
faith so certain, and is so expressly set forth in the Sacred
Scriptures, and in the tradition of the Church of God, that
it cannot be denied without manifest heresy. It is of
the idea of a counsel — as a counsel is distinguished from a
precept — that it should concern a work which is not
prescribed. It is not true, however, that every good work
which is not prescribed is a work of counsel. In order
that a work should be of counsel, it must be a work which
is better than is a work which is opposed to it, or which is
incompatible with it. To marry is not prescribed, and
nevertheless to marry is not of counsel, although to marry
is in itself good. Not to marry is not prescribed, and
nevertheless not to marry is better than to marry, and,
as better than the merely good deed of marrying, is of
counsel.
Two conditions suffice to the idea of a counsel, as it is
distinguished from a precept. These are, that the work
counselled should not be prescribed — and that the work
counselled should be not merely a good work, but a work
which is better than is a work which is merely good.
Any other conditions besides these two are either acciden
tal to the existence of a counsel, or they are contained
in these.
Counsels are divided into general counsels and particu
lar counsels. A general or universal counsel is so called,
not as if it did not concern particular and determinate
matter — for this it must do, since all actions are single and
individual — but because it is not for its own sake alone that
the counsel is given. It is given for the sake of its useful
ness in order to the practice of other virtues and especially
12 Elements of Religious Life.
in order to attaining to perfection of charity. A particular
counsel is so called because it is given with regard to a
certain work for the sole sake of the goodness of that
particular work.
General counsels are three in number — the counsel of
poverty, the counsel of chastity, and the counsel of
obedience. Every one of these counsels is an aid
in the exercise of all kinds of virtues. These counsels
lend freedom to the soul from solicitude and anxieties
which might lead men into danger of committing sin, and
which hinder a man from giving himself wholly up to
God. When these three counsels united are embraced,
they sufficiently effect this freedom of soul.
To these general counsels, which are only three in
number, if we regard the matter of them, may be added a
fourth, by reason of a mode in which these counsels may be
followed. It is of counsel to confirm these counsels by
vow. To preserve virginity, even when virginity is em
braced without a vow, is a counsel. To confirm the
preservation of virginity by vow is a fresh counsel. The
same is true with regard to the other general counsels.
Since, however, this counsel of a vow may extend itself
to the matter of all virtues — and since this counsel is,
as it were, reflected upon the other counsels, and is made
one with each of these — and since also this counsel in a
manner transforms the counsel which it concerns into a
precept, and makes that to be henceforward of necessity
which formerly was free — the counsel of a vow is not
usually enumerated among the general counsels, as distinct
from them. It is reckoned as comprehended under them.
Those three counsels have therefore the name of
The State of Perfection. 13
Evangelical Counsels, or — the Counsels of Perfection, or
simply— the Counsels.
Particular counsels may concern the matter of every
virtue. Even as regards works of precept in any virtue,
there may be particular counsels of the same works under
certain circumstances. Those works may be of counsel
by reason of a circumstance of time. That which is of
precept at certain times may be done freely and of counsel
at other times. Thus, to hear Mass or to fast on days
which are not days of obligation, is of counsel. The love
of enemies, which is of precept, is said to be of counsel
when it extends to the bestowal of benefits and other signs
of benevolence on an enemy at a time when these are not
demanded by precept as due. Another circumstance of
a work is that of quantity. A man who is bound by the
precept of almsgiving, does a work of counsel when he
gives larger alms than he is bound by precept to give.
A third circumstance of a work is that of mode, or the
manner in which it is done. A man may of counsel do a
work more fervently, or for a higher end than that for
which he is bound by precept to do that work.
Counsels may also concern not only works of virtue,
but avoidances of evil. The counsel does not regard the
not doing of evil, since that is always under precept, but
it may regard means which are taken for avoidance of
the evil.
That which is purely a counsel — or a counsel simply as
such — induces no obligation under pain of any even venial
sin. Works of counsel are spontaneous and free.
An external counsel of God — or a counsel which is ex
ternally proposed by God to men — indicates simply a
14 Elements of Religious Life.
dictate of the Divine Intelligence judging and approving
something as better adapted than that which is merely
well and sufficiently adapted for the obtaining of eternal
life, or as adapted for the more easily and the more
perfectly obtaining of that life. It signifies what we
ought to think of the special means of salvation which is
counselled. To think otherwise would be an injury to
the Divine Intelligence. Of this those would be guilty
who should think wrongly of the Counsels.
For a man not to will to follow a particular counsel,
not because he does not reckon it to be the best course
to follow it, but because his will is for other reasons not
inclined towards following it, is, on the other hand, not an
injury to the Divine Majesty.
We may distinguish in God a twofold will — one will which
is absolute, and which may be represented by the words
/ wni — and another will which is relative, and which we
may represent by the words / would. A counsel does not
in itself indicate in God such a will as should induce
obligation. It indicates at most a simple affection and
complacency in that which is better than its opposite
which is merely good.
It is certain that Christian perfection cannot be attained
without observance of counsels, over and above obser
vance of the precepts. In speaking of counsels, however,
we do not here restrict our meaning to the three
principal counsels, but include even every better way
of observing the precepts beyond that which in rigour a
precept of itself demands.
Christian perfection — as it is distinguished from the state
of perfection — demands observance of the precepts more
The State of Perfection. 15
principally than it demands observance of the counsels.
That which is of the essence of a thing is more principal
than are the accidents of that thing. Observance of the
precepts is of the essence of Christian perfection, while
observance of the counsels is an accidental perfection.
That is accidental which cannot exist without the essential.
Apart from, and without the perfection of the counsels,
there may exist essential perfection of charity.
The state of perfection is ordained in order to perfection
of both precepts and counsels together. Of the two,
however, the state of perfection has regard more princi
pally to the precepts than to the counsels. Observance
of the precepts is more necessary. It is also the founda
tion of observance of the counsels.
Hence the state of perfection embraces observance of
all and every one of the precepts. It does not embrace all
counsels. It embraces those counsels only which are neces
sary as means towards the end of perfection, in accordance
with the circumstances and conditions of particular Insti
tutes. The counsels are observed for the sake of the
precepts. They, as it were, surround and protect the
precepts.
The state of perfection is, nevertheless, in itself con
stituted by profession of the counsels. The essence of the
state of perfection, therefore, consists in the counsels
rather than in the precepts. This is manifest, inasmuch
as the state of perfection itself is not of precept, but of
counsel.
The act of profession of the counsels suffices to con
stitute the state of perfection without observance of the
precepts. A man may be in the state of perfection,
and, nevertheless, that man may not be perfect.
1 6 Elements of Religious Life.
7-
The obligation of the state of perfection is not induced
without the consent of the man who embraces that state.
An obligation of this kind must be either induced or
imposed by some act, since it is in itself neither natural
nor necessary. A man is neither naturally born, nor is he
supernaturally born again by baptism into the state of
perfection. The obligation of the state of perfection is
not imposed, since the state itself is not of precept. The
obligation of this state, therefore, if it is to exist, must be
induced by a man's own consent and deliberate act.
In the state of perfection there are three degrees.
There is the degree or grade of "beginners" — the degree
of " those who are making progress " — and the degree of
those who are " perfect."
The charity of a beginner is that charity which is not only
hindered from easy and pleasurable operation by occa
sion of concupiscences and other as yet unmortified
passions, but is imperilled by them.
This state is called the state of conflict, or the state of
the purgative way. In that state a man's principal care
is to resist concupiscences and to mortify his passions,
while he is at the same time nourishing and fostering
charity itself.
The second degree of charity, or the charity of a man
who is in the class of those who are " making progress,"
begins when his passions have been calmed, so that the
conflict with concupiscence, especially in view of any
grievous fall, is no longer his first care. He can now
promptly and with ease give himself to works of virtue,
and to increase of charity.
This state is called the state of the illuminative way-
Tlu: State of Perfection. 17
In it the mind is more and more enlightened in order
to works of virtue.
The third degree of charity, or the charity of \\\e perfect,
begins when the passions have been so conquered, and
when the soul has been so habituated to works of virtue,
that it can promptly and pleasurably exercise itself in
the proper and most perfect exercise of charity, which is
— the love of God.
This is the state which is called the state of the unitive
way. By love of God the soul is united to God.
Those three states are not distinguished one from the
other as if each of them was complete in itself, or as if
in the first and second a man was to rest satisfied. In
the third, moreover, a man has not arrived at the goal of
increase, so that there may be no further progress.
The state of perfection is divided into the u state of
perfection to be acquired" and the " state of perfection to
be exercised"
Bishops are in the state of perfection, by reason of
their episcopal dignity, and nevertheless Bishops are not
in the " state of perfection to be acquired" Between this
state and the "state of perfection to be exercised" there
is no middle or third state, as there is no middle
or third state between the state of a teacher and the
state of his disciple. While Bishops stand in need of
personal perfection, they nevertheless do not receive
any special means of acquiring it in virtue of their
state. They have, in virtue of their state, those means
only by which they exercise perfection for the benefit
of others.
The distinction between the two states is real and
B
1 8 Elements of Religious Life.
adequate, as is the distinction between a thing to be done
and a thing to be received, or between a man's acquiring a
thing for himself, and his communicating that thing toothers.
A man may exercise himself in works of perfection,
although he himself is not perfect. A man may persuade
another man to be chaste, while he himself is not chaste.
A man may induce another man to practise poverty,
although he himself does not even profess poverty.
The stability which is required in order to the idea
of a state is, in the episcopate as it is a state of perfec
tion, derived not from consecration but from prelature.
Episcopal consecration is indelible, but it does not con
stitute a state of perfection. It does not bind the man
who has been consecrated to the doing of any works of
perfection. It only bestows a capacity and power for the
performance of episcopal actions, so far as power of Order
is concerned. It does not give pastoral rights. It does
not of itself bind the Bishop to any works of counsel or
perfection ; neither does it of itself and ex officio bind him
to the enlightening and perfecting of others. A Bishop
is, in virtue of his consecration, bound only by reason of
his episcopal dignity to give a greater example of virtue
and good living within the sphere of the precepts. This
is an obligation which is common, in its measure, to all
persons who are placed in any dignity. It does not by
itself suffice to constitute a special state, and much less
a state of perfection.
The stability of the episcopate, as it is a state of per
fection, springs from prelature. The episcopate once
accepted carries with it a perpetual obligation of perma
nence in the episcopal office, so that this office cannot
be laid aside at the Bishop's will. This moral stability
is sufficient in order to the idea of a state. Consecration
77/6' State of Perfection. 19
adds nothing to his state, but gives him power to do acts
which, if he were not consecrated, he could not possibly
perform. It is then when a Bishop has been elected and
confirmed that he enters on the state of perfection.
That which specifically constitutes the episcopate as a
" state of perfection to be exercised" consists in the actions
to which the episcopate as it is a state binds a Bishop,
and to which it perpetually dedicates him. His functions
are of the most perfect kind. They are to enlighten, to
purify, and to perfect other men. As the royal state may
be called a state of prudence and fortitude, not because
it furnishes these virtues, or teaches how they are to be
acquired, but because it demands them and supposes
possession of them, if the royal office is to be rightly
exercised — and as the office of a teacher may be called
a state of learning, not because it makes a man learned,
but because it supposes and requires in him that already
acquired perfection — so is the state of a Bishop rightly
called a state of perfection or the state of a perfect man.
Since consecration does not place Bishops, still less
will ordination place priests in the " state of perfection to
be. exercised." Neither ordination nor episcopal conse
cration binds or deputes persons to works of perfection.
Although clerics are bound to minister worthily, they in
rigour satisfy this obligation by observance of the pre
cepts, and by ministering in the state of grace.
Priests are bound by reason of the excellence of their
ministry, and the works for the sake of which they are
ordained, especially the offering to God of the Divine
Sacrifice, to great virtue and goodness of life. All
Christians have, in their measure, the same obligation,
since all Christians are bound to communicate, and at the
2O Elements of Religious Life.
same time to approach worthily so great a sacrament.
The difference between priests and laymen in this matter
is a difference only of greater and less within the
same sphere of the common way of the precepts, and the
general state of Christian life.
Parish priests (parochi) are proper pastors. They are
not officials of the Bishop, as is his Vicar. They are not
the Bishop's instrumental causes. They are themselves
principal proximate causes. They are masters of their own
benefices. They exercise their own proper power and
office. They fulfil their own obligation. They do not
merely execute the obligation of another. It matters not
that parish priests (parochi) are, as it were, coadjutors of
the Bishop, for the Bishops themselves are cooperators with
the Sovereign Pontiff, " being called to a share of his
solicitude, although not to the plenitude of his power."
As the Bishops are true principal pastors in their own order,
although they are subject to a superior Pastor, so inferior
pastors are in their own grade proper pastors, although they
are subordinate to their Bishops.
Inferior pastors, and priests in cure of souls — although
by force of law their position may seem to possess stability,
yet, looking to the fact of the absence of any bond or even
purpose ot perpetual permanence in their benefices, they
cannot be said to enter on a state. They rather hold for the
time being a ministry, an office, or an ecclesiastical dignity.
They share in the obligation and exercise of perfection in
virtue of their function, whether it is to be called a state or
an office. Given that it is a state, they will, to the extent
in which they so share, be in the "state of perfection to be
txtrcistd. "
In the case of a priest, sacerdotal ordination usually
The State of Perfection. 2 i
precedes his promotion to be a parish priest (parochus) and
true pastor, and so by means of ordination this state of per
fection is, as it were, begun in simple priests. When the
pastoral care is added, this in a manner completes in its
degree a sort of " state of perfection to be exercised" In the
case of a Bishop, on the other hand, his election and con
firmation frequently, if not generally, precede his consecra
tion, and it is then when he has been elected and confirmed
that he enters on the state of perfection.
The state of Bishops is more perfect than is any religious
state, as the state of perfection to be exercised is of its
kind more perfect than is the state of perfection to be
acquired. There is here no question of comparison
between persons and their individual merits. The com
parison is between states, and the conditions and qualities of
these states.
There are four differences between the state of Religious,
and the state of Bishops.
1. The religious state is the state of perfection to be
acquired, while the episcopal state is a state of perfection to
be exercised or communicated.
2. The episcopal state supposes perfection in him who is
assumed to it, while the religious state does not suppose
perfection in him who professes it.
3. The religious state demands removal of hindrances
to the acquiring of perfection, and so it is constituted by
vows of the counsels of perfection. The episcopal state
does not of itself demand this.
4. The episcopal state has attached to it dignity, honour
and power, along with disposal of temporal goods. The
religious state requires poverty, subjection and renunciation
of temporal goods.
22 Elements of Religious Life.
Although the episcopal state is more perfect than any other
states, there is, nevertheless, and by reason of the adjuncts
of that state, peril in the desire of it. Desire of it is there
fore, morally speaking, not praiseworthy, or to be advised.
For the same reason the episcopal state is not matter of a
vow. The religious state, although it is less perfect as a
state, is, on the other hand, better than is any other merely
good thing which is incompatible with it. The religious
state has not the perils of the episcopate. It removes
hindrances to perfection, and the incentives to those vices
which hinder perfection. The religious state may therefore
be desired, and may rightly be advised. It may also be
vowed.
The religious state is, as it were, a holocaust, by which a
man consecrates himself, and all that he has, the whole of
his life and his will, to God. A secular in cure of souls
does not so bind himself. A parish priest, although
by reason of his office there is demanded of him a blame
less and exemplary life, is not bound, as such, to more than
that common manner of good living which consists in obser
vance of the precepts. When pastors of souls enter on the
religious state, it is in order that they may be placed in the
state of perfection. Religious, on the other hand, avoid the
pastoral care, in order that they may the better profess
perfection. The religious state is matter of counsel. The
position of those who have cure of souls is not matter
of counsel. The more voluntarily the religious state is
entered upon, the better and the more prudently is this done.
The more under compulsion, or through inducement of
superiors, or from obedience, the cure of souls is under
taken, the more safely is it accepted.
CHAPTER II.
Constitution of the Religious State.
THE " state of perfection to be acquired''' and the " state of
religion " are one and the same. They are the same both
in their end, and in their means. They differ in name
only.
The intrinsic and proximate end of the state of perfection
is perfection of charity, as perfection is possible in this
life, and to mortal men, and as it is to be arrived at by
observance not of the precepts only but of the counsels also.
The extrinsic end of the state of perfection is that perfec
tion of charity which obtains alone in heaven.
Although perfection of charity is, speaking absolutely, the
end of all and of every Christian life, it is nevertheless an end
which is aimed at in a special manner, and with the aid of
special means, in the religious state.
In order to the religious state, as commonly, strictly, and
properly so called, the three counsels — of poverty — of
chastity — and of obedience — are necessary and essential.
We must here again and carefully distinguish between
perfection in itself, and the state of perfection. In order to
attain perfection, renunciation of riches is most useful, and
is morally necessary. It is nevertheless not absolutely
necessary. It is possible for a rich man by making good use
of his riches, and by doing at the same time other works of
24 Riements of Religious
perfection, to arrive at perfection. In order, however, to
the state of perfection, in the integrity of that state, profes
sion of poverty is absolutely necessary. Without removal
of hindrances to perfection, the state of perfection cannot
exist as such. Hindrances to perfection are in no small
measure removed by embracing poverty.
With regard to chastity also we must again distinguish
between perfection in itself, and the state of perfection.
Perfection chiefly consists in union with God, and solicitude
to please His Divine Majesty. The conjugal state divides
the heart. It carries with it many cares and anxieties. Of
its own nature it greatly hinders spiritual progress and the
attaining of perfection.
Continence therefore, as removing hindrances to per
fection, is morally necessary in order to the acquiring of
perfection. To a perfect religious state continence is
absolutely necessary. It is of the very idea of that state
that it should be a state of life which is absolutely un
encumbered, and which is thereby rendered easy for the
acquiring of perfection. It must therefore exclude all
things which should notably hinder perfection, or render
perfection difficult.
Morally speaking, any true profession of poverty can.
scarcely exist apart from continence or celibacy. Wedlock
necessarily carries with it solicitude for the temporal goods
which are necessary for the support of a family. Fathers
are bound to lay up for their children.
So also as regards the counsel of voluntary obedience —
as it is distinguished from the necessary obedience which is
due to precepts, whether human or divine.
Constitution of the Religious State. 23
By reason of man's natural self-love, which hinders self-
knowledge, self-judgment, self-government, and self-cure, the
way of obedience is the safest of all ways towards perfection.
It removes all peril of self-will and of self-love. It is also
most pleasing to God by reason of the humility in which it
has its foundation. As the vow of poverty cuts off solicitude
with regard to one's temporal goods, so does the vow of
obedience cut off solicitude with regard to one's own self.
That which is true of the three counsels separately is true
also of the three counsels together. The three counsels
together are necessary in order to the religious state. It
is of the very idea of the religious state that a man
should renounce all created goods which might hinder his
perfect love of God. By profession of poverty, external
goods are renounced. By profession of chastity are re
nounced one's natural rights over one's own body. By
profession of obedience there is renounced one's own will.
By obedience a man consecrates to God his will. So doing
he consecrates the whole of his being to God's perfect
service.
The three counsels — of poverty, chastity and, obedience—
of themselves suffice to the essence of the religious state, or
suffice to constitute the substance of that state. They suffice
to remove all obstacles which hinder charity. The hindrances
to charity are chiefly three in number. There is desire of
riches, there is desire of the delights of sense, and there is the
inordination of the human will. These hindrances are re
moved by profession of poverty, of chastity, and of voluntary
obedience. Worldly solicitude is also threefold. There is
solicitude for riches — there is solicitude for one's family and.
there is solicitude with regard to the regulation of one's own
26 Elements of Religious Life.
actions. The first anxiety is removed by profession
of poverty. The second anxiety is removed by profes
sion of celibacy. The third anxiety is removed by
profession of obedience.
Those three counsels contain the substance of the re
ligious state. They are its primary and its principal founda
tions. To those three counsels all other counsels which may
be adapted towards the end of the religious state, may be
reduced.
Although chastity and poverty might in a manner be ob
served by a purpose of the will alone, apart from any bond
of obligation, obedience could not — in matter which is
purely voluntary and not of precept — be exercised without
some preexisting bond of obligation to obey. Obedience
supposes a directive, or even a coercive power of prescrib
ing. This there cannot be, as regards matter which is other
wise free from the obligation of any precept, unless there
has been first a voluntary subjection of himself to a superior
by the man to whom that superior prescribes.
Apart from such previous subjection there will be a
purpose of following the counsels of another person, rather
than a purpose of obeying his precepts.
In order that this subjection should not only exist, but
should also subsist and persevere, it must have a perpetual
source in some bond of obligation. This obligation will
first fall on the three principal counsels which are of the
substance of the religious state, and which are essential to
the existence of that state. The obligation must be with
out limit, and must therefore be perpetual or life-long.
The end of the religious state being perfection of charity
in this life and in the life to come, permanence in the
Constitution of the Religious State. 2 7
religious state to the close of this life is necessary. A
bond of life-long obligation is therefore necessarily of the
idea of the religious state,
It is also of the idea and essence of the religious state
that it should be confirmed by means of vows which are
made to God. That state alone is religious which is in it
self and primarily consecrated to God. A state cannot be
thus consecrated to God by means of a promise which is
made to man. The only way in which it can be conse
crated to God is by means of a promise which is made to
God. A human promise, if it is a private promise, can
always be dissolved by mutual consent of him who made
it, and of him to whom it was made. Such a promise will
not suffice to constitute a proper and true religious and
ecclesiastical state, unless the promise is confirmed by vow,
and with the sanction of public authority.
It belongs, moreover, to perfection not only to do a per
fect work, but also to vow the doing of that perfect work.
Counsel concerns both. Hence the man who of vow does a
perfect work, has doubled his perfection.
In order to constitute the religious state, a vow of
obedience alone will not suffice, even if through that
vow there should emerge an obligation both to poverty and
to chastity. Religious profession binds immediately both to
poverty and to chastity, and that independently of any precept
of a superior. The two vows, of poverty and chastity, pro
duce special effects, which a vow of obedience, which has
merely occasioned obligations of poverty and chastity, could
not produce. These vows of poverty and chastity are
such that a superior has no power to make any change in
them. The observance of them does not depend upon a
28 Elements of Religions Life.
superior's will. When in the verbal profession, which is
made in any Order, which is truly and properly a religious
Order, express mention is made only of obedience accord
ing to the Rule, there is always therein understood to be
included the making of the two vows of poverty and
chastity, as these are contained in that Rule.
The religious state may in itself be constituted in either
of two ways — either in a religious community — or in
solitary life. In the present practice of the Church, the
form.er is the only actually existing mode of the religious
state. It is cenobitic — that is to say, the religious state
is embraced in some ecclesiastical community, in which,
under one head, and under an approved rule of life, the
religious profess the way of perfection.
The other mode of the religious state, in a solitary life,
was in early ages far from uncommon. Religious virgins
were wont to have their dwelling within the precincts of
their paternal homes. They had made their religious
profession in the hands of the Bishop, and they had
received from him the sacred veil. This was no mere pro
fession of virginity only. These women were true religious.
As such, they were said to be specially consecrated.
The same mode of the religious state was practised also
by men. It is even most probable that religious dedication
of themselves bv men to God in solitary life preceded the
adoption of the cenobitic or common life. These
anchorites were living in a true religious state. For
existence of the religious state the condition of common
life is not in itself necessary. Common life simply adds
one other means in order to the acquiring of perfection.
It is a school of perfection.
Constitution of the Religious State. 2 9
Keeping in view this distinction of those two modes of
the religious state, we say that by means of religious
vows a man so gives and delivers himself to God, as in a
special manner to transfer the dominion or ownership of
himself to God. This is only then effected when these
vows are accepted in the name of God, by God's Church.
Since the religious state is an ecclesiastical state, the
donation and delivery of himself which is made by a
religious must be accepted by the Church. Donation
has no force or efficacy to transfer dominion to another,
unless the donation is accepted by that other who is the
person to whom it is made.
The Divine Majesty does not immediately and by
Himself directly accept any donation which is made to
Him. Acceptance must be transacted by God's Church
in the name of God, and through some minister who is
empowered to act in name of that Church. The donation
and delivery of himself by a religious must therefore be
made /";/ the hands of some man.
Acceptance of a donation is necessary of the very
nature of the case. Donation, being a contract, cannot
be perfected and completed without the consent of both
donor and donee.
There is, therefore, a most distinct difference between a
promise which is made to God, and a donation which is made
to God. A promise simply binds the person who has made
it to do that which he has promised to do. A donation
requires acceptance by the other side. The consequence
of acceptance is the acquiring of right over that which
has been given and delivered.
In order to constitute the religious state, when that
3O Elements of Religious Life.
state is embraced in a religious community, it is neces
sary that, besides the divine obligation of the three
substantial vows, which are made immediately to God,
there should be a special human obligation — or an obliga
tion as between man and man— by way of reciprocal
covenant. In virtue of this covenant the religious gives
himself to a religious Order and is bound to that Order. In
virtue of the same covenant the "religious Order accepts his
donation and delivery of himself. That religious body
is, therefore, henceforth bound to the religious as to a
member. It is bound to the support, to the care, and to
the government of this new member in accordance with its
Institute.
In the religious state, a religious becomes a member of
a mystical body. This is effected through union between
the whole and the part. This union, as it is a moral
union, is effected by means of a mutual bond of obliga
tion. Since this union is an actual and real union, the
donation and delivery of himself by the religious must be
actual, and the acceptance of it by the religious order must
correspond. The acceptance must be actual.
A simple and a solemn vow are one in the essential
idea of a vow. Every vow, whether simple or solemn,
induces an obligation of religion, in virtue of the promise
which has thereby been made to God. Transgression of
either a simple or a solemn vow is essentially of the same
kind of wickedness.
A solemn vow differs from a simple vow, inasmuch as a
solemn vow adds and includes something which a simple
vow does not include. A vow is simple, and is so called, as
it simply includes the essential idea of a vow. It does not
Constitution of the Religious State. 3 1
have attached to it that peculiar solemnity which a solemn
vow adds, over and above the essential idea of a vow.
That which a solemn vow adds does not effect an essen
tial difference between it and a simple vow. It does not
constitute a new species of vow. It is something which
accidentally perfects the vow. It formally constitutes the
vow in its special character as it is a solemn vow.
A vow may be substantially solemn, even when it is
made without any external and accidental solemnity. All
that is required is that there should be present two per
sons, one person who, along with the substantial vows of
religion, which are made to God, makes a donation and
delivery of himself, and another person, who is invested
with power to accept and who accepts those vows
and that donation in the name of the Church of God.
A vow, on the other hand, may be externally solemn,
that is to say, the vow may have been made with certain
rites and external ceremonies, and nevertheless, that vow
may not possess substantial solemnity.
Vows which are substantially solemn are not essential in
order to constitute the religious state.
A vow is called solemn, as a testament, or a contract, or an oath is
called solemn, to which that form, or public solemnity, is attached
which law requires. Solemnity is a form, or complexus of formalities,
which public authority adds to an act. It does so in order that this
act should be placed under the special guardianship of the whole body
of the commonwealth. That, therefore, is solemn, which has force
not merely from the action of a private agent, but also from public
authority. This authority may intervene, either through a public
person, or through certain rites and ceremonies, such as are not
necessary by natural law in order to the validity of the act. The act
will thus be taken and placed under a singular guardianship of the
whole body of the commonwealth, inasmuch as the commonwealth
took part in the doing of that act. In a solemn act, therefore, there
32 Elements of Religious J.ife.
intervenes the confirmation of the public authority, which thereby
takes that act under its own special guardianship. The solemnity of
vows consists in — a mode which has to be observed, in order that the
Church of God should with her divine authority confirm those vows.
If this mode should not be observed — or if the Church should in any
way protest that she is not confirming the vows with her authority, or
that she does not receive them as solemn vows — they will then be
simple vows only, and not solemn vows.
The solemnity of vows was originated by institution of the Church,
just as the solemnity of contracts, of testaments, and of oaths, was
originated by institution of the civil authority.
That there should be certain effects of vows — and that these effects
should be that which they are — is entirely within the discretion of the
Church. Hence certain effects of a solemn vow might be given by the
Church to a simple vow, without its ceasing to be a simple vow.
Certain effects of a solemn vow might, on the other hand, be restrained
by the Church, while that vow should nevertheless remain a solemn
vow.
The proper conception of the solemnity of vows is intervention
of ecclesiastical authority, and confirmation of the vows by that
authority, in the making of the vows. In virtue of this confirmation it is
that the Universal Church takes those vows under its o\vn special
guardianship.
It remains, nevertheless, proper to solemn religions profession to
annul previous matrimonium rat inn — or marriage which has been con
tracted, but which has not as yet been consummated — and also that in
virtue of solemn profession the religious Order is reciprocally bound to
the religious subject, to retain and support him for the rest of his life,
unless in punishment of crime he has to be expelled as incorrigible.
Disabilities spring not from the solemnity of a vow in itself, but
from special free decree of the Church which she has made with regard
to certain determinate actions. See Ballerini. Opus Thcologicnm
Morale, vol. ii, page 445.
4-
The donation and delivery of himself which a religious
makes to his Order is entirely distinct from his vow of
chastity. His vow of chastitv in itself is not a donation,
Constitution of the Religious State. 33
but is a promise which he has made to God alone. The
donation and the vow are distinct one from the other not
only in idea, but in reality. The donation has for its object
and its matter not the man's body, in order to the obser
vance of chastity — but the man himself m order to service
and subjection. The donation and the vow are mutually
separable. The donation might be made by itself apart
from any vow of chastity. A vow of chastity might be
made, and that even in the hands of a superior, apart from
any donation of oneself. Those two things, which are
really distinct, are nowadays made together in religious
profession, and are morally conjoined in order to religious
profession. The act of promising a thing, and the act of
delivering the thing which has been promised, are not in
themselves or necessarily conjoined. The two acts may be
separated at will. We often give that which we have never
promised. It is possible for us to promise that which we
do not give, or which we do not immediately give. A
promise has regard to the future. Delivery exists in the
present.
Even if a man should promise his goods to God for His
service, with a deliberate intention of delivering them
to God then and there, he nevertheless, so long as he
has not handed them over to God's Church, or to God's
poor, or expended them on other pious works, has not
renounced his own dominion over them, or his ownership
of them. God does not by Himself immediately accept
any donation which is made to Him, and by an unaccepted
donation God does not acquire any special right and
dominion over and above that general right and dominion,
or ownership, which belongs to Him as He is the one
Creator. In accepting, God employs the intervention of
34 Elements of Religious Life.
second causes, such as are His ministers. His ministers
are the administrators of His goods, and it is for them
to accept and use these for Him.
That which is in this matter true of external goods is
true also of a man's own body. Even if a man should
have an internal purpose of delivering his body to God
for His special service, he will not thereby lose his
dominion or right of ownership over his body. He will
not have imposed on himself a new obligation with
regard to the observance of chastity, which he has not
vowed. A good purpose does not of itself induce
obligation.
A promise is, as it were, a particular law which a man
imposes on himself. A promise can therefore be made
immediately to God. The promise has its effect im
mediately on the person who makes it, and whom therefore
it specially binds to the service of God.
A donation, on the other hand, does not of itself and
immediately bind the giver. It is not in him, but in the
person to whom it is made, that a donation produces its
own proper effect. To that person it transfers the
dominion or ownership of the thing given. The giver is
by means of his donation deprived of his ownership. He
is consequently bound henceforth not to act to the prejudice
of his donation.
A solemn vow of chastity has always attached to it a
donation and delivery which is made to God, not im
mediately, but through the intervention of God's ministers,
by whom also it is that this donation is accepted. That
which is thus delivered to God remains under the care and
irovernment of God's ministers, and by means of the
delivery of it to them they acquire for God a new right to
it. Delivery is required in order to the solemnity of a vow
Constitution of the Religious State. 35
of chastity, but delivery is not of itself sufficient to render
a vow of chastity solemn.
The power of entering on the married state is in such
wise natural, and given for the common good of all man
kind, that although a man may, by an act of his own will
alone, bind himself to God not to use this power, he never
theless cannot wholly deprive himself of the power itself.
He cannot, by his own private authority alone, and apart
from intervention si public authority, disable or render him
self incapable of matrimony. The right to marry is more a
public right of all mankind than it is a private right of
any human individual, since it is ordained for the preserva
tion of the species.
A solemn vow of religious chastity perpetually disables
him who makes it from contracting valid matrimony. This
disabling efficacy is to be attributed to the vow rather than
to the do?iation. Prohibition to marry follows not from the
donation, but from the vow, and therefore so does also the
invalidation of the matrimony.
The same vow, remaining in itself unchanged, may be
come from being a solemn vow to being a simple vow — or
from being a simple vow to be a solemn vow. It may be
come so independently of the will of the man who made
the vow. Solemnity depends on intervention of a law of
the Church. This law does not, as regards its duration,
its abrogation, or its effect, depend on the will or intention
of the man who makes a vo\v.
A change of simple vows into solemn vows might take
place, for instance, in the c;ise of the simple vows of
scholastics in the Society of Jesus. In the beginning Of
3 6 Elements of Religions Life.
the Society these vows were simple on two grounds. They
were simple, in the first place, because they did not
render those who made them incapable of matri
mony. They were simple, secondly, because they were not
annexed to a donation and delivery which was absolutely
perpetual and indissoluble on both sides. The donation
and delivery of themselves was perpetual and indissoluble
only on the side of the religious who made it. Power
remained with the Society to dissolve the bond and to
dismiss the religious for just causes.
As regards the first ground of simplicity in these vows it
has been so far diminished. The vows of scholastics of the
Society now render them incapable of contracting rahd
matrimony, so long as these vows endure. This they do in
virtue of the Bull of Pope Gregory XIII., Ascendente
Domino, which, as soon as uttered, had effect not only on
those who should thereafter make such vows, but also on
those religious who had previously to that date been free
from this matrimonial impediment. This is manifest from
the tenor of the Bull.
As regards the second ground of the simplicity of these
vows, it also might at any time be taken away by means of
a law of the Sovereign Pontiff which should deprive the
Society of Jesus of its power of dismissing scholastics.
The Pontiff has, most certainly, power to do this. The
vows of scholastics are in themselves perpetual, and the
donation to which they are annexed is, so far as
the religious are concerned, irrevocable. The Pontift
might therefore make the acceptance of the donation
by the Society irrevocable, in virtue of his power, as
he is its supreme pastor and legislator. There would
then be completed in the scholastics' vow of chastity the
idea of a solemn vow. That vow would then possess
Constitution of tlic Religions State. 37
all the necessary conditions which a solemn vow de
mands.
In the same way, on the other hand, if the Pontiff were to
give power to a religious Order to dismiss those who were
already solemnly professed, and to dismiss them free
from the bond of profession, and from all their vows, the
vows which had previously been solemn would thereupon
cease to be solemn. They would be no longer solemn,
since, from the date of the Pontiff's decree, they would not
be absolutely perpetual, — but perpetual only under
condition.
6.
A vow of poverty is simple, when there is merely made to
God a promise of observance of poverty by abdication of
dominion or ownership of all temporal goods, and of the
use of goods as if they were one's own property.
A simple and a solemn vow of poverty are one in the
essential idea of a vow. A simple vow might, however, be
partial only, that is to say, it might concern some and
not all temporal goods. A solemn vow of poverty must be
entire, that is to say, it must be a vow not to possess any
thing whatsoever as property, whether as regards owner
ship, or as regards usufruct, or even as regards the
use of it as if it were one's own.
Simple and solemn vows of poverty are distinguished
from each other by their effects, just as simple and solemn
vows of chastity are so distinguished.
A solemn vow of poverty not only binds a man not to
possess temporal goods as his own property, but it also
disables him, and renders him perpetually incapable of owner
ship and dominion. A solemn vow consequently renders
3 8 Elements of Religious Life.
him incapable of entering on any inheritance whatsoever.
As soon as a solemn vow is taken, it by its own force and
ipso facto excludes ownership of those goods which he
previously possessed.
This disability must be perpetual, absolutely and morally,
in virtue of the state entered on through solemn religious
profession. A simple vow of poverty which should produce
these disabling effects only so long as it lasts, does not
induce an absolutely perpetual incapacity. A vow is
solemn, not because the vow has disabling effects, but
because it has power to produce them.
A solemn vow has its disabling force not from natural
law, nor from divine law, nor as it is a vow, nor even from
the donation to which it is annexed, but from institution of
the Church.
7-
A peculiar moral effect which distinguishes a solemn
vow of obedience from a simple vow of obedience is that a
solemn vow of obedience so subjects the will of the
religious to his superior that, without the superior's consent,
the will of the religious subject is inefficacious to the con
tracting of any civil or natural obligation, whether by way
of contract, or in any other way.
A simple vow of obedience does not produce this effect.
It only induces the obligation of a promise to obey the
superior. This is not sufficient to invalidate a man's bind
ing himself to another man in matters which are not to the
prejudice of his vow, or at variance with his Rule, or with
the rights of his Order. A vow of obedience does not of
itself bind a man not to make any promise with regard to a
lawful matter which is not forbidden either by the Rule or
by the superior. Such a promise will be valid.
Constitution of the Religious State. 39
The effect of invalidation therefore springs from the
solemnity which is added to the vow. The force and
•efficacy to invalidate, which is annexed to the vow, con
stitutes and is its solemnity.
A simple promise of obedience does not of itself induce so
great a subjection and dependence on the part of the re
ligious, nor does it give so great a power to him to whom
obedience is promised. A simple promise of obedience
gives to the superior the power only of prescribing, and it
imposes on his subject the obligation only of obeying in
those things which have been prescribed within the limits
of the matter of his vow. Power in a superior to in
validate every obligation of his religious subject is not of
itself annexed to his power of prescribing. It does not
therefore follow or flow from a simple vow of obedience. It
belongs to a peculiar property from which a vow derives
this efficacy. In this property consists the solemnity of a
vow of obedience.
Power in superiors to invalidate the obligations of their
subjects springs from the dominative power which they possess
over them. This dominative power is not derived from the
vow of obedience, which is not a donation but a promise.
Dominative power is derived from the subject's donation
and delivery of himself. This donation is specially conse
crated to God by means of the vow. It is elevated so as to
be a spiritual holocaust which is offered to God. The
donation is moreover confirmed by the vow. The vow adds
to the donation a special obligation of fidelity due to God.
This the donation by itself does not induce. The addition
of the vow to the donation is therefore not superfluous.
It is not possible for a man to deprive himself of his
power to bind himseif in lawful matters, by depriving
40 Elements of Religious Life.
himself, at his own discretion and by his own private
authority, of the dominion of his will through transference
of it to another. For this there is required intervention
of the public authority of ecclesiastical law.
In religious profession, the donation and delivery of him
self by the religious is, as it were, the matter, while his
vow is the form. The vow not only confirms the obliga
tion of obedience but completes it, and specially conse
crates it to God. To the vow therefore it is that there is
specially attributed abnegation of the will, and disabling
efficacy.
If all the substantial vows of religion, especially the vow
of obedience, are perfectly observed, simple vows will
not less exactly remove all hindrances to perfection than
would solemn vows. If, on the other hand, the vows are not
observed, those vows would not, even if they were solemn
vows, contribute towards removal of hindrances to perfec
tion.
8.
According to the present law and usage of the Church
of God, it is not possible for a true religious state to exist,
except in a religious body which has been approved by the
Church.
The approbation of the Church includes two things.
One of these belongs to the understanding, or to a judg
ment of the understanding. The other is more properly an
operation of the will. To approve a religious community in
the first way is, after sufficient examination, to make an
internal judgment, and externally and authoritatively to
declare — that the mode of life of that community is holy—
that it is free from all error and superstition — that in its end,
and in the means which it proposes, it is a manner of life
Constitution of the Religions State. 41
which is tending towards perfection — and that therefore it
is worthy of erection to the religious state.
By this approbation nothing is conferred on the In
stitute. That which the Institute already possesses is simply
made known.
To approve in the second way is efficaciously to create or
erect a community into an ecclesiastical and truly religious
state.
It is to this public and authoritative approbation, where
by the new Order is proposed to the Universal Church as a
system to be imitated or embraced and followed, that
theologians refer when they say that the Sovereign Pontiff
cannot err in his approving of a religious body. He
cannot err in authoritatively declaring that its mode of
life is good and holy, and that it is a fitting means towards
the end of acquiring perfection.
This approbation is, as it were, a canonization, by which
the Institute is publicly and authoritatively set forth as holy.
The necessity for approbation does not arise from canon
law alone. It is founded in the law of nature.
A religious body, with a mode of common life, cannot be
instituted by means of the substantial vows of religion
alone, without the addition of certain observances which
give to that body its special character. In that which is
added by merely human action peril of error is always
imminent. To avoid this, the authoritative approbation of
the Church is necessary.
If propagation of religious bodies were free to private
individuals, many errors might easily be introduced, and
the faithful might be deluded into embracing a mode of
life which was either prejudicial to their salvation — or was
a hindrance to their perfection — or at least was in no way
a real means towards perfection.
42 Elements of Religions Life.
It so happened in the time of Innocent III. Certain
heretics, who were called Poor Men of Lyons, or Walden-
ses, invented a superstitious mode of life. They en
deavoured also to introduce it as a religious state.
Innocent III. therefore decreed that no religious Order
should in future be erected without the approbation of
the Sovereign Pontiff.
Approbation in some fashion was always, from the
beginning of the Church of Christ, necessary in order to
the introduction into that Church of a new religious body.
There are two ways in which a new religious body may
be introduced into the Universal Church. One is when
the religious body is from the first instituted for the
Universal Church, so as to spread itself throughout the
whole Church, preserving the unity of one body with a
bond of union of its members under one head. This mode
was not that of the more ancient Orders. It was a mode
which obtained in later days and chiefly with the rise of the
Mendicant Orders. Such an Order requires, of its own
nature, the approbation of the Universal Church. The
approbation of it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, to whom
belongs the care of the Universal Church.
The older religious bodies, before the time of Innocent
III., had another mode of origin and propagation. At the
first they were not instituted generally for the Universal
Church. They were not propagated by way of one corporate
body under one head. A religious body began in one
monastery, and to that one monastery it was not seldom
confined. Sometimes monasteries were multiplied upon
the same lines. In this case, although those monasteries
did not properly form one religious body, they nevertheless
Constitution of the Religions State. 43
by reason of their oneness with regard to Rule, and by
reason also of their emanation from one common parent,
were held to form — one family.
In those days the approbation of a religious body was not
universal from the first, nor did bestowal of approbation
proceed immediately from the Sovereign Pontiff. The initia
tion of a religious body belonged to the Bishop in whose
diocese the first monastery of that body arose. If a similar
monastery was to be erected in another diocese, the appro
bation of this monastery belonged to the Bishop of that
•diocese. This Bishop was not bound to follow the judg
ment of the other Bishop. That Bishop was not his
superior. The judgment of that Bishop was moreover not
universal. Things went on in this way, until at last the
approbation of the religious body became so general that
that body was held as approved by at least the tacit
consent of the Universal Church. This consent was
completed by the ipso facto or tacit approval of the
Sovereign Pontiff.
Besides speculative approbation — by which the usefulness
and the excellence of a religious body is declared — there is
also necessary, in order to the institution and erection of
that body, a practical approbation. By this practical
approbation there is given to a religious congregation, or
to its superiors, power to accept in the name of Christ, and
to constitute in a true religious state, those persons who
offer themselves for profession of that manner of life which
it embodies.
The power of approving religious bodies belongs, in its
fulness, to the Sovereign Pontiff alone. It exists in a
44 Elements of Religious Life.
manner in the Bishops. Before the date of the Fourth
Lateran Council, the Bishops had some share in the exer
cise of this power. Monks were at that time subject to the
Bishops as to their own proper superiors. They were
subject to the Bishop not only in that general sense in
which all persons who are dwelling within the diocese are
subject to the Bishop, but in a special sense, and in that
sense in which they are now subject to, for instance, their
Provincial or their General. The Abbot was himself
subject to the Bishop, as his monks were proximately
subject to the Abbot, and mediately or remotely subject to
the Bishop. To the Bishop the act of reception of monks
belonged. Superiors, or even founders of religious bodies,
could not accept monks on their own authority. To the
Bishop, in like manner, there belonged the expulsion of
incorrigible monks.
There are various distinctions between Pontifical appro
bation and Episcopal approbation of religious bodies. In
the first place, the approbation of the Sovereign Pontiff
extends to the Universal Church. The approbation of
a Bishop is confined within the limits of his own diocese.
An Archbishop cannot approve a religious body for his
province. He can approve it only for his own diocese.
Outside his diocese an Archbishop has no ordinary
jurisdiction.
Secondly, Episcopal approbation results in, at most, merely
human certainty. It is, therefore, fallible. The approba
tion of the Sovereign Pontiff is of divine authority, through
special assistance of the Holy Ghost, lest he should err in
so grave a matter. The Pontiff's approbation has therefore
infallible certainty. This special privilege of the Pontiff
cannot be delegated, any more than the Pontiff can delegate
Constitution of the Religioiis State. 45
his power of canonizing saints, or of defining Catholic
doctrine.
Thirdly, this power of approbation of religious bodies
exists in the Sovereign Pontiff immediately of divine right.
It does not so exist in the Bishops. Even if it did, it
would exist in them with dependence on the Pontiff.
Fourthly, this power of approbation of religious orders,
which exists in the Pontiff, is independent of any man or
men. It depends on no one save on Christ, his only master.
It cannot therefore be either taken away, or diminished, or
limited. So far as this power may exist in the Bishops, it
can be limited, or even taken away, as was in fact done in
the Lateran Council. The Pontiff therein reserved to him
self the approbation of religious bodies.
Fifthly, the Pontiff can, in approving a religious body,
solemnize its vows. A Bishop cannot solemnize vows.
Consequently a Bishop can only approve a religious body
as constituted by simple vows.
Finally, the Pontiff alone has power absolutely to approve
a religious body. Bishops can do so only relatively, or
partially. Their approbation is limited, it is fallible, and it
is revocable.
- Besides the Regular Orders there exist at the present day Religious
Congregations, both of men- and women, which have grown up with
the greatest profit not only to the whole of Christendom, but to the
civil commonwealth. Of these Congregations some are diocesan,
while some are not. Those Congregations are diocesan, which have
one or more houses in one diocese, and which have the intention of
existence within the limits of that diocese. Those Congregations are
not diocesan which — although they are not exempt — are under the
obedience of one general superior or superioress, and are spread
abroad throughout several dioceses. The men or women who com
pose such Congregations make simple vows of poverty, chastity and
obedience, either in perpetuity or for a time. By their vow of poverty
46 Elements of Religious Life.
they are not disabled with regard to the retaining of the radical
ownership of their property, or witli regard to acquiring and disposing
of goods, although the administration and use of them, and the
demanding of the fruits of them, is entirely forbidden. The utmost
freedom is granted to religious under simple vows to grant the adminis
tration and usufruct of their goods to, or in favour of, their parents,
if it shall so please them, or, if they prefer it, to their own Order. The
reason is because the community or Institute does not through simple
profession acquire any right to the goods of its subjects. Since
religious under simple vows can acquire goods by inheritance, they
ought to commit the administration, usufruct and use of them to some
person of their choice, if they have not committed it to their own
Congregation. Religious sisters require the written leave of the Bishop
before they can dispose of the ownership of their goods, and this to
secure prudence in so doing ; but any covenants made by way of
contract between a professed Sister and her Congregation, are not left
to the judgment of their ecclesiastical superior.
With regard to the approbation of those Congregations, the petition
for approbation of the Institute usually coincides with the petition for
confirmation of the Constitutions. The distinction between Rules and
Constitutions is not admitted in the case of those new Institutes.
Under the name of Rules, there come only the Rules of the ancient
Orders which were in old times approved by the Apostolic See.
\Vith regard to merely diocesan Institutes, the Apostolic See is not
wont to approve either them or their Constitutions, but leaves the
approbation of them to the Bishop. With regard to Institutes which
intend to settle in other dioceses, they must have recourse for appro
bation to Propaganda, in the case of missionary countries, and, in the
case of other countries, to the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars.
In order to obtain approbation there must be procured, in the first
place, letters from the Bishop in whose diocese the Institute, or its
principal house is situated ; and, if the Institute is to be spread abroad
in other dioceses, letters must be procured from the several Ordinaries.
In these letters there ought to be set forth (i) when and by whom the
Institute was founded, whether it has obtained any Decree of prai-c
from the Apostolic See, and how many houses there are. It ought also
to be set forth how many men or women have been professed, when the
Constitutions were framed, what is the progress which the new founda
tion has made, what is its present state, and what are its temporal
Constitution of tJie Kcligions State. 47
resources. There is required (2) the consent of all the religious, or
of all the nuns, given in Chapter ; (3) and proof by experience of the
usefulness of the Constitutions.
Ordinarily, before the Constitutions are approved, there is given a
Decree of praise, and this is not always of the same import. Some
times there is praised only the scope and end of the Institute, and
this is wont to be done when some defect is apprehended in the mode
of government or in the Constitutions. Sometimes both the scope and
the Institute are praised, and not seldom simply the Institute. Some
times the Institute is approved, while the Constitutions are simply
praised. Sometimes there is granted a Decree of praise and at the
same time of approbation, that is, when as the result of experience the
usefulness of the Constitutions has been recognized. If there has
hitherto been no trial of these by experience, a fitting time is fixed for
this, and very often certain modifications of the Constitutions are pro
posed. At the end of that time the Constitutions are again submitted
to examination until at length they are definitely approved. See
Zitelli, Apparatus Juris Ecclcsiastici, pp. 240-243.
With regard to jurisdiction — as necessary in order to
the existence of the religious state — there are three ways in
which jurisdiction may be conceived as required — (i) for the
institution of a religious body ; (2) for the constitution of
the members of that body in the religious state ; (3) for
the government of the religious body.
(i) For the institution of a religious body jurisdiction is
most certainly required. It is then that a religious body is
instituted when that body is approved and confirmed.
There must necessarily be in the first place the founding
and the ordering of the Institute on which approbation is
to fall. This is nevertheless only a preparation and a dis
position of the matter. For this jurisdiction is not neces
sary. There is in preparation or disposition no question
of right or law, nor any exercise of the action of a
superior.
48 Elements of Religions Life.
Approbation is, on the other hand, the as it were forma
tion of the matter which has been thus disposed to receive
a form. Approbation is, therefore, the effecting or the
creation of the religious body.
(2) Jurisdiction is also necessary for the accepting of the
vows or profession of the religious. Acceptance would not
be valid if it were not made by one who had the necessary
power.
(3) The question however principally is, as to whether in
a religious body there is required the peculiar jurisdiction
which belongs to a superior over his subjects, in order that
the members of that body may be true religious. To deter
mine this question we must first clearly understand what is
meant both \>y jurisdiction and by dominative power.
By jurisdiction is signified a spiritual power which belongs
to the Keys of the Church, and which is derived from Christ
through the Vicar of Christ.
By dominative power is signified a right which has been
acquired by a religious body, and by its superiors, to govern
the religious members of that body. This power does not
belong to the Keys. It does not descend from Christ
through any special donation made by Him to His Church.
It is a power which springs radically from the wills of those
who profess [the Rule, and who give themselves to the re
ligious body, with a promise and bond of obligation of
obedience to its superiors according to the Rule. This
power, as it is distinct from the power of the Keys, is dis
tinct from jurisdiction, properly so-called.
In a religious body it is necessary that there should
exist in its superior a power of government of his monastery,
which is in its measure dominative over the individual re
ligious, and which is distinct from power of jurisdiction,
Constitution of the Religious State. 49
and is separable from jurisdiction, properly so-called.
The religious state is a state of bondage, which is distinct
from the state of subjection in which, in virtue of ecclesias
tical jurisdiction, all the faithful are living. To this special
bondage there corresponds a peculiar dominative power^
which is distinct and separable from proper power of juris
diction.
This dominative and, so to speak, domestic or economic
power, which exists in the Abbot, in the Prior, or in any-
other proper and immediate Superior, is, apart from juris
diction, sufficient to constitute a true religious state. This
is evident from the case of Nuns. An Abbess does not
possess jurisdiction. The Nuns are nevertheless subjected
to her, as to a mother, and they are bound to obey her in
accordance with the Rule which they have professed. Her
power and their subjection suffice to constitute the com
munities of religious women to which they belong true
religious bodies.
In virtue of this paternal, or maternal, power, which is
derived from voluntary compact — along with lawfully accep
ted delivery of themselves by the religious, which has been
confirmed by the vow of obedience — a religious superior
possesses, apart from proper jurisdiction, power to prescribe
to his subjects, to coerce them, and to punish them, with a
moderate and duly regulated punishment, or such a punish
ment as should suffice in order to the ordinary government
of a well-regulated family.
In order, however, to the perfect government of a religious
body, proper power of jurisdiction is required, and jurisdic
tion must exist in some superior of that body. This juris
diction must be at least extrinsic, and such as is brought to
D
5O Elements of Religious Life.
bear upon the rest of the faithful. The spiritual jurisdiction
which is necessary for the government of the Universal
Church is necessary for the government of all ecclesias
tical states which that Church comprehends. A special
subjection to the spiritual jurisdiction of the Church follows
as a natural consequence of the institution of any religious
body. Although communities of Nuns do not have among
themselves any superior who possesses jurisdiction, those
nuns have nevertheless, and always, a superior who has proper
jurisdiction over the whole body of them including the
abbess. This superior is the Bishop, in the case of com
munities which are subject to him. In the case of com
munities which are exempt from his jurisdiction, it is the
provincial or other superior of the same order of men, of
which the community of nuns is a member.
In the early ages, before the exemption of religious>
monasteries of monks were subject to the Bishop, who
possessed and exercised jurisdiction over them. From the
date of their exemption, they are subject to the Sovereign
Pontiff, or to superiors of their own Order, to whom the
Pontiff has communicated his jurisdiction. The religious
state has, therefore, never existed apart from jurisdiction.
As in a civil commonwealth no family, or private society,
or other civil state can exist without subjection to a civil
ruler who has proper jurisdiction over it, so is it also in
that spiritual commonwealth which is the Universal Church.
Merely private or paternal power would not suffice
in order to the good government of a religious community,
or of its members. It is sometimes necessary to use
censures to coerce men, as well as other punishments
which are graver than are those which can be inflicted by
paternal power alone.
Subjection of religious to jurisdiction, properly so-called.
Constitution of the Religious State. 5 1
is not a condition which is necessary in order to constitute
the religious state. It is a property which is a consequence
of that state. It follows in the same way as from the
ordination of a cleric there follows the subjection of that
cleric to a superior who possesses spiritual jurisdiction.
This subjection, or the jurisdiction which is the correlative
of it, is not a condition which is necessary in order to
the clericate. It is a property which is consequent upon
the clericate.
The two powers, both jurisdiction and the dominative or
paternal power which springs from religious profession, may
exist united in the same person. A Bishop, for instance,
has power to prescribe in virtue of obedience to Nuns who
are not exempt from his jurisdiction, and who are there
fore subject to him, as he is himself the Superior of their
convent. He can, at the same time, and as he is their
Bishop, add to his precept a censure.
10.
The state of perfection, simply and absolutely, and as
it includes all that is of the substantial perfection of that
state, is proper to the law of grace. Before the time of
the law of grace the state of perfection was only fore
shadowed, or in part inaugurated. It was not perfected.
With regard to three points we have certainty — (i) that the
religious state is not of purely human institution, but that,
on the contrary, it derives its origin from divine law; (2)
that the religious state has been preserved by a continuous
and uninterrupted tradition in the Church of Christ ; and
(3) that in its essence the religious state has always been
the same.
Besides instituting the religious state, so far as regards
52 Elements of Religions Life.
the substance of that state, Jesus Christ instituted also one
particular religious body. This he did by congregating
certain men, and by delivering to them a proper and
particular mode of religious life. He called His Apostles
to embrace a true and proper religious state. They truly
and properly made the three vows of poverty, of chastity,
and of obedience, and that as belonging to the state of
perfection. Since Christ called His Apostles in order
that by means of them He might sow the seeds of all
virtue and perfection throughout the world, it cannot be
doubted that He constituted them in that state in which
they might be to all men examples of perfection.
A special Rule was not necessary in the case of the
Apostles. So long as Christ Himself was with them, He
was to them their living Rule. After He was gone they
could not have been hampered with the restrictions of a
special ceremonial Rule, since they were to be dispersed
throughout the whole world. Of such a Rule they did not
stand in need. They were themselves most perfect. They
were also assisted and directed by the Holy Ghost. They
were acting moreover under the living influence of Peter.
The religious state has always continued in the Church
from the time of its institution by Jesus Christ. This is
the common doctrine of the Fathers. Pius IV., in a Bull
in favour of the Clerks Regular of St. Augustine, speaks
of regular clerks as instituted by the Apostles. This order
was restored and renewed, but was not begun by St.
Augustine. St. Anthony did not institute, but found
many monasteries already in existence. These he brought
to perfection. The monasticism of the fourth century is
so notorious that even heretics do not deny the existence
of it.
Constitution of the Religious State. 53
By means of simple vows a man may at the present day be con
stituted a true religious, and an Institute in which simple vows alone
are made, cannot be denied to have the dignity of a religious state.
By authority, however, of the Apostolic See, there is this difference,
that that Institute alone is to be reckoned and called absolutely an
Order — a true Order — a Religious Order — a Regular Order — or an
Order to which the privileges of a Regular Order belong — in which
solemn vows are made, if not. by all, at least by some of the members of
the Order — as in the case of the Society of Jesus, in which solemn
vows are made by the Professed Fathers only, and not by either the
Approved Scholastics, or the Formed Coadjutors, although both are in
virtue of their simple vows true religious. To other Institutes there is
left the name of Institute — Society — Pious and religious, but secular
Congregation— subject to the authority of the Bishop, like the rest of
the secular clergy. If, however, as is frequently the case, the Roman
See, or the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars has
approved such Institutes and their Rules, and their manner of life,
they are, so far as these are concerned, exempt from the jurisdiction of
the Bishop. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, vol. iv. p. 17.
CHAPTER III.
Entrance into Religion.
IT is not forbidden by any law to enter into religion at
any age. Age may be divided into three periods — (i)
that of adults after puberty ; (2) that of children before
the years of puberty, who have arrived at such use of
reason as would be sufficient for the commission of mortal
sin, and consequently sufficient for the making of a vow ;
(3) that of infancy, or the age before use of reason.
Looking merely to natural law, it is lawful at any age
freely to offer oneself to the perpetual service of God.
There is no natural principle by which should be fixed
any certain age for such an act. After a person has
attained to freedom of will, there is no more reason for
the selection of one age than there is for the selection of
another age. There is so far no distinction between the
ages before and after puberty, since all do not come at the
same time to the same perfection in discretion and use of
reason. That extent of age alone is required which is
sufficient for perfect deliberation. Deliberation is neces
sary in order that the act should be a human act, or such
an act as becomes a human being. Looking to divine
positive law, we do not find any law laid down by Christ
to forbid this most excellent act before any age. We do
not find any trace of prohibition in the Sacred Scriptures,
in the decrees of Pontiffs or Councils, or in the tradition
of the Fathers.
Looking to the words and example of Christ Himself,
Entrance into Religion. 55
we find that the very opposite of any such prohibition is
in accordance with His intention.
The Council of Trent ordains that no one should be
admitted to profession before the age of sixteen years
complete. The Council does not forbid entrance before
the age of fifteen. One may enter at any earlier age so
long as profession is not made until the age of sixteen.
Clement III. ordained that lay brothers should not be admitted to
the noviceship before the age of twenty. In the case of Nuns the
Council of Trent forbids the entrance of girls before the age of twelve
years complete, that is, before puberty. A Decree of the Sacred Con
gregation of Bishops and Regulars, May 23, 1659, declares that girls
are not to receive the religious habit before completion of their fifteenth
year. For those under that age an Apostolic Indult may be applied
for. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, vol. iv. p. 28.
By a decree of Pius IX., promulgated by Encyclical Letters to
the Superiors of Religious Orders on March 19, 1857, it was ordained
that all religious of those Orders in which solemn vows are taken,
should for the future take simple vows only at the end of their
noviceship, and that they should not take solemn vows until after the
lapse of at least three years, when they might be admitted to solemn
vows, if then found worthy by their superiors. For just causes their
solemn profession might be even longer delayed, although not beyond
the age of twenty-five years complete. These simple vows are per
petual on the part of him who makes them, and dispensation of them
is reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff. They are dissolved, however,
by dismissal from the Order. The religious under simple vows are
sharers in all the graces and privileges which the solemnly professed
of the same Order enjoy. That which Gregory XIII. in his Bull
Ascendente Domino defined with regard to the scholastics of the Society
of Jesus, namely, that they are true religious, although they have taken
only simple vows, applies also to those religious of other Orders who,
in accordance with this ordinance of Pius IX., remain for some years
under simple vows only, before they make solemn profession. See
Gury, Ed. Ballerini, 1869, vol. ii. pp. 74, 75.
Parents may lawfully offer their children to a religious
56 Elements of Religious Life.
Order, to be educated, and thereafter perpetually to per
severe therein, so far as the parents are concerned. The
parent has right and dominion over his child, and can
dispose of him to any use which does not involve injustice,
or other evil. Much more can a parent dispose of his
child to a use which is for God's greater service and for
the child's greater benefit.
Parental oblation of a child to a religious Order pro
duces three effects — (i) that the child can be lawfully
received and retained by the Order ; (2) that the father
can no longer exercise his power of recalling his child,
since he has renounced his right, and has, so far as he is
concerned, made a donation of his child, and that donation
has been accepted; (3) the child cannot, of his own will,
leave the order before the age of puberty, since before
that age he is ruled not by his own will, but by the will
of his father. He may, however, be expelled, since the
Order has not bound itself to retain him.
If the child consents to his parents' offering of him,
there is no difficulty. He is then not only offered by his
parent, but he offers himself. A child cannot, however,
be compelled to enter a religious Order so as to be bound
to profession therein, since to this not even an adult can
be bound without his own consent and desire.
" To educate youth was one of the objects which St. Benedict had in
view, when he founded his Order. He makes provision for this in his
Rule. The reception of a child in those days was almost as solemn as
a profession in our own. His parents carried him to church. Whilst
they wrapped his hand, which held the petition, in the sacred linen of
the altar, they promised, in the presence of God and of His Saints,
stability in his name. " Little beings of three or four or five years
old were brought in the arms of those who gave them life, to accept
at their bidding the course in which that life was to run. They were
brought into the sanctuary, spoke by the mouth of their parents, as at
Entrance into Religion. 57
the font, put out their tiny hand for the sacred corporal to be wrapped
round it, received the cowl, and took their place as monks in the
monastic community." (Benedictine Centttrits, Atlantis, 1859,
p. 19). The children's training was in keeping with the holiness of
their consecration. They were confided to the care of a large-hearted
and God-fearing man. The one object was to fill their souls with God,
to teach them the power of knowledge, and the force of love, to
educate the intellect, and to purify the heart. It was in this way, as
offered by his parents at Monte Cassino, that St. Thomas Aquinas
entered on his ecclesiastical career. — See The Life of St. Thomas of
Aquin, by Roger Bede Vaughan, O.S.B., vol. i. p. 18.
2.
Both sexes are capable of religious life. A woman is,
however, incapable of entrance into religious life in a
monastery of men. A man is equally incapable of
entrance into religious life in a monastery of women.
Hindrances to entrance into the religious state may-
arise either from the nature of the case, and apart from
any special positive law, or from positive law only. A
man who is incapable of profession is equally incapable of
entrance. He who is incapable of leading the religious
life is not capable of probation for profession of that life.
The first impediment which renders a man incapable
of entrance on the religious state is absence of the use
of reason, if it is perpetual. If it is temporary, it renders
him incapable only so long as it continues.
A second impediment is the bond of consummated
matrimony. This disables, not absolutely, but condi
tionally, that is, unless the other party renounces his or
her right, and gives leave. Entrance without such consent
would be a manifest injury, since it would be an invasion
of already existing and just rights. The leave given may,
58 Elements of Religious Life.
even after entrance, be recalled, since as yet no bond of
obligation has been contracted to God, and there has been
as yet no transference of the person's right of ownership
in himself. The person who enters can, of his or her own
will, come out before profession, and return to his or her
consort, who will be bound to receive and to admit him
or her, as the case may be, to matrimonial life. The one
who has remained in the world has also power to recall
the other, and that other will be bound to return to matri
monial life. Each of the two is understood to be, for
the year before profession, on probation, in order to
ascertain whether their perpetual separation is expedient
or not. The rights of both are therefore equal. If both
man and wife should, of mutual consent, enter the reli
gious state, and if one of them should not persevere in
that state, he or she has power to recall the other. The
probation of each of them is understood to be with depend
ence on the probation of the other.
A third impediment to entrance into a religious Order
is profession already made in another religious Order.
Reception into another Order would be directly subversive
of the donation and delivery of himself, which was made
by the religious in his first profession.
This impediment is limited, however, to the case of
entrance either into a less strict Order, or into an Order
profession in which, and consequently entrance into
which from another Order, has been invalidated by special
declaration of the Sovereign Pontiff.
A fourth impediment to entrance into the religious state
is episcopal dignity. This impediment also is not absolute
but conditional, namely, that entrance should not be made
without leave of the Sovereign Pontiff.
Besides these impediments there is no other general
Entrance into Religion. 59
impediment which invalidates entrance into the religious
state. In the case of certain Orders, however, particular
laws exist in virtue of which some other impediments
invalidate entrance. In some Orders there is the impedi
ment of descent from Jews or Pagans ; in others, illegitimate
birth, or infamy, or the irregularity which arises from
voluntary homicide, and the like.
It has to be ascertained whether the words of such
Constitutions are merely prohibitory, or whether they also
invalidate. If they invalidate, it has farther to be ascer
tained whether the invalidation falls immediately on pro
fession alone, or directly and immediately on reception
also. If invalidation falls on profession alone, the entrance
will not be absolutely null. When the impediment has
been removed by dispensation, the noviceship will be
reckoned from the date of entrance, and not from the
date of the dispensation. If, on the other hand, the in
validation falls directly and immediately on reception as
well as on profession, the entrance will be absolutely null.
The noviceship will have to be begun over again, unless
for this also a special dispensation has been obtained.
Such a dispensation the Sovereign Pontiff alone has power
to grant, since he alone has power to dispense in order to
the validity of profession without an entire year of previous
probation.
There are many impediments which, while they do not
invalidate, render entrance into religion unlawful. These
arise either from natural law, or from ecclesiastical com
mon law, or from the private laws of particular religious
Orders.
With regard to the question whether Parish priests and other clerics
can go into religion without the consent of the Bishop, we have first to
60 Elements of Religious Life.
set aside certain cases. If a cleric, on account of his education having
been paid for, or for other causes, has bound himself by bargain to
serve a diocese for a certain time, it is not lawful for him, before he
has fulfilled his bargain, on his own authority to go into religion. The
reason is evident. That bargain was a most proper one, and a bargain
which was for the advantage of the Church. The obligation to observe
a bargain is matter of precept, and that prevails over counsel. It is
proved also by the practice of the Colleges which the munificence of the
Pontiffs has established in Rome. In these — and that by Pontifical law
— promises to this effect are made and sworn to. These promises can
not be departed from without express dispensation of the Pope. These
oaths cannot be objected to on the ground that they hinder individuals
from going into religion, as into that which is more perfect. The
promises do not properly hinder entrance into religion. They only
demand delay. Further, all things have to be weighed by the standard
of their end, and the prosperity of the Church of Christ is, as a good
which is both common and divine, to be preferred to other good things.
The preservation of the Church itself, and of its efficacious energy,
demands that the several dioceses should be furnished with their own
clergy, and that a perennial supply of clergy should be certain. T< >
this the arrangement in question contributes. This is a far greater good
than is the good that this or that individual should go into religion, to
the certain damage of the diocese by which he has been nourished, in a
lack of necessary pastors and assistants. By these covenants there is
promised, not a man's service of his church in perpetuity, but only his
service for a certain time. This suffices in order that this church
should not be left destitute of necessary clergy. If perpetual service
were promised, and this became common practice, there would be
hindered without cause the freedom of individuals to dedicate them
selves to God in religion. While the convenience of existing churches
was provided for, the Church and the Apostolic See would be deprived
of labourers for the conversion of the heathen. Further, freedom to
follow God's vocation to religious life must be safeguarded. It is the
duty of Bishops to commend the evangelical counsels, and to promote
religious Institutes. The Church must always have labourers at hand,
by whom may be executed the charge of Christ, " Go, and teach all
nations."
If the Church were to suffer grievous loss by a cleric's going into
religion, the Bishop could hinder his going, and he could recall him
Entrance into Religion. 61
after he had gone, even after profession. Apart from these cases, and
therefore looking at the matter on its own merits, it is certain that
clerics who are not Bishops, and even if these clerics have cure of souls,
can without leave of their Bishop go into religion. This is not hindered
by their promise of obedience to the Bishop. That promise was made in
accordance with the canons, and the canons permit priests, who have
cure of souls, to go into religion, even against the expressed will of the
Bishop. Benedict XIV. declares not only that they are not to be
hindered in their purpose, but that they are rather to be exhorted to,
and strengthened in, theirperseverance. The reason is manifest. Since
these priests have not bound themselves to the service of their par
ticular church in perpetuity, they have right, as have others of the
faithful, to enjoyment of a benefit which Christ has prepared for all
men. Since they are living in a less perfect state, they have a right
to pass to a more perfect state, so as to place in greater security the
affair of their salvation.
Since clerics have power, even against the expressed will of the Bishop,
to go into religion, it is not in itself necessary for them to ask his leave,
and especially since there is no law which imposes this obligation.
The reverence which is due to a Bishop, nevertheless, demands that,
if it is possible, every cleric should inform his Bishop about his entrance
and ask leave. If he is a priest who has cure of souls, the Bishop
ought to be informed by him in good time, in order that he may supply
his place. Since at the present day every man who goes into religion
must bring letters-testimonial from his Ordinary, it cannot be that in
practice the leave of the Ordinary should not in some way be asked.
The faculty which is given to clerics of going into religion, avails for
entrance even into those Congregations which make only simple,
although perpetual, vows. The motive of the law is not solemnity
of vows, but the perfection of the religious state. — See Ballerini, O^tts
Thcologicum Morale, vol. iv. pp. 130-133.
3-
A son is bound not to leave his father in extreme
necessity in order to become a religious. There are three
kinds of necessity to be considered in connection with the
obligations of charity, mercy, and almsgiving. Necessity
may be either extreme, grievous, or common.
62 Elements of Religious Life.
There is extreme necessity when a man is in such peril
of death that, unless he is relieved, his death is morally cer
tain, or there is at least the greatest risk of its occurrence.
Necessity is grievous when life cannot be supported unless
in great indigence, and with great difficulty, or with great
degradation and loss of position, or by means of a drudgery
which is foreign to one's quality and condition.
Necessity is called common^ when it lias become neces
sary for a man to live sparingly, and not only without
superfluities, but without those surroundings which befit his
position, and this even if with due diligence and industry
the man need not be in want of the necessaries of life.
With regard to common necessity, there can be no ques
tion. A son is never bound by reason of common necessity
to give up or to delay his entrance into religion. Such
necessity of the parent is to be regarded as being morally
nothing in comparison with the loss which the son would
suffer by depriving himself of the state of perfection. As a
son is not in rigour bound to relieve his father in common
necessity, especially if by so doing he should himself suffer
equal temporal inconvenience, still less is he bound to
relieve his father at great spiritual cost to himself. If a
father who is in merely common necessity should expressly
command his son to relieve him, and to give up entrance
into the religious state, his son will not be bound to obey
him. A father has no power to impose on his son a pre
cept which is more rigorous than is that which nature itself
imposes. In matters, moreover, which concern the salva
tion of the soul, a son is not bound to obey a father who,
without sufficient cause, forbids an act which will be so
much for the soul's advantage of his son, and to which
the son believes himself to have been called by God.
It is to be remembered, however, that a father's necessity
Entrance into Religion. 63
is to be weighed not only as that necessity is at present,
but by the standard of that which may reasonably be
dreaded as imminent or in the near future.
In the case of extreme necessity, it is equally certain that
a son is bound not to leave his father, in order to become a
religious. Two conditions are necessary in order to found
this obligation. One condition is that the son will be able,
by remaining in the world, to relieve the extreme necessity
of his father, or that he should have a moral or probable
hope of being thus able to relieve him. No one is bound
either to the impossible, or to the doing of anything in
vain. The second condition which is required in order
that a son should be bound to remain in the world is, that
the son should himself individually be necessary to his
father in his extreme necessity. If there are other sons, or
if the father's extreme necessity can be provided for in
another way, the son who desires to do so may rightly enter
religion.
In order to justify a son, however, it is not sufficient that
others might possibly relieve his father. There must be a
well-grounded hope or a moral certainty that they will
actually relieve him. It is not to the point that the other
sons may sin by refusing to relieve their father. The fact
remains that the father is actually living in extreme necessity.
This necessity a son is bound to see to, and that, if need be,
till his father's death. The father's necessity is the root of
the son's obligation. The duration of that necessity is
consequently the root also of the duration of the son's
obligation.
We are bound to relieve our neighbours who are in
extreme necessity, so long as we ourselves are in possession
of goods, and those goods are not necessary for ourselves
64 Elements of Religious Life.
in order to the preservation of our lives. We are, neverthe
less, not bound, as a rule, to acquire goods for this
purpose, nor are we bound by actual labour or toil to
succour the extreme necessity of every neighbour. With
regard to parents, however, there exists a special and a
singular obligation, which arises from a special and singular
title. We are bound to relieve our parents in their extreme
necessity, not only by means of those goods which we pre
sently possess, but also by acquiring goods for this purpose,
even if this should be difficult, and should entail con
siderable toil, and that for some length of time. This
obligation extends also to necessary bodily service, and to
dedicating, if need be, our exertions throughout our lives
to the aid of our indigent parents.
This filial debt is due from a special title. From our
parents it is that we derive whatsoever we are, as from the
sources or causes of our human being. This does not apply
in the case of other blood relations.
In the case of our neighbours, the relief of them in their
extreme necessity is payment of a general debt of mercy. In
the case of our parents it is in addition the payment of a
special debt of piety. This debt is of much more rigorous
obligation. The obligation is greater than is an ordinary-
obligation of justice. Although piety is not properlyjustice,
piety is nevertheless more perfect in the rigour of its obliga
tion, and in the demands of the debt which it begets.
A son is not entitled to leave his father even in grievous
necessity, when there is no other person to relieve him, and
no other way in which he may be relieved, and when that
son himself could do so by remaining in the world.
There is a greater obligation of a father to his son than
there is of a son to his father. A son, as St. Thomas
Entrance ijito Religion. 65
teaches, is not bound per se to support his father, but is
bound only accidentally, and by reason of his father's
extreme or grievous necessity. A father is bound, not
accidentally butflerse, and in virtue of his paternal office,
to support and educate his son. He is the principle and
cause or author of his son's existence. Hence it is not
only when a son is in necessity that his father cannot enter
religion. He is bound absolutely not to abandon his
charge of his son, unless he has made sufficient provision
for him in all things necessary, and has secured by means
of the intervention of other persons his education and
proper supervision. This is a natural obligation which
springs from a natural precept. It cannot, therefore, be
set aside for any work or state which is not of precept.
This is to be understood, however, as referring only to the
time during which a son is still under. the charge of his
father, and in actual subjection to him, and not to the time
after the son's emancipation from paternal control. The
father is then supposed to have sufficiently reared and
educated his son, and to have fulfilled and to have been
divested of his office as a father. His natural obligation
is ended. It was not perpetual. It lasted only during the
continuance of the state of his son's natural need of it.
In the case, however, of even an emancipated son who
is in necessity, his father is bound with the same obligation
as that which a son lies under by reason of his father's
necessity. The bond between them is reciprocal. So also
are the obligations which it induces.
It is certain that a brother is not bound to support and
educate his brother, and this not even if that brother is his
younger brother. He is not the author of his brother's being.
There exists towards brothers no obligation of justice but
•only an obligation of charity, although the obligation of
E
66 Elements of Religious Life.
charity is greater as regards brothers than it is as regards
strangers, by reason of the greater connection between
them.
Even a son who is already professed is bound to leave his monastery
to succour his father who has fallen into extreme necessity. By
religious profession there is not extinguished the natural obligation of
a son towards his parents. His return for a time to the world to
relieve them is not at variance with his religious profession, the
obligation of which is suspended by the urgency of a law of nature.
A precept of natural and divine law prevails in extreme necessity over
every vow and bond, and vows ought not to be such as should hinder
acts of justice. There is here no question of dispensation from his
vows, since that is not necessary to the end in view. See Ballerini,
Opus Theologicum Morale^ vol. iv. page 118.
4-
No man is entitled to enter into religion with injury to
a third party, or to transgress a natural precept in order to
do a work of counsel. No man, therefore, can enter into
religion who is burdened with debts, which it is possible for
him to pay by remaining in the world. Debts are of two
kinds. Some debts are uncertain, and do not involve
restitution to any ascertained person. Other debts are
certain, and payment of them is due to some determinate
individual.
Uncertain debts do not hinder a man's entrance into
religion. If a man delivers his goods along with himself
to a religious order, or if he expends them upon the poor,
or devotes them to other pious uses, he satisfies his obliga
tion. If a debt is certain, that is to say, if the debt is due
to a known determinate individual or individuals, and the
debtor is absolutely unable to pay it, either now or in the
future, he is free at once to enter into religion. By his
entrance he does no injury to his creditors. Their action
Entrance into Religion. 67
against him would be in vain. It is rendered useless by
reason of his indigence. If a man, however, although he
has no present means of paying his debts, has hope of
being able by and by to pay them, he is bound to wait for
some time and to pay his debts before he enters into
religion. With regard to the length of time, no general rule
can be laid down. The matter must be determined in in
dividual cases, according to the circumstances of them, and
in accordance with that which would be the judgment of
prudent men. A hope of being able to pay his debts
must, however, if it is to bind a man not to enter into
religion, amount to a moral certainty. A merely dubious
hope would not induce the obligation of so great a burden
as would be that of waiting for a great length of time.
A man would not be bound to beg or to do drudgery
which was unbecoming to him in his position in life,
in order to pay his debts. When reduced to this as
the only means, he will be reckoned as simply unable to
pay.
A Constitution of Sixtus V. declares criminals or perso is
who are justly suspected of grievous crimes to be per
petually incapable of the religious state. He decrees that
if they have been rashly admitted thereinto, both their
entrance and their profession are null and void. The
crimes to which he refers are such as homicide, theft,
robbery, and similarly grievous crimes. Hidden crimes are
not comprehended by this Constitution, Those who have
committed them are not included as criminals, so far
as the effect of it is concerned. A later Constitution of
Clement VIII. has modified that of Sixtus V., but to this
extent only that the profession of such persons, whether
criminals or debtors to large amounts, should stand. The
earlier Constitution remains in vigour so far as regards the
68 Elements of Religions Life.
unlawfulness of their reception, and the punishment of
those who receive them.
There are three effects of crime which may in some way
hinder entrance into religion. First, there is the obligation
in conscience — and that of commutative justice — to restore
in the case of loss through crime, and to make satisfaction
for injuries. A second effect of crime is infamy. This
does not, however, arise from hidden crimes. A third effect
of crime is to leave the delinquent liable to punishment by
the public authorities.
By a Decree of Pius IX. (January 25, 1848) it is ordained that no
one should be admitted to the religious habit without letters-
testimonial both from the Ordinary of the postulant's birthplace, and
from the Ordinary of the place where he has lived for more than a year
since he was fifteen years of age. This applies even to Congregations
in which only simple vows are made, but not to Nuns, of whom there is
no mention. There is not required by this decree the Bishop's leave,
or consent, or approbation, but only his letters-testimonial. However
much the Bishop may oppose the reception of the postulant, the
religious Superior has power to admit him. The letters-testimonial,
moreover, are required in order to the lawfulness, but not to the
validity of admission. No one can therefore pretend nullity of pro
fession on the ground that he was admitted without such letters-
testimonial. (See Bouix, DC Jure Regularium, torn. i. pp. 552, 575.
2nded.) This new legislation does not affect the Society of Jesus,
•which was exempted from it by the same Pontiff, on the petition of the
Father General (Roothan), Jan. 28, 1850. The examination of postu
lants, however, by the Society, which was formerly a matter of Rule, is
now of true and strict law, the existence of this examination having
been a condition or ground of the Pontiffs exemption.
5-
He who enters the religious state must, of the nature of
the case, do so with full deliberation and sufficient know
ledge. His knowledge must be not merely general and
Entrance into Religion. 69
speculative, but particular and practical, and such as is
arrived at by prudent judgment. It is not sufficient that the
religious state should be judged by him to be in itself
the best of states. With regard to this, deliberation is not
necessary. It is evident from the end of that state. The
religious state must be considered with special relation to
this particular person, taking into account his powers and
capabilities, and other both intrinsic and extrinsic con
ditions. It is not true that everything which is best in
itself is best for every individual.
Three things have principally to be kept in view. In
the first place, counsel should be sought of good men,
who are free from all human affection, and who are of sound
judgment with regard to what constitutes and concerns
holy and religious life, and, if possible, of men who have
themselves had experience of religious life.
Secondly, the consultation should be prudent and
mature, but not too long protracted. This is not neces
sary. It is likely rather to hinder divine vocation, and it
opens the way to many perils.
Thirdly, there should be taken into account not merely
the person's own unaided powers, but along with these the
divine assistance.
Desire for the religious state is itself, as a rule, from the
Holy Ghost, and this desire is to be entertained as coming
from Him. The Holy Ghost may, however, cause the
desire of a thing the accomplishment of which He does
not will. He sometimes instils the desire, as a means
of merit, even if the desire is never to be fulfilled, and
even if it is not expedient that it should be fulfilled.
Hence even if it is morally clear to a religious Superio
;o Elements of Religious Life.
that a particular person has been moved by the Holy
Ghost to ask for the religious habit, he will nevertheless
rightly refuse him, if it is not expedient for the Order that he
should be received. In like manner, even if a man may
himself morally believe that he is moved by the Holy
Ghost to ask for the religious habit, he may nevertheless
hesitate and take counsel. The desire is given for this end
chiefly that a man should deliberate, take counsel, and test
his motives.
Sometimes there is such an affection towards the reli
gious state, and such a desire of entrance into it, that this
state is absolutely, or so far as the person in question is con
cerned, desired — if it should prove to be expedient. This is
what is strictly and properly called vocation. Sometimes,
however, a man does not feel in himself this affection and
desire, and nevertheless he has certain cogitations and
internal movements of his soul, either with regard to the
perils of the world — or with regard to the spiritual advan
tages of the religious state — or with regard to his choice
of a state of life in accordance with whatsoever may be
judged to be best for him individually. In this case,
although there may not be that which is commonly under
stood as vocation by the Holy Ghost, there may neverthe
less in reality be, on the part of the Holy Ghost, some
beginning of vocation. This beginning suffices as a reason
for taking counsel with regard to entrance, and this may
result in an efficacious election made with mature judg
ment. An extraordinary vocation of the Holy Ghost,
such as should beget a desire which would of itself be
efficacious without its being preceded by counsel and
deliberation, is not always to be looked for.
In order rightly to enter into the religious state there
Entrance into Religion. 71
must be an intention which is not only not bad, but good
with a goodness which is in proportion with the end of
entrance. To enter from weariness of misfortunes, or in
order merely to avoid want, or loss of position, would not
be in accordance or in proportion with the end of the
religious state.
An occasion^ however, must be carefully distinguished
from an intention. The two are distinguished from each
other as is an occasion from a cause. A desire to enter
the religious state is not seldom occasioned by some tempo
ral motive or event, and nevertheless the end of entrance
comes afterwards to be not this, but greater perfection
in the divine service. It often happens that " vexation
gives understanding," and that temporal affliction excites
a man to think of eternal things and to think little of
temporal things. In this way he, little by little, arrives at
a determination to secure eternal things, and for the sake
of them to leave all temporal things.
Deliberation, therefore, with regard to the religious state
which has been occasioned by temporal annoyances, is not
lightly to be disregarded. It is the more carefully to be
transacted. It is rather a common way in which God
excites men to follow after better things.
If, however, escape from temporal annoyances should
remain in reality the one and only motive for leaving the
world, it will not suffice as a reason for entrance into
religion. There would in that case be no prompt will to
aim at the perfection which is the proper end of the
religious state, no alacrity to bear its burdens, and no con
fidence in looking for and begging the necessary succours
of divine grace. The man would either not persevere, or
he would not make progress. Religious life would be to
him not a sweet yoke, but a grievous burden.
72 Elements of Religious Life.
The counsels of perfection have been set before all men indis
criminately by Christ. St. Thomas therefore affirms, speaking gene
rally, that those who induce others towards religion not only do
not sin, but merit great reward. He says that those alone sin who
induce others in an undue way, that is to say, with violence, or
simoniacally, or by means of lies. He denies that there is need for
consultation, in order that a man should go into religion. It is in
a matter which is doubtful that counsel is required. It is certain that
entrance into religion is something better than that which is merely
good. He who doubts this derogates from Christ, Who gave this counsel.
It may certainly happen that a particular person should not be fit for the
religious state, and is therefore not called by God thereto. For this
very reason it is, says St. Thomas, that there is reserved a period of
probation, during which novices have trial by actual experience of the
difficulties of religious life.
Mere entrance into religion cannot be by itself a sin, and if at the
present day proofs of vocation are wont to be sought before entrance,
this is for an extrinsic reason. It is because it would be unbecoming,
and would savour of lightness of character, that a man on com
pletion of his noviceship should return to the world, while it would
not be for the advantage of a religious Order to have to house and feed
an unfit novice at its own expense. Further, there might rightly be
fear of a novice, who had got through his noviceship somehow, not
daring to leave, even if he did not feel himself to be fit for the life,
and so making his profession.
A man would certainly sin who, having the intention not to be pro
fessed, should nevertheless enter the noviceship. He would be doing
an injury to the Order, deceiving it, and spending a whole year at its
expense. If a man does not feel that he has a vocation, but neverthe
less is serious in making his religious profession, and has a true will
to satisfy his religious obligations, what is there that is lacking to his
vocation, if his profession is of only the religions state without the
clericate, as bound up therewith ? Christ's counsel of religion is set
before all men, and, so long as a man has the will to fulfil the obliga
tions of his state, in what way could he be sinning ?
It is not all who are called to the clericate, and so, if his religious
state is also clerical, a man would be acting rashly who should embrace it
without God's vocation to the clericate. Since, however, the religious
state supplies very many and most abundant spiritual aids, the man,
Entrance info Religion. 73
if his will is firm to live religiously, as he ought, will not be exposing
himself to grievous peril of losing his soul. If, on the other hand, a
man, who does not feel himself to be called, makes religious profession
without a will to lead a true religious life, he sins in the very act of
his profession. With it he mingles deception, and he is establishing
himself in a state in which he will probably make shipwreck of his
eternal salvation.
It is certain that the two cases are not on the same level — that of the
man who, without being called, goes into religion — and that of the man
who, being called into religion, remains in the world. The latter deprives
himself of very many spiritual aids and means, wherewith the former,
on the other hand, abounds. It is not to be supposed that all, or that
the greater number of bad religious had never been called. It is one
thing to be called, and it is another to follow the calling, and con
stantly to persevere therein by faithful co-operation with the direction
of the divine grace.
The common and sufficient signs of true vocation to religious life are
two in number. These are found when a man is fitted for the state,
being endowed with those qualities which that state demands, and
when at the same time, keeping steadfastly in view the end for which
he was created, he in serious deliberation constantly finds that the
religious state commends itself to him, and he forms a judgment that,
with the aid of God, he will easily in that state attain his end. It is
in this way that God is wont to call men to the ecclesiastical or to the
religious state, by inspiring both inclination and trustful confidence,
there being always supposed any special fitness which may be required.
A difference has been indicated between vocation to the religious
state, simply as such, and vocation to the priesthood. Vocation there
fore to a religious Order, which combines clerical with religious life,
must be considered in the light of the rules which apply to both voca
tions, as they exist in separation. Some internal disposition of fitness
is demanded, and the existence of it is presupposed by the Church in
those who are raised by her Bishops to the ecclesiastical dignity of
clerical orders. The principal dispositions are holiness of life and
sufficient knowledge. Between those two there is this difference.
Knowledge can be ascertained by trial and demonstration, and it can
easily be preserved and increased. It is with difficulty that there can
be any real proof of holiness of life, which is an internal matter and,
74 Elements of Religious Life.
unless through continual exercise it is deeply rooted, it will most easily
be lost amid the occasions of the world.
Since the Church is wont to promote those only who offer themselves
spontaneously, and since the clerical state demands that those only
should be promoted to it who are fitted for it, it is of the utmost im
portance that a man who offers himself should know that he is fur
nished with due dispositions. As regards knowledge, he can leave the
question to the Bishop, and rest satisfied with his decision, since he has
full power of examination, and it belongs to him to form a judgment
with regard to sufficiency of knowledge. With regard to holiness of
life, the Church takes external holiness as a sign of internal holiness,
and presumes therefrom. This presumption, however, must yield to
the truth, that is, to the cogency of facts. He, therefore, who is con
scious that he has not the due moral dispositions, cannot acquiesce in the
judgment of the Church in admitting him, since she would certainly
reject him, if she knew him as he is.
Internal dispositions of holiness do not in themselves constitute a
divine internal vocation. A man may be most holy, and yet at the
same time not called to the clericate. Vocation, or calling by God,
so far as God is concerned, is a counsel of the Divine providence
which ordains individual creatures towards their several ends, and
chooses a particular man to a certain special state, and provides for him
the aids which belong thereto. If a man is to remain in the common
state, it is sufficient that he should have no vocation to ^peculiar state.
Observance of the precepts is prescribed to all men, and the state of a
layman is permitted to all men, unless God should call any man to a
higher life.
Vocation is a manifestation of this counsel through internal inspira
tion, more or less efficacious. As a general rule this counsel is wont
to manifest itself when a man, keeping carefully in view his last end,
feels himself, not once and again but frequently, affected towards the
clerical state and its functions, and finds consolation therein, and on
continued consideration thinks that in that state he will easily attain to
his salvation. Every one is conscious of a vocation which is really
there, even if, perchance, he does not yet know that it is that which
is called a divine vocation. God may speak internally to hearts which
are not yet cleansed. As it is not that all the holy are called to the
priesthood, so not seldom it is that those are called who by their own
wickedness render themselves unworthy of their calling. Although
Entrance into Religion. 75
they cannot follow their vocation while they remain unworthy, they
are, nevertheless, bound to make themselves worthy, so that they may
follow their vocation.
Not to follow a divine vocation is not at least a grievous sin, look
ing to the matter in itself, and apart from the effects of it. Voca
tion is not a precept, but a persuasion and affection, and the neces
sary means of salvation are always at hand in every state of life, and
for all men, so long as they are yet alive. To enter, on the other hand,
with a positive unworthiness, on a state which demands worthiness, is
an inordinateness which is anything but small, and is in itself a grievous
sin. Many and various cases may occur, and with regard to them our
ideas ought to be clear. A man may offer himself for the ecclesiastical
state without any vocation, and this man may be either good or bad.
A man, who has been really called, may not offer himself, and this
man again may be either good or bad. If a man who has not been
called comes, and he is bad and comes for a bad end, he certainly ex
poses himself to some peril of his own salvation, and of being an
occasion of the damnation of other men. He does so not merely by
his coming unworthily, but because he cannot count upon the aids of
the state on which he enters, and it is not likely that he will easily
amend his life, but will naturally go from bad to worse.
If a man, on the other hand, enters on the clerical state who is a
a man of good life, but nevertheless without any vocation — and this
may happen if from fear of some fellow man, or from any similar
motive, he has been, as it were, compelled to receive orders — he will not
be in grievous peril either of losing his own soul or of damaging other
souls. If he goes on living a good life, and this in his case ought not
to be hard, he will be a priest who is more or less useful in many ways,
and one who through his daily Mass will not fail to receive all
necessary and befitting graces.
With regard to the man who has really been called to the ecclesiastical
state, and who not only refuses to enter that state, but is at the same
time a bad man, he will not, so long as he has not amended his life, be
bound to offer himself to the ecclesiastical state. He will be bound
only to amend his life. If, however, that man cannot with any solid
reason hope to be able to lead a holy life in celibacy, even after he has
repented of his past life, and even after he has repented of not having
followed his vocation which, as we have seen, was not of precept, we
can only say that, although, absolutely speaking, he was at one time
7 6 Elements of Religions Life.
really called, he is now no longer called. — See Ballerini, Opus Theo-
logicum Morale, pp. 133, 173.
Not only must a man's intention be good, but his will
to enter the religious state must be spontaneous and
voluntary. Hence a man does not enter rightly who enters
from fear or merely from filial reverence for his parents.
Before the Holy Ghost has begun to call a man to the
religious state, it is rarely expedient to directly induce him
to embrace that state. It is well, however, to excite and
lead him towards fear of God and purity of conscience
and avoidance of every peril of sin, and at the same time
to set before him the advantages and excellence of the
religious state.
The Council of Trent excommunicates both those who
by force or fear compel women to enter religion, and
those also who hinder them without just cause.
Paternal power cannot take away the right which sons and daugh
ters have to make their own choice of a state of life and, if they will,
to follow Christ's counsels. The duty, however, which filial piety-
demands, ought not to be disregarded, and the leave of parents ought
to he asked. If it is straightway refused, their children ought not at
once to take their departure, but should wait for some little time till
the parents have realised their obligation. If they can easily obtain
the consent of their parents, they ought not to go away without the
parental benediction. If, however, there should be danger of the
parents unjustly hindering the fulfilment of their children's vocation,
they may and ought to go without their parents' knowledge. To
avoid scandals and useless contentions, regard is also to be had to the
laws of the country which define the authority of fathers over their
children. Parents have right to make some trial of the vocation of
their children, before they enter the noviceship, lest they should be
imprudently exposing themselves to rejection, with annoyance to their
family, and the useless spending of a year. It is not, however, lawful
for parents to insist, by way of trial, that their children should first
Entrance into Religion. 77
taste the pleasures of the world. If by these they should happen to
be affected, the parents would not have reason to conclude that there
had not been a true vocation. There may be a true vocation which is
wrongfully abandoned. See Ballerini, Opus Thcologicum Morale^ vol.
iv. page 121.
By common custom of the Church, something is received
by monasteries of Nuns for the fitting support of the reli
gious. This is called the Nun's dowry, and with regard
to it there may be a bargain. In this there is no simony.
The money is taken not as the price of her profession, but
only as the means of her support.
The Council of Trent, in order to provide for the liberty
of the novice, forbids, under pain of anathema, parents,
relations, or guardians under any pretext to give to the
monastery, except for the novice's food and clothing during
the noviceship, any of the novice's goods before profes
sion, lest the novice should be hindered from going away
through the monastery's being in possession of the whole
or great part of his worldly substance.
6.
A man cannot enter a religious order unless he is
received by that order. Entrance and reception are corre
latives. They are counterparts in a human contract, which
cannot be perfected except by mutual consent of the parties
to that contract.
Two things are necessary in order to the act of recep
tion, namely — power to receive subjects — and due exercise
of that power.
Power to receive subjects is necessary, not only in order
to the lawfulness, but in order also to the validity of their
reception into the religious state. Without power of acting,
nothing can be transacted. Without power of contracting,
no contract can be valid.
7 8 Elements of Religious Life.
Power to receive candidates into the religious state exists
primarily and principally in the Sovereign Pontiff. His
Holiness, however, is not in the habit of directly or imme
diately exercising this power. The power exists imme
diately and proximately in every religious body which has
been approved by the Apostolic See, and it so exists in
such bodies alone. It is conferred by means of Apostolic
approbation. It is intrinsically included therein. If a
religious body had not power to receive members, it could
not continue to exist. This power, which belongs to the
religious body, is exercised by the head of that body, or
by that superior who is designated by the Rule and Con
stitutions, or custom of the Order, or by the Privileges
which have been granted to it by the Apostolic See.
The form and mode of reception is determined, as
regards both validity and lawfulness, in accordance with
the Constitutions and Institutes of the various Orders.
Supposing a concurrence of all things which are neces
sary, both on the part of the candidate and on the part of
the Order, a superior who has power to receive subjects is
bound by his office, and of charity, to receive a postulant
into the Order, unless there should exist some reasonable
cause to excuse him. The superior is bound as regards his
own Order, which is thereby increased in its numbers, and
which thereby so far fulfils its end. He is bound also as
regards his neighbour. He would otherwise be without
cause depriving his neighbour of a great benefit. This
benefit, which is supplied not from his own goods but from
the common goods of Christ and of Christ's Church, the
superior is bound as a faithful dispenser to bestow upon
the postulant.
This obligation might, however, for many causes not
Entrance into Religion. 79
exist. The Order might, for instance, not possess a suffi
ciency of temporal goods, and the support of a new religious
would be a grievous burden. In case of doubt with regard
to the expediency of admission, the superior is free not to
admit the postulant. If the superior is in good faith, and
uses fair and ordinary diligence, without personal dislike
or other inordinate affection, he is safe in either way in
making his decision.
The first and principal effect of entrance into the reli
gious state is that from the date of entrance is computed
the term of the novice's probation, which is requisite for
profession. In lawfulness of entrance, therefore, is founded
validity of profession.
A second effect of entrance into religion is that the
novice, so long as he retains the habit, cannot lawfully
contract matrimony. If he should contract it, however,
the contract will be valid. Entrance into religion does
not bind the novice to perseverance and profession.
A third effect of entrance into religion may be freedom
from every previous vow or promise. Previous vows are
not properly abolished. During the noviceship they are
suspended. They may afterwards bind, if the religious
habit should be abandoned. The suspension is made by
way of commutation into that which is of itself a better
thing than is a good thing which is merely good.
A fourth effect of entrance into religion is to annul the
obligation of espousals, so far as concerns the other
party who remains in the world. He or she will not be
bound to wait, but may at once contract espousals with
another. If, however, the party in the world has waited,
and desires fulfilment of the espousals, the other party,.
8o Elements of Religious Life.
if he or she has not persevered in religious life, will be
bound by his or her contract.
A fifth effect of entrance into religion is enjoyment of
the privileges of clerics. This includes not only the pro
tection of excommunication from being bodily assaulted,
but also the privilege of immunity as an ecclesiastical
person from secular tribunals.
8.
No fixed period of probation, or term of noviceship,
before profession, is necessary of divine law. Looking to
the religious state in itself and apart from any religious
Order or Rule, that state might be, and in ancient times
was embraced without any definite noviceship, or novice-
ship properly so called. The matter was left to the judg
ment of the Bishop, or of him who had power to
receive the donation of himself which was made by the
religious.
Probation, by means of noviceship, is required in a
ccnobitic religious state, that is to say, in a religious com
munity.
By positive law there is required before religious pro
fession a definite period of probation. This law was first
introduced by private enactment of the religious Orders
themselves. It afterwards passed into the common law
of the Church, which fixed one year as the period of pro
bation. This period was at that time regarded as in
favour of both parties. Either the Order or the novice
might renounce his right, and so by mutual consent
shorten the period of probation. Apart from this renun
ciation, profession before the end of one year's probation
would have been null and void. Now-a-days, however.
Entrance into Religion. 81
and since the date of the Council of Trent, in all religious
bodies, both of men and women, and without any excep
tion, there must be one year of probation. Profession
made before this year has elapsed will be null and void.
It has been decreed by Pius IX. (Neminem latet, March 19, 1857)
that in all religious Orders of men which have solemn vows, simple
vows only should be made at the end of the noviceship, the novice
being also then of the age of at least sixteen years complete, and that
these simple vows are to continue for at least three years, at the end of
which the religious may be admitted to profession of solemn vows.
The same Pontiff decreed by Brief (Ad universalis, February 7, 1862)
that profession of solemn vows in any religious family of men whatso
ever should be wholly null and void, unless the novice should have
previously made simple vows, and should have persevered under them
for three years complete.
9-
The year of probation begins on the day on which the
postulant is admitted into the Order in the state of a
novice, in order that he may begin to be proved therein.
There is a contract between the Order and the future
religious. By this contract both agree to make mutual
trial of each other in order to a certain .end — in a certain
way — and for a certain time.
Probation supposes freedom either to embrace or to
abandon the religious state. Probation is ordained in
order that a man may ascertain by experience whether
or not the religious state is expedient for him individually.
A novice has an habitual relation to and union with
the Order into which he has entered, which he did not
have when he was not a novice. This cannot be con
tracted without some positive human act. That act is, in
the case of a novice, his delivery of himself, with accep
tance of that delivery by the Order, for the purpose of
F
82 Elements of Religions Life.
probation. This and all the outward signs of this, which
are necessary to it, are of the substance of the state of
noviceship. In this sense bestowal and reception of the
religious habit is reckoned to be of the substance of the
religious state.
In this way the religious Order acquires a right to
govern the novice, and to impose upon him certain
burdens for the purpose of proving and making trial of
him. The novice is, on his part, bound to obey, and he
is so bound that he may be compelled to obey.
Actual probation is not of the substance of the state of
probation. If the novice perseveres in the state of pro
bation, he is there persevering for the purpose of being
proved. It is not his fault if he is not being proved. He
ought not therefore to suffer for this. His not having
been duly proved will not be any impediment to the
validity of his profession.
If a novice should resist actual probation, it is thereby
sufficiently ascertained that he is not suited for the reli
gious state.
To dwell within the cloister during the period of pro
bation is of the substance of noviceship in this sense,
that wheresoever the religious is living he is considered,
if he is living there under obedience to his superior, to
be within his religious cloister. If a novice should be
sent anywhere else by his superior, and even if he should
remain there for many months, he will nevertheless be
truly on probation, since he is truly living under obe
dience to his Superior.
If a novice should, however, of his own accord desert
his cloister, he will thereby cease to be on probation, that
is to say, if he departs with the intention of not returning.
Entrance tnto Religion. 83
It is not of itself sufficient to interrupt his probation that
he goes away without leave. The novice must intend in
going away to place himself outside obedience to his
superior. If a novice were to fall sick and to remain in
bed during the whole time of his noviceship, that time
would, nevertheless, be a true period of probation, and
he might at the end of it be professed. So far as in him
lay, he was remaining in the state of probation. Absence
of actual probation was accidental. Although actual
probation is the end of the state of probation, it is
nevertheless not of the substance of that state. In such a
case, moreover, the novice would be sufficiently proved
by means of his infirmity. The Order would have suffi
cient knowledge of his character and fitness for the
religious state. He would himself have experience of its
manner of life, and even if he had not personal experience
of its austerity of life, he could have knowledge of this
in other ways.
TO.
The period of probation is to be reckoned from moment
to moment. If the novice should put on the habit, say
on the first day of January after noon, he cannot be
professed on the same day of the next January before
noon. Apart from this, it is not to be said that a year
and a day is necessary. There is no law which prescribes
this.
The period of probation must be continuous. There
are two ways in which the continuity of the time may
be interrupted. First, by profession before the end of
it with the intention and in the belief that true profession
is being made. The novice would be then no longer on
84 Elements of Religious Life.
probation. Secondly, by abandoning the habit, and
departing from religion. He would thereby cease to be
on probation. The period of probation would be inter
rupted even if on the very same day he should repent.
He will have again to be received, so as to be again a
novice, and there will then begin a new and distinct
noviceship.
If the novice departs with the intention of returning,
and especially if he departs in the habit, his noviceship
will not be interrupted, even by an absence of some days.
It is not by every laying aside of the habit that the
period of probation is interrupted. It is one thing to put
off the habit, and it is another thing to abandon the habit.
He puts off the habit who lays it aside for a time. He
abandons the habit who lays it aside with the intention
of not resuming it. The habit may sometimes be put off
with leave of the superior, or for the sake of penance,
or by dispensation, and the novice is not therefore
reckoned to have morally changed his state of a novice.
Even if the habit has been put off by the novice himself
without leave and against rule, or in order that he may
more freely commit some sin, his noviceship will not be
interrupted. By abandonment of the habit, on the other
hand, the noviceship is interrupted, because the novice's
state as a novice is changed. The abandonment, how
ever, must be not merely contemplated, or begun, but
completely carried out.
The same laws which establish a period of probation in
the religious state ordain also, as a consequence, that at the
end of that period a judgment should immediately be
formed with regard to the fitness of the novice. If this
judgment is favourable, he should then be admitted to
Entrance into Religion. 85
profession. If not, and he is nevertheless permitted to
remain, it must still be in the state of probation.
ii.
A novice is not bound in conscience to regular obser
vance. He has not made any vow by reason of which
this obligation should arise. A novice ought, nevertheless,
to be in some way subject to religious discipline, so long as
he remains in the religious community. He is not bound
by any new or special bond of obligation to observance of
chastity, over and above that obligation which springs
from the law of nature. On account of scandal, however,
and looking to the honour of the religious habit and of the
Order, a novice is bound to observe chastity by a greater
accidental obligation.
With regard to poverty, a novice is not bound to any
action or omission which concerns poverty, inasmuch as
he has not yet made a vow of poverty. By the law of
justice, however, he is bound not to appropriate the goods
of the Order, because those goods are not his own. To
do so would be to commit a theft. This theft would
be sacrilegious, since the goods of the Order are sacred
and dedicated to God.
A novice can possess and dispose of his own property.
He can both validly and lawfully acquire property, even
without leave of his superior, either by testament or gift,
or in any other way which is not at variance with his
state, since he is not hindered from doing so either by
vow, or by law. A novice who is dying in the monastery
before profession can freely leave his goods by testament
to whomsoever he pleases, passing over the monastery
altogether.
An Order, even when it possesses the right of filiation,
86 Elements of Religious Life.
that is, the right of inheritance in name and place of a
deceased religious, does not succeed as heir to an intestate
novice. A novice who dies before profession is not truly
a religious, and therefore the Order has no ground of
succession to him as intestate. It has this right then only
when the religious has rendered himself incapable of owner
ship, and has transferred his right of property to the
Order.
Donations and dispositions of goods during life are
forbidden to novices by the Council of Trent, except with
certain prescribed solemnities. Even with these, it is
ordained that the donation shall be of no effect if pro
fession does not follow.
This refers to donations of considerable value, or of
real property.
Novices of the Society of Jesus can validly make donations, and
renunciation of goods, without observing the forms prescribed by the
Council of Trent, which in its decree excepted the Society. Donations
made by the novices, after the first year of noviceship, are valid, even
if those novices should not persevere.
As regards obedience a novice cannot be directly bound
in conscience by a precept of his superior, since he has
not yet promised obedience to him. A novice is, in like
manner, not bound in conscience to observance of the
Rule, since he has not as yet professed it. A novice is
bound, however, not to give scandal or bad example to
the other religious. He may sometimes be bound, there
fore, either to abandon the religious state or to observe
the Rule, at least in public and community matters. He
is always bound so to subject himself to religious discipline
as not to resist it by violence. This is necessary in order
Entrance, into Religion. 87
to government. There would otherwise be utter dis
order and confusion. When a novice receives the habit
he virtually binds himself to such subjection. He thereby
enters into a covenant with the Order that, since he is to
be supported, taught, and directed by it, he should, so
long as he remains in it, submit himself to its religious
correction. The superior of the Order stands to the novice,
so long as he remains a novice, in place of his parish
priest (parochus) or Bishop. Although the superior
cannot bind the novice under precept to do works of
counsel, he can nevertheless prescribe, and, if necessary,
under censures, all things that his parish priest or his
Bishop could have prescribed. He has power to do this
in virtue, not of a vow of obedience which as yet does
not exist, but of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction which has
been bestowed on him by the Sovereign Pontiff.
CHAPTER IV.
Religious Profession.
RELIGIOUS profession is that act by which a person, whose
desire it is to be a religious, publicly, solemnly, and perma
nently embraces the religious state. True and valid pro
fession is so essentially of the substance of the religious state
that previous to profession a man is not truly and properly
a religious, while by means of profession he becomes a
religious.
The donation and delivery which a religious makes of
himself to the Order which he enters, or makes to God in
that Order, through its Superior, is of the substance of
religious profession. The acceptance of this by the
Order, through the Superior, is also of the substance of
religious profession.
In order that a man should be constituted in the
religious state, a promise is not sufficient. He must
deprive himself of the right which he has hitherto
possessed over himself as regards his actions, and transfer
that right to another.
The power which a religious Superior possesses to in
validate any private vows of his subjects is founded not
in his power of jurisdiction, but in the dominative power
which he acquires over his subjects in virtue of their
donation and delivery of themselves which he has
accepted.
By means of religious profession there is transferred,
Religious Profession. 89
along with the person of the religious, all his goods and
all his rights, to the Order. Whatsoever he may hence
forth acquire, whether by hereditary right, or by donation
or otherwise, passes at once to the Order. The funda
mental reason of this is because the religious has wholly
delivered himself to the Order.
Besides a man's delivery of himself to a religious Order,
the three vows of poverty, of chastity, and of obedience
are of the substance of religious profession. They are of
the substance of the religious state, and whatever is of the
substance of the religious state, is of the substance also
of religious profession.
The formal effect of religious profession includes at once
a bondage and a sons/tip. The two, so far as God is con
cerned, are not incompatible. The religious state is a
state of bondage, inasmuch as it is ordained for the pur
pose of giving to God homage and service. It is, at
the same time, a state of sonship. The formal effect of
religious profession has in it more of sonship than it has
of bondage.
Although a man's donation and delivery of himself, and
the three substantial vows, are in themselves and formally
distinct, there nevertheless coalesces from both of them
the substance of religious profession, by way of one
perfect and completed moral contract.
2.
Some external formality, such as should sufficiently
exhibit the mutual consent both of the religious and of
the Order, is necessary in order that religious profession
should be completed, and that the bond which springs
from religious profession should emerge. This follows
go Elements of Religious Life.
from the general idea of a human contract. A contract
between men, although it requires internal consent, is not
completed by internal consent alone. Without external
signs men cannot recognize and accept their mutual
consents.
Although in religious profession it is principally a bond
of obligation towards God which is established, there is
also in religious profession a human contract as between
men. Religious profession cannot therefore be made
without some sign which is an object of the senses, as
in the similar case of matrimony. The religious state
exists not only before God, but also before God's Church,
and it contains a special grade or class of persons within
God's visible church. It must therefore be constituted by
some act which is an object of the senses.
It is necessary that the sign of consent should be suffi
ciently expressive of consent, such as is, for instance, an
utterance of the human voice. Ordinarily, however,
words are required only on the part of the person who is
making profession. On the part of the religious superior
who receives him, any external sign will suffice by which
the superior signifies that he accepts the profession.
Verbal expression on the part of the person professed is
made sufficiently by his assent to interrogatories on the
part of the superior who receives him, the assent being
manifested by any external sign whatsoever, such as, for
instance, an inclination of the head, as also suffices in the
parallel case of matrimony. Taken in conjunction with
sufficiently express interrogation, the external sign of con
sent is invested with and shares in the full significance of
the words of interrogation.
So far as common law is concerned, and apart from
Religious Profession. 91
positive law, writing is not necessary. By the special law,
however, of some Orders profession is made in writing.
By the law of the Benedictine Order, for instance, he who
is professed places his profession, written and subscribed,
upon the altar. In the Society of Jesus, the vows are
written and are read from the manuscript. Where this
form of making the vows has been prescribed, it is to be
observed, both in order to observance of the Rule, and
also to remove all risk of question of validity. If, in a
Rule which has been approved and confirmed by the
Sovereign Pontiff, this condition is expressly laid down as
essential, it must be regarded as essential.
Although it is not expressly defined by common law,
the nature of the act of profession demands that it should
be made before sufficient witnesses, in order to its being
rightly made. Since by means of religious profession a
special state in the Church is embraced, the Church ought
to have evidence of the fact. By the law of the Society
of Jesus it is essential that the vows of the solemnly
professed should be read before some members of the
Society and some externs.
The form of profession must sufficiently express the
obligation of the three vows, along with the donation and
delivery of himself by the religious to that particular
religious Order in which he is making profession. The
formulas of profession vary, however, in different Orders.
In some of them the separate vows are not distinctly
expressed, nor is the donation and delivery, as distinct
from the vows, explicitly expressed.
3-
By religious profession a man is incorporated into the
body of Religion as an actual member thereof. A
92 Elements of Religious Life.
particular member cannot, however, be really united to a
body in the abstract, but only to a certain and determinate
body. A man cannot actually be a citizen in the abstract
and a citizen of no city in particular, nor can he be a
servant in the abstract, and not the servant of this or
of that man.
Neither Bishops, nor any persons inferior to the Sovereign
Pontiff have power to admit to religious profession without
incorporating the professed into some approved religious
community. The Sovereign Pontiff has power to dispense
from common law, and therefore, by the fact of his
receiving any one to religious profession, without incorpora
ting him into any determinate religious body, he is apprw-
ing the state of that person and his mode of life as an
individual. A person so professed would not be bound to
any one of the approved religious Orders, but only to that
state which he had professed, under obedience to the
Sovereign Pontiff, or to some particular man as a special
vicar of the Pontiff, in that private mode of life, and
without obligation to any determinate religious Rule.
4-
In order to the validity of religious profession the
formula of profession must be so absolute as not to
include any condition which is destructive of the substatice
of the religious state. If a man were, for instance, to be
professed under condition of his retaining his property,
this condition would be subversive of the substance of
solemn profession.
Profession made under a condition which regards the
future is null and void, so far as the bond of profession is
concerned. Since profession consists in actual donation
and delivery, it is of the substance of profession that this
Religious Profession. 93
should at once take effect. Even if the condition should
afterwards be fulfilled, the previous consent will not suffice.
A new consent with actual donation and delivery will be
necessary. Professions under condition are mere promises
affecting the future. Although a promise, as such, induces
an obligation in the present, the execution of the obligation
has regard to the future. The obligation which is induced
by a conditional profession would be similar to that of
conditional matrimony, which is regarded as equivalent to
espousals, which bind the parties to contract matrimony
on fulfilment of the condition.
Reception of a habit on entrance into a monastery, or
that the profession should be made in a church, being
circumstances which are very extrinsic to the contract, are
not of the substance, and do not belong to the validity of
religious profession.
5-
Among extrinsic effects of religious profession, which
follow, not in virtue of profession alone, but from certain
privileges which are annexed thereto, either of ecclesiastical
or of divine concession, there may be several — such as
removal of irregularities — exemption of the religious
from the jurisdiction of ordinary judges — reception
of them by the Apostolic See under its own special
government — and capacity for having pontifical juris
diction communicated to them.
St. Thomas attributes to religious profession, and as an
effect of religious profession, remission of all punishment
which is due for sin, and this as it were ex opere operate.
He does so on the ground that if a man by means of
94 Elements of Religious Life.
some alms can satisfy for his past sins, that man can
satisfy for all his past sins who gives himself wholly and
without reserve to the service of God. Such an offering
exceeds every kind of satisfaction, or even of public
penance, in the same way as a holocaust exceeds a
sacrifice.
Religious profession is, according to St. Thomas, an act
which is so excellent that, if it is made in an ordinary way
from an affection of charity, even if without extraordinary
fervour, it suffices, as a rule, to satisfy for all sins of the
past. This effect therefore would follow, not from extrinsic
privilege but, from the perfection of an act which is such
as is religious profession. Besides this, however, there has
been granted to some Orders, by concession of the
Sovereign Pontiff, as for example to the Society of Jesus.
a plenary indulgence at entrance into the Order, and
another at the hour of death.
All previous vows are extinguished by religious pro
fession, by way of commutation into something which is
better than these vows are, and which comprehends them.
A vow as such, and of its own nature, always includes the
condition that it should not hinder a still greater good.
Religion is a greater good than is any temporal good
or than is any particular spiritual good which is or can be
vowed. He who professes religion does not therefore act
at variance with his previous vows. He is simply acting
in exercise of a right, which was always understood as
reserved in his previous vows. Those vows consequently
cease with the conditions under which they were made.
A man in favour of whom a vow is made does not
acquire a right in the thing which is vowed. The vow
Religious Profession. 95
therefore remains a mere vow, and as such it is extin
guished by religious profession.
In the commutation of a vow, the obligation of that
vow is not taken away. The matter of the vow is changed
into other matter. The professed must intend this com
mutation. He who is already bound by one vow, and who
makes another which is better, does not thereby commute
the one vow into the other vow, unless he had the intention
of taking the second vow in place of the first vow, and not
an intention of conjoining the two.
7-
The bond of religious profession is indissoluble on the
part of him who contracts it. His own will alone can
never suffice to break it. He cannot of his own accord
recover his liberty, nor can he compel the Order to grant it
to him. This follows from the idea of perpetual bondage
which is contracted, and the absolute donation of himself
which is made by the religious in his profession, and which
is involved in profession. Perpetual bondage and absolute
donation cannot be recalled at a servant's or at a donor's
will.
After absolute and solemn profession, which has been
accepted by a duly approved religious Order, that Order
has not the power, in virtue of its own will alone, to
dismiss the religious against his will. The Order cannot
release him from the bond of profession, nor can it divest
him of the religious state, nor compel him to accept
dismissal.
A solemnly professed religious, even if he should be
expelled for ever from his Order, and exempted from the
actual yoke of religion, always remains a religious. He
96 Elements of Religious Life.
may consequently be compelled by the Order, or, at any
rate, by the Sovereign Pontiff, to return to the religious
habit and to religious observance.
When a religious Order accepts the donation and delivery
of himself which is made by a religious in his profession,
the Order does not accept it as a merely liberal or
gratuitous donation. The Order accepts it as forming part
of an onerous and mutual contract. It thereby absolutely
binds itself to retain the religious, to support him, to
educate him, and to govern him.
By the expulsion of a solemnly professed religious, how
ever just his expulsion may be, and even if it is perpetual,
the previous bond of profession is never wholly re
scinded.
It is not rescinded on the part of the religious, as regards
his donation and delivery of himself to the Order. It is
not rescinded on the part of the Order, which does not lose
its right of ownership over the expelled religious, so long
as he does not enter, and has not been professed in
another religious Order.
Religious who have been expelled from exempt Orders
are bound to obey the local Bishop, not only as he is the
diocesan Bishop, but also as he is their own religious
Superior. By their expulsion those religious have lost the
privilege of exemption from the jurisdiction of the local
Bishop.
A solemnly professed religious has deprived himself
entirely of the power of retracting his covenant, and his
donation and delivery of himself, since, so far as he is con
cerned, he has absolutely transferred all his rights to God.
His Order has, on its part, so accepted this donation and
delivery as to acquire an absolute dominion over its
Religions Profession. 97
religious subject, and that — for God principally — and for
itself ministerially. This acceptance the Order has no
longer any power to retract. It cannot retract it in its
own name since the right has already passed specially
to God. It cannot retract it in the name of God, since
the superior is not entrusted with this ministry. This
ministry belongs only to the Sovereign Pontiff, as he is the
Vicar of Christ. He alone has power to dispense the goods
and rights which have been specially acquired by God.
It involves contradiction to say that acceptance of
religious profession should be entirely absolute, and that
there should at the same time remain power in the Order to
deprive the professed of his religious state.
The Sovereign Pontiff has power to dispense from
solemn religious profession, and to effect that he who
has been hitherto a solemnly professed religious should
be no longer a religious.
The Sovereign Pontiff, as he is also the Supreme Prelate
of every religious Order, has power to dispense in everything
which belongs to any Order, and to cede the rights of
any, Order for just and reasonable causes. Besides the
dominative power which belongs to him as he is Supreme
Prelate of every religious Order, he possesses also, and
that as he is Supreme Pontiff, supreme jurisdiction over
the whole Church. In virtue of this supreme jurisdiction
the Pontiff is supreme dispenser of all ecclesiastical
goods and rights. Among these there is included the
right which is acquired by a religious Order over its sub
ject, in virtue of that subject's religious profession.
The Sovereign Pontiff can, therefore, and that without
doing any injury or wrong to an Order, dispense the
G
0,8 Elements of Religious Life.
profession of any one of its subjects, when he deems this
to be necessary for the common good.
The Sovereign Pontiff has power to dispense from
religious profession even in view of the greater good of an
individual religious. The right which has been acquired
by his Order is not a rigorous right of property ordained
for its own private benefit. It is a right which has been
ordained for the good of the religious himself and for the
greater service of God.
As matter of actual fact and present practice, and so far
as ordinary law is concerned, the Sovereign Pontiff alone
has power to dispense from the bond of religious profession.
As he can reserve to himself dispensation of simple vows
of chastity and of entrance into religion, with still more
reason can he reserve to himself dispensation from religious
profession. The Pontiff's power follows also from his
having reserved to himself the approbation of religious
Orders, and from his having exempted them from the juris
diction of the local Ordinaries, and received them under
his own particular charge and special protection. During
the period antecedent to this reservation by the Apostolic
See, the Bishops had power to dispense the profession of
religious who were subject to them.
9-
Religious profession, like other human contracts and
vows, may be invalid. It may be invalid in as many
ways as there are conditions which are necessary in order
to the validity of it. Sometimes religious profession may
be invalid by the law of nature, and sometimes by eccle
siastical law, sometimes from an internal defect, and some
times from an external defect.
On the part of a religious Order four conditions are
TQRON10
Religious Profession. 99
required in order to the validity of religious profession.
These are — pontifical approbation of the community as a
religious Order — lawful power in the Superior who in name
of the Order receives the profession — his internal consent —
and his sufficient external acceptance.
On the part of the religious also there are several
necessary conditions in order to the validity of his pro
fession. He must have attained the age which is required
by law — had a full year of probation — and be free from
every such bond as would by law hinder the validity of
religious profession. He must also, of course, be free
from bias through fraud or through such fear as would
affect a constant man, and he must have intention to
make profession, and of this there must be sufficient
external manifestation.
Sometimes religious profession is null and void in such
a way that it can never be rectified or made valid. This
will be the case if it has been made in accordance with a
Rule, and in a community which has not been approved by
the Apostolic See as constituting a religious state. Even
if such a body should subsequently be approved, this will
not be a ratification of previous profession. Subsequent
profession will be religious profession which is made for
the first time.
The vows, however, which were made in that invalid pro
fession, although they did not induce the bond of religious
profession, have nevertheless validity as vows, apart from any
intrinsic impediment which may attach to them as vows.
Profession which was invalid is never confirmed simply
by lapse of time, even if the defect, by reason of which it
was invalid, should be removed, as, for instance, want of
lawful age. There must, as in the case of invalid
ioo Elements of Religious Life.
marriage, which can never begin to be valid solely by lapse
of time, be reiteration of consent, after removal of the defect.
This must be done in such a way as will be efficacious
in the present to induce a bond of obligation. Profession
which was null and void is, therefore, said to be ratified,
not in the sense that the first profession now begins to be
valid, but because in place of the first invalid profession
there is now effected a new and valid profession.
He who is thus to ratify invalid profession must have
knowledge of the previous defect and nullity of it. With
out this knowledge there cannot exist a new consent, and
sufficient intention to ratify the profession. It is not
sufficient that during the time of ignorance of the nullity
the person was in the disposition, and had the will to
remain in religion. This is not a will to vow, or to make
profession. It is only a disposition or will to fulfil an
obligation which is supposed already to exist. Such a
will is not sufficient to ratify a vow.
If the reception to the religious habit was null, no part
of the term of probation which was founded upon it can be
reckoned in order to complete the year of probation which
is necessary to validity of profession. There must be a
new and valid reception, and therefore an entire year
of probation before profession.
If the reception to the religious habit was valid, but the
profession was null, as having been made before the end
of the term of probation, the whole time of perseverance in
religion under the idea of valid profession will in no way
avail towards completion of the year of probation. During
that time the person was not on probation. It was not
therefore a time of noviceship.
He who has been invalidly professed can lawfully refuse
Religious Profession. 101
to ratify his profession. He is free to abandon the habit
without in conscience incurring the ecclesiastical penalties
of apostasy or excommunication, since his invalid pro
fession did not constitute him a religious, nor did it bind
him to perseverance.
An assertion made by a religious that he had no
intention to make profession is not to be believed, even if
he should confirm it by an oath, unless his statement
should be corroborated by other sufficient proof. His
external profession begets a vehement presumption against
his oath. There is here question also of prejudice to
another's right, the right, namely, of the Order which, in
virtue of his accepted profession, has acquired a right over
him, as well as prejudice to God Himself, to Whom this
right principally belongs. It is furthermore to the prejudice
of the common good and of the whole religious state. If
an oath were admitted in such circumstances, the door
would be opened to countless frauds, and nothing would
remain stable in the religious state. By the mere fact that
the person affirms and is ready to swear that he had not
the intention to make profession, he confesses that he
acted fraudulently and faithlessly, and that therefore he is
not worthy of belief.
In order that the Church should regard a profession as
null and void, it is not sufficient that it should not be
proved to have been validly made. If there is a doubt,
the doubt will be given in favour of the profession, as a
doubt is given in the same way in the parallel case of
matrimony.
It is certain, as the Sacred Congregation of the Council has several
times declared, that the Renovation of vows which is made annually in
102 Elements of Religious Life.
some Orders, as prescribed by their Rules, which have been approved
by the Apostolic See, does not render an invalid profession valid,
The reason is because it is made of necessity by precept of the Rule.
If, however, in any Institute, it is lawfully declared, and the renovants
are previously instructed that their renovations of their vows are to have
the force of the first making of them, if perchance their first vows
should, through some defect, have been of no effect, then he who
knows and understands this does himself truly will and bind himself
afresh. This is therefore a true voluntary obligation, as real as
is that by which he binds himself who for the first time makes
his vows. This is the case in the Society of Jesus, as regards the
renovations of simple vows, which are made by the scholastics. See
Hallerini, Opns Theohgicum Morale, voliv., page 38.
An Answer of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, 10 January, 1879,
with regard to the Renovation of vows made by Nuns, declares that a
custom according to which the Sisters singly recite the formula of
renovation, and then receive the Blessed Sacrament, the priest mean
time standing at the altar-rails, and holding the Sacred Host— is not
lawful, and is utterly to be eliminated. It declares also that the
renovation will be made more fittingly outside Mass, and that the
utmost that will be tolerated during Mass is that the formula of renova
tion of vows should be pronounced aloud by one of the Nuns, and
mentally ratified by the rest.
/
^nfc>
* V
CHAPTER V.
Religious Poverty.
THE idea si voluntary poverty includes both the will not to
possess riches — and also actual absence of riches. Involun
tary poverty denotes only the latter. This poverty may be an
incentive to vice, instead of being a means towards progress
in virtue.
As voluntarily to embrace poverty is itself a good deed of
supererogation, so also to promise poverty by vow, and to
consecrate poverty to God, is a work of counsel. It is an
act which is better than is a good act which is merely
good. From the words of Christ, when He counselled
poverty, it may be gathered that He counselled also a vow
of poverty. If He counselled poverty, He counselled
perpetuity of poverty. To secure perpetuity is one pur
pose of a vow. Moreover, when Christ counselled
poverty in order to perfection, He still more evidently
counselled perfection itself. The voluntary poverty, which
is consecrated to God by vow, is more perfect in itself,
and it is also more conducive towards perfection. St.
Thomas observes that Christ, in teaching what is neces
sary to perfection, comprehends that which is necessary
in order to the stability of a purpose of perfection. This
stability is effected by means of a vow.
In order to a perfect " leaving of all things " it is
necessary that all things should be so left that they cannot
again be recovered. In the same way, goods which might
IO4 Elements of Religions Life.
possibly be acquired in the future are not " left," unless
they are so left in affection and will that they may not in
the future be acquired and possessed. This necessitates a
promise which concerns the future.
A simple vow of poverty may be made in two ways — (i)
either by surrendering all private ownership or free use of
one's own goods, but so as that those goods may be
possessed by a religious community of which the
individual religious becomes a member, or (2) by a vow
not to possess any goods, but this without any change
of state, or without incorporation into any religious
community.
Although goods which are relinquished by an individual
are possessed by the religious community to which he
himself belongs, that does not prevent his having made
a true oblation of his goods to God. He has deprived
himself of his dominion over them, or his right of owner
ship — of his right of using them — and even of his right to
administer them in his own name, and by his own authority.
That he still has the advantage of sufficient support is in no
way contrary to the holiness and the religious character of
a vow of poverty. The counsel to " leave all things " does
not abrogate the law to provide for the necessities of the
body. It causes this to be done with order, moderation,
and humility.
It is certain that a simple vow of poverty which is made
outside a religious community is lawful and good. Many
Saints have led a solitary life, and have in that life
practised poverty, and they most likely consecrated their
poverty to God by vow, as for instance, St. Paul the
Hermit and others. St. Anthony, St. Benedict and others,
Religious Poverty. 105
who were afterwards fathers of monastic families, began by
exercising themselves individually, and devoting themselves
to God in a life of solitary poverty.
Further, certain religious Orders~have been pontifically
approved, and that with the highest of approbations, in
which community poverty as well as individual poverty is
observed. That which is lawful for a community, namely,
to surrender all ownership of goods, must be equally lawful
for an individual.
Voluntary poverty which is vowed in this way is not
contrary to charity towards oneself. Human nature and
human individuals need but few things. These can
easily be obtained, either by one's own labour, or by means
of humble begging. Neither is this kind of voluntary
poverty contrary to charity towards others. No force is
used, and no necessity is laid on others by begging of
their bounty. An opportunity is thereby afforded to them
for exercise of their charity.
The Church desires poverty even in simple clerics, but
only such poverty as beseems the clerical state and dignity.
Hence she does not admit clerics to sacred orders who
have not a secured income which is sufficient for their
support, lest they should be driven to traffic, or to actions
which are unbecoming to ecclesiastical persons. In the case
of clerics of higher rank, and especially for Bishops, she
desires a larger income, in order to their due maintenance in
a manner befitting their condition. She does not however
exclude from sacred orders or from ecclesiastical dignities
those who are voluntarily poor, and who have professed
poverty in a manner which has been approved by her.
Since the date of the Council of Trent she requires for
secular clerics either a benefice, or a suitable income or
io6 Elements of Religious Life.
patrimony, as a title, in order to ordination. Hence a
faculty from the Sovereign Pontiff is necessary in order
that any cleric, who is not strictly a religious, should be
admitted to sacred orders on the title of voluntary poverty.
A simple vow of poverty may be made apart from any
vow of obedience, since poverty and the practice of poverty
do not necessarily depend upon the will of a superior. A
vow of poverty might be made even by the Sovereign
Pontiff, and he has no superior.
2.
Since poverty consists in privation or absence of riches,
the only matter that poverty can have is by way of privation.
The matter of poverty must be that of which it deprives, in
the same way as sin is said to be the matter of the sacrament
of penance. The remote matter of poverty consists in
riches, privation of which constitutes poverty. The
proximate matter of poverty is that action or that relation
of a man with regard to riches, which is opposed to poverty.
This includes all that relates to ownership of goods, or right
to them, or any use of them which is equivalent to right, or
which supposes right in the using of them.
The remote matter of poverty extends only to those
external goods, which are comprehended under the name
of riches.
Although a man is not properly master of his own life, he
has nevertheless a right to his life, and to the preservation
of his life. This right he does not renounce by a vow of
poverty. He cannot renounce it. It is not in his power to
divest himself of his right to life. A man has the right to
use both the members of his body, and the faculties of his
soul, in order to the doing of his own actions, of which he
Religions Poverty. 107
is master. This right he can alienate. He alienates it when
he voluntarily sells or gives himself into bondage. This
right does not, however, belong to the matter of poverty.
It is not reckoned amongst riches, which are extrinsic
goods, but amongst corporeal goods, which are intrinsic to
a man. Such intrinsic goods, so far as they can be matter
of a vow, belong to the vow, not of poverty but — of
obedience.
Internal spiritual goods, such as grace and virtues do not
belong to the matter of voluntary poverty. This poverty is
promised and practised as it is a means in order to the
increase of these virtnes, and that grace. Any lawful inter
ference with the exercise of internal spiritual goods will
belong to — the vow of obedience. It will in that case be
ordained as a means in order to the increase and perfection
of these spiritual goods. Reputation, or good name, does
not belong to the matter of the vow of poverty. No man
can deprive another of his good name without sin, and a
man cannot lawfully deprive himself of his good name by
his own act.
By riches we mean money — and whatsoever is equivalent
to money — and can be reckoned at a price — or can be con
verted into money.
3-
There are two ways in which a vow of poverty can be
made. The vow may be made wholly and entirely, as com
prehending everything which the idea of poverty can
possibly include. It may be made also partially, by a
promise of poverty under certain conditions or limitations.
A man might, for instance, renounce the use or the usufruct
of property without renouncing his right of ownership. If
io8 Elements of Religious Life.
poverty is promised simply and absolutely, without any
limitation expressed or understood, the promise binds to
poverty in its complete and unrestricted sense.
Dominion, or ownership, is a principal right to dispose of
property to any use whatever which is not prohibited by
law. The word principal distinguishes the master or owner
of a piece of property from the administrator of that pro
perty. That man is properly called master or owner of a
piece of property who is the principal cause of any use to
which that property may be put. Another man may have
power to use a piece of property, by permission of the
master and owner of it, and even to dispose of it to any
use whatsoever, and nevertheless this man may not be the
master and owner of that property. He is using it merely
as he is the instrument of another man. He is un
doubtedly in possession of A RIGHT, but that right is not a
principal right. It is merely a ministerial right.
His Divine Majesty, as He is the one Creator, and
therefore the one Lord of all things, has a dominion, or
ownership, which \s principal, in the primary and highest of
all possible senses. Under the Divine Majesty, the Son of
God as He is also Son of man has a dominion, or owner
ship, of excellence. A civil commonwealth has what is
called altum dominium over even those goods which are
the private property of a man who is an individual member,
and subject of that commonwealth. This man has,
nevertheless, a real and principal dominion, or right of
ownership. That cause is truly a principal cause which
operates by its own efficacy, although it may not be the
chief cause in comparison with still higher causes.
Usufruct is the right of using a thing which is the
Religioiis Poverty. 109
property of another, without damage to the substance of that
thing. Usufruct is called dominium utile, or dominion of
use, to distinguish it from dominium directum, or full
dominion, that is, dominion of ownership. Usufruct gives
complete dominion over the fruits of the property, although
the usufructuary has no dominion or ownership of the
property itself.
Use is a right to the use of a thing without any owner
ship. In usufruct there is real ownership of the fruits,
although there is no ownership of that which bears them.
Dominion, or ownership of property, is the first and prin
cipal part of the proximate matter of poverty. From
ownership flow acts of ownership. Ownership is that
by which a man is constituted as rich. Ownership neces
sitates also that solicitude, in order to the preservation of
it, which is at variance with the vow of poverty.
A solemn vow of religious poverty excludes ownership in
such wise as at once to annul previous ownership,
and to hinder future ownership. A simple vow of re
ligious poverty — apart from any disability of ecclesiastical
law, such as that which affects Spiritual Coadjutors in
the Society of Jesus, who make only simple and not
solemn vows — does not have this effect. It does not
effect deprivation of ownership. It binds only by way
of promise. He who has made a merely simple vow of
poverty continues to acquire a true right of ownership over
anything which he receives, although in receiving it on his
own authority he sins. The efficacy of the simple promise
arose from the will of him who made it. and from that
i lo Elements of Religious Life.
will alone. This act of will was afterwards overborne
by a contrary act of will. Both acts of will being of the
same order, and having the same efficacy, the last act of
will is destructive of the act of will which preceded it. It
is otherwise when there is intervention of God's Church,
and the addition of the will of a lawful superior to the will
of him who promised poverty. The will of the superior,
being of greater efficacy, renders the will of the subject in
capable of accepting ownership. This incapacity the subject
cannot by any contrary act of his own will undo. By his
donation and delivery of himself and of all his rights,
present and future, a present right has been, through accept
ance, acquired by the religious body, of which this member
cannot deprive that body.
Usufruct, use, and possession of a thing as one's own
property, fall under the proximate matter of poverty. All
of them have to be renounced in virtue of a vow of
poverty, otherwise that vow will be sinned against. They
all include either ownership, or something which is equiva
lent to ownership.
Usufruct, although it is not a complete dominion, is,
nevertheless, a true dominion. So far as profit to be
derived from temporal goods is concerned, usufruct is, in
fact, more fruitful than is a dominion which is dominium
directum only, that is to say, which is merely a dominion of
bare ownership. Usufruct suffices to enrich, and to
entangle a man with worldly aftairs. Renunciation of
usufruct, moreover, as it is a right to use and to enjoy a
thing, and to own the fruits of that thing, is itself valuable
Religious Poverty. 1 1 1
at a price, and he who possesses it has true dominion
over it.
Use — as distinguished from usufruct — although it is not
ownership of the thing which is used, is nevertheless such
a right to the use of that thing, that this use cannot with
out injustice be hindered or interfered with. He who has
right of use has dominion over that right. He owns the
right, and if he is injured with regard to it, restitution is
due to him of justice. This right to use is valuable at a
price, and is therefore reckoned amongst riches.
Possession, properly so called, falls also under the pro
ximate matter of poverty. It is of the idea of possession to
keep a thing as if it were one's own property. To keep it
by one as the property of another is not to possess it.
Actual use — as distinguished from a right to use — and all
taking, or retention, or administration of a thing which is
exercised, not in one's own right and name, but in depen
dence on the right or concession of another, is not in itself
matter of poverty, so as to be excluded by a vow of
poverty. Some limitation or moderation of this may, how
ever, be matter of poverty, according to the intention of
the person who makes the vow.
Without actual use of temporal things it would be im
possible for a man to live. A man does not, therefore,
have it in his power wholly to deprive himself of all actual
use, nor can he promise to do so.
Actual administration, as such, does not include any right
of ownership, of use, or of enjoyment. It does not, there
fore, belong to the matter of poverty. The property which
ii2 Elements of Religious Life.
is administered is held by its administrator not as his own,
but as another's. It is not, therefore, possessed by its
administrator but, through him, by its master or owner. To
its owner it increases or perishes, as to him it belongs. All
use and disposal of it by its administrator is simply actual
use, since the use of it is exercised only by concession and
will of its owner. This use is such that, in virtue of
administration, it cannot be turned to the profit of the
administrator. It must be exercised in order to the pre
servation and increase of the property for the benefit of its
owner. There is, therefore, no reason why administration,
as such, should be excluded by a vow of poverty.
Administration may, however, be made matter of obedience,
both as regards the undertaking of it, and as regards sur
rendering administration.
Not only actual administration, but also a right to
administer, is not in itself contrary to poverty, unless to this
right there should be attached some temporal emolument,
so that this right should be valuable at a price. A right
to administer does not of itself enrich.
6.
The obligation of a vow of poverty is measured by the
matter of the vow. In accordance with the measure of
the obligation will be the measure of a sin against poverty.
The first way of sinning against a vow of poverty is by
accepting or retaining dominion of anything as one's own.
This sin is, of its nature, a mortal sin, and it is sacrilegious
as against a vow. It is certain, however, that in order
that the sin should be mortal, grave matter is required. It
is difficult to determine its precise amount. Some authors
lay it down as a general rule, that that matter is to be held
Religious Poverty. 1 1 3
as grave against a vow of poverty, which would suffice
to constitute a mortal sin in the case of theft.
A religious sins against poverty, not only by acquiring
or retaining anything as if it were his own, but also by
giving anything away without leave of his superior.
A sin, which in the genus of it is mortal, can become, through
smallness of matter, a venial sin, and there may be smallness of matter
in the breaking of a vow. The obligation of a vow is such as the
matter of the vow permits, and no one can with smallness of matter
bind himself under mortal sin. The common and received opinion is
that the matter is sufficient for grave violation of a vow, which would
be sufficient for a grave sin of theft, as against justice. This rule
cannot be regarded as too rigid when it is remembered that the
sacredness of a vow does not demand less in its own order than does
the right of a man in the order of justice. This rule must, however,
be rightly understood. It is in no way needful that the action of the
religious should have the character of a theft, or of an injustice, in
order to its being a sin, and a grievous sin. If, for instance, a
stranger were to give to a religious a notable sum of money on condition
that it should not be taken possession of by the monastery or by the
Order, but should either be used by the religious, or be returned to the
giver, and the religious spends it without leave of his Superior, he
does no injury to his Order, which he does not deprive of anything,
but he sins grievously against his vow, by acting as an owner in matter
which is grave. The rule therefore is to be taken in the sense that the
•quantity which would suffice to constitute a grievous theft, if it were
taken contrary to justice, will suffice to constitute a grievous sin against
the vow of poverty, if it is taken or given without leave of the Superior.
The relation of a religious to his monastery, with regard to temporal
goods, is not the relation of a son towards his father. Hence the
character of the wickedness of theft in a son differs from the character
of the wickedness of theft in a religious. In the theft of a son regard
is had only to the damage done to the father and to the family property.
In order therefore that the owner of any property should be reasonably
•unwilling to be deprived of it, greater quantity is certainly required in
the case of a son than in the case of a stranger. In the violation of a
vow, on the other hand, regard is had not so much to the damage done
to the monastery in its temporal goods, as to the spiritual damage
H
ii4 filciiicnts of Religious Life.
which the Order suffers in relaxation of discipline with regard to one of
the principal foundations of religious life. Hence a religious Superior
will with reason be most unwilling, even in the case of a quantity for
which a father would not he unwilling that it should be taken pos
session of by his son.
Although a religious is not in this matter to be icgarded in his
monastery as is a son in his family, he is nevertheless not a stranger.
He is a part of the community, and the goods of the monastery are
possessed for the benefit of its subjects, and not for the advantage of the
Superior. For this reason there may be some benignity in judgment
with regard to graveness of matter.
Although in violation of the vow of poverty there is frequently the
twofold wickedness of injustice and of sacrilege, there may, however,
be sacrilege without injustice, and it is the sacrilege which has princi
pally to be considered, as it is the more directly at variance with the
religious state. See Ballerini, Opus Thcologicnm Morale, vol. iv.
page 70.
Slight thefts may coalesce to form an amount of matter which is
grave enough to suffice lor mortal sin, and the question arises as to
whether small sins against religious poverty can coalesce so as to form
one grievous sin. If in this sin we look not to the injury or loss to the
monastery, but solely to the individual's guilt, or to the violation of the
vow of poverty, small sins, whatever the number of them may be, will
never make a grievous sin, just as a great number of slight disobediences
will never make a grievous sin against the vow of obedience. It very
often happens in transgressions of religious poverty that the vow is
violated without any damage having been done to the community, as
when for instance a religious hands over to another that which was given
for himself to consume — or when that which was granted to him to use
for a certain purpose, he spends for another purpose — or when he takes
for himself books, clothes, food and the like, which, if he had asked for
them, would not have been refused to him — or when he accepts from
externs something which is consumed in the act of using it. These
are ways in which religious poverty is most frequently violated.
If, on the other hand, loss occurs to the community, as when money
is spent by a religious without leave for his own private convenience,
small sins of this kind may certainly coalesce so as to form a grievous
sin, in the same way as small thefts may coalesce into being a
Religious Poverty. 115
grievous sin of theft. A greater amount is, however, required in this
case than that which would suffice for mortal sin in a single act of
theft. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, vol. iv. page 81.
A religious will be sinning against his vow of poverty if he does not
exercise the same diligence for the preservation of those things which
are given him to use, as other men are commonly wont to exercise,
and if for instance clothes which were to last him for a whole year,
should by his own fault be worn out within six months, so that the
monastery should be put to fresh expense. A religious ought to have
greater care of goods than he would have had if he were the owner of
them, since he has only the actual use of them, and no power to
consume them at his own will. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum
Morale, vol. iv. page 84.
There are four modes of poverty which are possible to
a religious.
(1) There is the first mode or degree of poverty when a
man cannot, either lawfully or validly, have ownership of
any property whatsoever — or cannot use it as if it were
his own. This degree is that which belongs to all those
who now-a-days make a solemn vow of poverty.
(2) There is the second degree of poverty when a man
cannot lawfully have ownership of any property, or cannot
even use it as if it were his own, but is not at the same
time incapable of ownership. Such would be the poveity
of those who should make an absolute and entire vow of
poverty, but apart from any solemnity added by the Church.
(3) There is the third degree of poverty when a man is
neither incapable of ownership, nor bound at once to
deprive himself of his right of ownership, but bound only
not to use anything as if it were his own. This is the case
of approved scholastics in the Society of Jesus.
(4) There is a fourth degree of poverty when a man is
bound by vow, not indeed to refrain from ownership, or
n6 Elements of Religious Life.
from all use of any property as his own, but only not to
acquire, or not to possess goods beyond a certain measure,
such as is sufficient for his support and maintenance, in
accordance with some lawful or perfect end which he has
set before him.
All degrees of poverty have one thing in common,
namely, the taking away of an excessive superfluity of
temporal goods, which should entail solicitude and distrac
tion. If this moderation is that which alone is exercised,
then we have the fourth degree of poverty.
If besides moderation in quantity, there is moderation
also with regard to mode, so that, although ownership is
retained, there must be dependence on the will of another
in the exercise of ownership, there is the third degree of
poverty.
If besides both kinds of moderation, ownership is sur
rendered so far as one's own will and promise is concerned,
but without anything which causes incapability of owner
ship, added by intervention of ecclesiastical law, there is
the second degree of poverty.
When incapability of ownership is added, through inter
vention and action of the Church, this completes that which
constitutes the first degree of religious poverty.
It is probable that at one time the religious state existed
with poverty of the fourth kind only. Such poverty is
therefore sufficient substantially to constitute the religious
state. Poverty is not for its own sake necessary in order
to perfection. Poverty is necessary only as it is a means
for the removal of hindrances to the acquiring of perfection,
such as solicitude for temporal things, love of riches, and
occasions of elation or vain glory. The last two of these
Religious Poverty. 1 1 7
hindrances may be sufficiently diminished or obviated
through some considerable diminution of riches, even if
some few temporal goods should still be retained as one's
own property. Solicitude for the means of living cannot be
wholly prevented, since a man cannot possibly live with
out at least the possession and use of some temporal goods,
and so he cannot be set entirely free from all care and
solicitude with regard to these. That solicitude is, how
ever, small which suffices for the few things which are
really necessary for support of life. There would, in fact,
be greater solicitude were a man to live by begging, than
there would be if he were in possession of a few necessaries
of life, or if he had a small but certain income. Solicitude
so measured would not be contrary to perfection.
Although it is probable that at one time the religious
state existed with poverty of the fourth kind only — and
therefore that such poverty suffices substantially to constitute
the religious state — it is nevertheless more probable that
the kind of poverty which is exercised by way of abdication
of ownership, at least so far as regards independent use of
property, always obtained in the state of perfection, as that
state has always existed in Christ's Church. Although
ownership is not absolutely at variance with personal per
fection, it nevertheless does seem to be in no small degree
at variance with the state of perfection. It is certain at
least that absence of ownership contributes towards greater
perfection. It cannot be doubted that the state of per
fection existed in its greatest perfection in the Apostles,
and in their followers, of whom a series and succession has
never failed in the Church of God.
The kind of poverty which renders a religious incapable
n8 Elements of Religious Life.
of ownership was not observed from the beginning of the
Church. Poverty of this kind is not induced in the
religious state by the nature of the case, and it is not
matter of a vow of poverty. However much a man might
wish to deprive himself of capability of ownership, it is not
in his own power to do so, and therefore he cannot make
a vow to do so. Incapability of ownership is an effect
which is added to his vow by ordinance of the Church.
This effect of incapability of ownership is nevertheless
voluntary on the part of the man who makes a vow of
poverty. He who wills the cause wills also the effect.
The solemnity of a vow of poverty which renders a
religious incapable of ownership was introduced universally
in the time of the Emperor Justinian. That it obtained in
any religious Order before that time, by grant of the
Sovereign Pontiff, is by no means certain.
The primary reason of the institution of the solemnity of
the religious vow of poverty is that, although incapability
of ownership is not absolutely necessary in order to per
fection, it nevertheless contributes largely towards perfection,
through cutting out by the roots all occasions of ownership.
As the religious, moreover, ceases through his profession
to be his own master, and is himself made personally
subject to the dominion of the Order, so it is fitting that
the accessory should follow the principal, and that, by force
of ordinary law, all that a religious possesses, or may ever
possess, should pass by way of ownership to the Order.
The existence of a solemn vow of poverty is compatible with reten
tion of ownership by a religious. St. Francis Borgia, by dispensation
of Paul III., so made his solemn vows in the Society of Jesus as never
theless only after four years from his profession to abdicate his Duchy
of Gandia and other temporal possessions. The Sacred Penitentiary
gave faculty to Nuns in France, Nov. 28, 1818, that notwithstanding
Religious Poverty. 1 1 9
their solemn vows of poverty, they should have power to retain goods
and revenues which they had acquired. By express authority of the
Holy See faculty was given also on Nov. 20, 1820, to Nuns in Belgium,
although solemnly professed, to acquire, possess, and administer goods.
St. Ignatius, in a Declaration added by him to the Constitutions of the
Society of Jesus, makes express mention of a faculty to acquire and re
tain ownership even after solemn profession, which can be obtained
from the Apostolic See.
The reason of this is not abstruse. Ownership of temporal goods is
compatible with a simple vow of poverty. That which is added to a
simple vow, namely, the solemnity of the same vow, is produced by
ecclesiastical law, as the Apostolic Constitutions plainly declare.
Hence it is manifest that the force and measure of the effects of
solemnity can be limited by the same power from which the solemnity
itself proceeds, and therefore it depends on the will of the Supreme
Lawgiver in the Church. It is of the very nature of the case that a
religious who is solemnly professed should live either incapable or
capable of ownership at the decision of the supreme authority, to whose
wisdom it belongs to dispose all matters in accordance with their
adjuncts of times, places, and persons. See Ballerini, Opus Theo-
logicum Morale, vol. iv. page 55.
8.
Two kinds of poverty are conceivable in a religious
community. The first, although it excludes all private
ownership in individual religious, admits of ownership in
the religious body, as that body constitutes one moral
person. The second kind of poverty excludes ownership
even by the community. Even in community poverty — as it
is distinguished from individual poverty — there may exist
degrees. The first degree excludes ownership of real pro
perty and revenues, but not ownership of moveable goods.
The second degree does not admit ownership even of move-
able goods. A third degree not only excludes ownership of
both kinds of goods, but also debars collection of
necessaries for use at some future time. It allows the
120 Elements of Religions Life.
acquisition of those things only which are necessary for
present actual use.
Community pwerty has its foundations in the most
ancient traditions of the Church of God. As observed in
religious bodies, however, which profess common life in
one congregation, or body politic, its origin is not so
ancient. It began in the time of St. Francis and St.
Dominic. The approbation by Pontiffs and Councils of
Institutes which profess community poverty suffices to
make manifest, and that as of faith, the certainty of its
lawfulness.
The Council of Trent not only approved the poverty of
St. Francis, but willed it to be observed in its integrity.
When giving to other religious bodies power as com
munities to possess goods, even if this should hitherto
have been forbidden to them, it excepted the Order of
St. Francis.
That religious Institute is also laudable in which poverty
is observed by a combination of abdication of all owner
ship by individual religious, with ownership of goods as
possessed by the religious body of which the individuals
are members. This is not only certain as of faith, but it
is also manifest on the face of it that this kind of poverty
is most useful as it is a means towards the attaining of
perfection.
9-
St. Thomas holds that no one of these modes of poverty
is simply and in itself to be preferred to the other modes.
He maintains that that mode of poverty is the most
excellent which is most in accordance with the ends of the
religious state, poverty being regarded not for its own sake,
Religious Poverty. 121
but solely as it is a means towards the end of perfection.
That kind of poverty is not, therefore, always to be
reckoned the best, which is the most extreme. That is the
best which is best suited to its end. In this consists its
perfection.
St. Thomas distinguishes three kinds of religious Orders,
and three ends of the religious state. Some Orders are
principally active. They are concerned with corporal
works, such as hospitality and military service. In this
case he says that it is better for a community to possess
goods, and these even in abundance, as being necessary in
order to the end of the Institute. Other religious bodies
are ordained for a purely contemplative life. In these, he
says, it is convenient for the community to be the owner of
moderate possessions. Solicitude with regard to temporal
affairs is thereby sufficiently obviated. Other religious
bodies have been instituted not only for contemplation,
but also for bestowing on others outside themselves the
fruits of contemplation. For these St. Thomas says that
community poverty as well as individual poverty is to be
preferred, since their state requires that there should be
the very smallest degree of temporal solicitude.
The Council of Trent however granted to all monasteries
and religious houses, even of Mendicants, power to possess
real property, even if this should have been forbidden by
their Institutes, or otherwise, with the sole exception of the
Observantine Friars Minor and the Capuchins.
By this decree the Council signifies that this mode of
living on the fruits of community possessions is the most
generally suitable. The Council excepted from its decree
the Friars Minor, both because of the special profession of
that religious body, and because it was not well that
122 Elements of Religious Life.
poverty in this extreme of its perfection should nowhere
exist within the limits of the religious state in the Church
of God.
10.
It is held as a general rule that the acceptance of a thing
is an act of ownership. It is consequently contrary to the
vow of poverty that a private religious should accept any
thing without leave of his superior. This sin is of its own
nature mortal. It is rendered venial only by reason of small-
ness of matter. The Council of Trent permits to religious
the use of moveable goods only with leave of their Su
periors. The Council says that a religious cannot keep any
goods as his own, but that all goods must be immediately
delivered to his superior. Goods are held to be morally
delivered to the superior when leave is asked and obtained,
and when in the superior's name or by his authority the
goods are received and retained, or given away to others.
Express leave is necessary when it can conveniently be
asked for. Religious rule, as well as order and the fitness
of things, demands this.
When there is no opportunity for asking leave, a
presumed or interpretative leave will suffice; as when, for
instance, the superior is engaged or absent, and there
is some considerable reason for immediate acceptance of
the offered gift. In this case if an individual religious
supposes that his superior, if he could have been got at,
would have given leave, the gift may be accepted without
sin on the score of ownership The religious should have
the intention to manifest the matter to his superior as soon
as an opportunity occurs, so that the superior may expressly
ratify the acceptance, or, if he pleases, annul it. This also
religious rule as well as due order demands.
Religions Poverty. 123
With regard to the question as to whether a religious has power to
refuse things which are offered to him by an extern, there has first to
be distinguished whether that which is offered is a simple gift, or
whether it is a debt which is due on account of work which has been
done by the religious. If that which is offered is a simple gift, it is
lawful for a religious to refuse it, and even to beg that it should be
given to another, as for instance to a kinsman. For this the leave of
the Superior is not required. The religious is not thereby disposing
of any thing — he is not exercising any right — and he is not doing to
any one an injury. His monastery has no right to that gift. It might
be however that he should be sinning against charity, if his monastery
from which he turned away the benefaction stood in great need
of it.
If, on the other hand, that which is offered to a religious by an
extern is due, as for instance a stipend for a course of Lenten sermons,
and his monastery or his Order is one of those which are capable of
acquiring such goods, he has no power to refuse it, and he would be
acting inequitably and unjustly in refusing it. As soon as the work in
question has been done by him — and before his either acceptance
or refusal of the stipend — a right to that stipend has been acquired
by the monastery. This it is not free to the religious to dispose of.
If he does dispose of it, he will be sinning against his vow of poverty,
and doing an injury to his monastery.
A religious cannot either lawfully or validly give alms without leave
of his Superior, since he has no right either of ownership or of adminis
tration. There is an exception in the case of the extreme necessity of
a poor person, to whom an alms is to be given, even against the will of
the Superior. The virtue of charity in that case prevails, and the poor
man has himself already the right to take the goods. In his exercise
of this right of his, the religious is only co-operating by giving him an
alms.
There are other cases of exception, but that inasmuch as there is
in them tacit or presumed leave, if access cannot be had to the
Superior, as for instance in the case of grievous necessity. If a
religious is, either by command or with the consent of his Superiors,
living outside his cloister, for the sake of his studies, and they have
supplied him with money for his support, there will then be either
tacit or presumed leave for his giving some small alms which will
conduce to edification. The goods of the monastery, of which a part
124 Elements of Religious Life.
has been supplied to him, are destined for this use also, that from
them alms should be given to the poor.
It is also permitted to religious generally to make small donations in
token of gratitude, which is a sort of debt. For these therefore the
leave of the Superior is at least presumed. If, however, the Superior
should oppose either these donations, or those alms which are lawful
only on the ground of tacit or presumed leave, the giving of them will
be no longer lawful.
If a religious were to paint a picture, or to execute some work of art
for an extern, and give it to him without leave of his Superior, his
intention in so doing has to be considered. If, of his primary intention
the work was done at the request of the extern, who also supplied the
materials, then the religious will only have been doing the extern a
service, and in that case he will not have done anything against his vow
of poverty. It will therefore be lawful for him to do so, unless it has
been otherwise forbidden. If, on the other hand, the primary intention
of the religious was to execute the work for himself, and then he
afterwards decided to give it to an extern, he cannot do so. Right to
that work of art has already passed to his monastery, and he cannot
without leave of the Superior dispose of it. See Ballerini, Opus
Thcologicum Morale, vol. iv. page 80.
As nothing can be accepted by a religious without leave,
so also nothing can without leave be retained. Express
leave, therefore, when it can conveniently be asked for, is
necessary for retaining, in at least the same way in which
it is necessary for accepting. When the asking of express
leave to accept, therefore, has been impossible, there re
mains, when the hindrance ceases, the same obligation to
ask express leave at least for the retaining of the gift. By
rigorous interpretation of the precept, reasonable pre
sumption of the will of the Superior is sufficient for avoid
ance of the sin of ownership, even in a case in which his
express leave might have been asked, if the asking has
been omitted from some motive of human respect, or
Religious Poverty. 125
from shyness, or difficulty of approaching the Superior.
There is a distinction between tacit leave and presumed
leave. That is tacit leave which is virtually contained in
some express act, in accordance with its legal or its reason
able interpretation. That is presumed leave which, it is
with probability believed, would have been granted, if the
Superior could have been asked. The will is of the present
in the one case. In the other case it is of the future, and
conditioned.
There is a case of tacit leave when, for instance, the
Superior gives a religious leave for a journey, and does not
forbid him to accept anything. The Superior is then held
virtually to have given him leave to accept such things as
might otherwise prudently, and in accordance with reli
gious fitness, be accepted. The one leave is understood,
and not without reason, to be implicitly contained in the
other leave.
Again, a Superior has, generally speaking, the intention
to administer his office worthily and for the benefit of his
community. He is held, therefore, implicitly and tacitly
to have the will that, when he is absent or is difficult of
access, and there is disadvantage in delay, an offered
gift may be accepted. Further, there may exist in a
religious community a custom of accepting up to a certain
amount, without asking and obtaining express leave. If
this custom is known to and tolerated by Superiors, it is
a sufficient indication of a general will on their part. In
this case, and as regards the reasonableness of such a
custom, the burden lies on the consciences of Superiors
rather than on those of subjects. Even if the custom is
unreasonable, the fact of the existence of it is sufficient to
prevent the act of the subject from being contrary to
126 Elements of Religious Life.
poverty. This is evident, since if, even in the case of ex
press leave, it should appear to a religious that his Superior
was not rightly fulfilling his office by granting a certain
leave, the religious will, nevertheless, in availing himself of
that leave, not sin against poverty, although he may be
sinning on other grounds, either by reason of scandal, or
of co-operation in evil doing.
Subjects ought, having regard to their Rule and Insti
tute, to beware of availing themselves of any custom which
manifestly tends towards religious relaxation. This they
ought to refrain from, both by reason of the grievous injury
to religion in which they are co-operating, and also because
there is always brought by subjects a certain moral force
to bear upon their Superiors, so that these sometimes can
not or dare not root out an evil custom. When this is so,
the custom itself manifests not so much the consent of the
Superior, as his mere permission of an evil.
There is another mode of tacit leave. This occurs
when a Superior sees a subject accept something, and is
silent. Since it may be presumed that he will not connive
at sinful ownership in his subject, he is reasonably sup
posed to be silent because he consents, and so gives tacit
leave.
Presumed leave — as distinguished from tacit leave — is
not founded in any will of the Superior, past or present,
formal or virtual, nor in any signs thereof. It is founded
only in probable conjectures with regard to what would
have been his will, had he known the circumstances, or had
leave been asked. Such leave suffices, nevertheless, to
excuse acceptance by a religious of an offered gift from
sin through ownership.
Displeasure of a superior at acceptance of a gift might
Religious Poverty. 127
arise in two different ways. He might object to the thing
itself being accepted. If this should at the time be known
to- the receiver, there would not be any presumption of
leave, and acceptance would involve ownership. If, how
ever, the displeasure of the Superior which is anticipated
regards not acceptance of the gift, but only the manner of
its acceptance, namely, without express leave, acceptance
will be excused from mortal sin, since it is excused from
ownership, even if it cannot be excused from some fault of
disobedience.
Leave may be unjust in various ways on the part of him
who asks it, either by reason of that for which leave is
asked — or by reason of the cause for which the leave is
asked. Leave is unjust on the part of him who asks it,
when he extorts it by force, deceit, or fraud. Such leave is
null and void. If the leave is surreptitious and proceeds
from a false cause, it will not render the subject who has
obtained it safe in conscience. In like manner, if circum
stances are kept back which would most likely and reason
ably have caused the Superior not to give leave, his
ignorance of such circumstances would be sufficient to
annul the leave. If, however, that which is kept back is
something which might perhaps have made the granting of
the leave more difficult to obtain, but would not absolutely
have prevented its being granted, the leave may be suffi
cient. The ground of difficulty in this case belonged not
to the substance of the leave, but to the mode of the leave
as asked and granted.
Leave may also be unjust by reason of that for which
leave is asked, as, for instance, leave to receive something
from one who has no power to give it, or who is not its
128 Elements of Religious Life.
owner. Such leave is invalid, apart from any vow of
poverty.
Further, leave may be unjust by reason of the cause for
which it is given. Leave is, for instance, unjust when it is
given without necessity or reasonable cause. Acceptance,
however, which follows upon it, does not involve the idea
of ownership. Such acceptance is not contrary to — or
apart from — but is dependent on the Superior's will. The
acceptance is not in one's own, but in another's name.
The Superior, in giving leave, does not dispense from
the vtnv of poverty. He only places matter of poverty
outside the vow of poverty. Hence, leave given without
just cause is not therefore null.
The fact that leave ought to have been given will not, when
the leave has not been given, prevent ownership. The fact
that a Superior ought to will is not equivalent to his actually
willing.
Acceptance of a loan by a religious cannot be excused
from grievous sin. More grave matter, however, is re
quired for this than would be necessary as matter of
grievous sin, if the thing lent had been accepted as a gift.
A loan is a contract, whereby dominion is acquired, along
with an obligation of repayment. Acceptance of a thing
lent is therefore an act of ownership. It is at variance
with poverty, since something is accepted without leave,
and thus treated as if it were one's own, and also because
the religious has bound himself on his own authority to
restitution. This is an obligation which, morally speaking,
cannot be fulfilled. The religious has not wherewith to
repay the loan, and his monastery is not bound to refund
Religious Poverty. 129
it. If, however, a religious should, with leave of his
Superior, be absent from his monastery, and he were to fall
sick, or should he from any other cause stand in need of
money for necessary uses, such as a religious Order is
wont and ought to provide, then in accepting a loan there
is no act of ownership. There is then sufficient leave, and
the religious body is bound to repayment of the loan even
as it was bound to provide whatsoever was necessary for its
religious subject.
If a religious, without leave of his Superior, receives money to distribute
to externs, and he distributes it in his own name, he will sin against
his vow of poverty by an exercise of ownership. If, however, he distri
butes it in the name of another, that is to say, of the giver, it will be an
act of simple administration, and he will not be sinning against poverty,
whatever the sum which he has received may be. He may however be
sinning in other ways, as against obedience or as against the Rule.
Although the man who gives money to a religious for distribution to
others does not designate the persons to whom it is to be distributed,
nor the amount which is to be given to each, it still remains purely a
matter of ministry so long as one makes the distribution in name of
another. The religious does not accept or retain the money as his
own, or as if he were master of it, but in the name of another, to give
to the poor. He does not therefore exercise any act of dominion or
ownership.
It is not every possession and every administration of money which is
at variance with the vow of poverty, but those only which are exercised
as matter of right, that is, when a religious administers property in his
own name.
In the expending which occurs in the case supposed we find four
things only — acceptance of the money — faculty to make selection among
poor persons — the choice of these — and the distribution among them.
No one of these is against a vow of poverty. Acceptance of the
money is not against it, because the religious receives the money, not
for himself, but to distribute in name of the giver amongst the poor.
Faculty to select persons is not contrary to the vow of poverty, since
this is merely a right of nomination. The choice of certain poor
persons is not contrary to the vow of poverty, since if the right to
I
130 Elements of Religious Life.
select them is not contrary, most certainly the selection of them, which
is an exercise of that right, cannot possibly be contrary to the vow of
poverty. In like manner the distribution of the money to the poor is
not at variance with the vow of poverty, because the religious is dis
tributing it not in his own name, but in name of the giver of the alms.
See Ballerini, Opus Thcologicum Morale, vol. iv. page 76.
By a Constitution of Clement VIII. every religious, and every
convent, and every chapter is forbidden to give or send a gift to any
person, unless in General Chapter or in a general congregation, and
after mature discussion of the matter, the cause has been approved by
the unanimous consent of all, and by the permission of Superiors.
This Constitution while it was confirmed was at the same time
tempered by Urban VIII., who has declared that gifts may be given
by religious of both sexes on the ground of gratitude, of conciliation, of
benevolence, and of preservation of benevolence, towards the Order or
Convent, and for other reasons which of their own nature contain an
act of virtue and merit, with modesty, however, and discreetness, and
so long as the gifts are not made except with leave of the local
Superior, and with consent also of the greater part of the Convent,
if such consent is required by law, or by the Constitutions, or by the
custom of the Order.
Pope Urban also declared that the consent of the Convent which was
required by Clement VIII. for eatables and drinkables of small
amount, or for little gifts of objects of devotion, is not required, unless
nasmuch as it is otherwise already required by law, or unless there is
ground for suspicion of ambition, and that then the verbal leave of
the Superior is sufficient.
He also declared that refreshments and entertainments in receiving
benefactors or protectors or the Ordinaries, are not unlawful, so long as
they do not exceed the limits of that which is becoming in the religious
state. Neither of these Pontiffs prohibited, but on the contrary greatly
commended, hospitality. See Ballerini, Opus Thcologicum Morale,
vol. iv. page 87.
II.
A proprietary peculium is contrary to religious poverty.
The first and principal sign of a thing being a proprietary
peculium is its being possessed without lawful leave of the
Religious Poverty. 131
Superior. He who so possesses, possesses not in another's
name, but in his own name. He therefore possesses that
thing as if it were his own. He thus violates his vow
of poverty, and commits a sacrilege. He also commits
a theft. He is taking away and retaining the property of
another, against the will of its owner. The thing belongs,
not to him, but to the religious body, without the con
sent of which he takes it.
A second sign of proprietary peculium is when the thing
possessed is hidden so that it cannot be found by the
Superior. The subject has then the disposition to retain
the thing, whatever may be the will of his Superior. The
Superior is thus deprived of his power of otherwise dis
posing of that thing.
If an individual religious, with leave of his Superior,
lawfully obtained, in accordance with his Rule, or with an
approved custom of his Order, has a key, that key is not a
sign of ownership. He is in possession of the key, not in
his own name, but in his Superior's name. A key in itself
is only an instrument and a sign of guardianship. A key
is then only a sign of ownership^ when it is kept and used
in one's own name, and as by one's own right.
Apart from scandal, it ought not hastily to be assumed
that there has been mortal sin, if a religious subject is
really prepared to surrender all things at the beck of his
Superior, and to give up the key whenever he is asked for
it. He has not in this case the disposition or intention of
ownership, even if his affection is irregular, and the
manner of his guardianship is contrary to his Rule.
12.
Use of a thing as if it were one's own is of course
132 Elements of Religious Life.
excluded by a vow of poverty. Such use is an act of owner
ship. The exercise of poverty is, moreover, even more
necessary as regards use, than it is as regards ownership.
A vow to surrender the use of things as if they were one's
own, even if the ownership of them is retained, is intel
ligible. To deprive oneself by vow of all ownership, and
at the same time to retain /m- use of things as if they were
one's own, without leave of a Superior, is not intelligible.
Leave is not to be so easily presumed for the expending
of goods, as it may be presumed for the acceptance and
retaining of goods, when they are offered as gifts.
A religious sins against poverty when he gives away,
either inside or outside his monastery, things which have
been granted to himself for his own use. He sins even if
it is himself only whom he deprives of the use of these
goods, and even if he does not thereby burden his monas
tery. It is not in the power of a religious, for instance, to
give away food which he might have himself lawfully con
sumed, or to give away money which he might have law
fully spent on a journey.
When a religious is granted the use of a thing, there is
not thereby granted to him the right to use it. Of the
right to use it a religious is not capable, inasmuch as
this right partakes of ownership. When actual use is
granted to a religious, it is granted to him not in general,
and at his own discretion, but in a particular case. Outside
that particular actual use, he cannot on his own authority
usurp any other use.
It follows that not only may a religious not give to
another that which he subtracts from himself, but he may
not apply a thing to a use for which it was not granted to
him. He cannot, for instance, sell his food to buy books,
Religious Poverty. 133
and money given to him to buy certain books he cannot
spend in buying other books.
Superiors have not power to spend the goods of the
monastery at their own free will. The Superior has the
proximate administration of the goods of the monastery,
but he is not the owner of those goods. He himself is in
capable of ownership, and the monastery has not trans
ferred to him the ownership of its goods.
Religious, who have been solemnly professed, have no
power, either lawfully or validly, to make testaments with
out faculty. This cannot be given to them by any
Superior except the Sovereign Pontiff. To make a testa
ment is an act of ownership.
A religious sins against his vow of poverty in having superfluities
even with leave of his Superior. He does not sin for want of leave,
or with the vice of ownership, but because his vow is not only not to
use goods without leave of his Superior, but also to observe the stats of
a poor matt, and not to make expenses which do not beseem poor men.
Hence the Council of Trent prescribes to Superiors, that they should
not allow surroundings to religious which do not become the state of
poverty which they have professed, or which have in them anything of
superfluity. Leave of a Superior may in this matter prevent any sin
of ownership, but it will not effect that superfluity should not be
at variance with the state of poverty which a religious has vowed.
See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, vol iv. page 37.
The Council of Trent granted to all religious Orders —
the Observantine Friars Minor and the Capuchins ex-
cepted — power to possess real property, even if that had
previously been forbidden to them. This grant includes
permission for community ownership, and right to revenues,
usufructs, and the like.
134 Elements of Religious Life.
The Council does not prescribe that community poverty
should not be observed by other religious Orders. It
merely grants indulgence. Notwithstanding this decree,
therefore, any religious body is free to renounce the right
which the Council grants, and to retain its own observance
and obligation.
This has, in fact, been done by the Society of Jesus, so
far as the Professed Houses of the Society are concerned.
The Institute of the Society was approved by the Apostolic
See subsequently to the decree of the Council.
A religious body which professes community poverty is
bound not to possess any real property for the support of
its members. This is the special matter of its vow and
obligation. It has power to collect, and to keep for use at
convenience, moveable goods, although with due modera
tion, so as not morally to nullify its profession of poverty-
Money, as such, is never reckoned as real property. These
communities may therefore — with the exception of the
Friars Minor — collect the money which is necessary for
their support.
They may have a house for their ordinary habitation — a
church for the divine service — and a garden adjoining the
house for the recreation of the religious.
"We have spoken hitherto principally of the obligations of subjects,
and something remains to be said with regard to the obligations of
Superiors. It is, in the first place, certain that Superiors cannot
lawfully give leave to their subjects for things which, looking to all the
circumstances, are not becoming to the state of poverty. Facility in
this matter on the part of Superiors will lead to remissness of
regular observance.
Secondly, since the Superior is the administrator of the common
goods, he cannot alienate either real property or precious moveables.
Thirdly, in expending the revenues of the convent, it is not sufficient
Religious Poverty. 135
that the works on which they are rspent should be pious works, or
works which are ordained for the worship of God and the good of
religion, but they must also be such works as beseem the state of
religious poverty.
Fourthly, the Superior ought to give alms out of his superfluity of
revenue, since ecclesiastical goods are destined also for the poor, and
religious houses ought to give an example of poverty, and this is given
by bestowal of their superfluity upon the poor.
Fifthly, in supplying his subjects with food and clothing, a Superior,
having regard always to religious poverty, will commend himself to his
subjects by liberality rather than by parsimony. Experience teaches
that St. Bernard spoke truly when he said that — where there is not
abundance, there will not be observance.
Sixthly, a Superior who introduces peculia among his subjects, or
who permits them to be introduced, will, unless there be most grave
cause to excuse it, sin grievously. The Superiors of an Order, if they
can without great difficulty bring back common life, are bound to pro
mote it, since they are bound to procure the good of their subjects in
accordance with the Rule, and to procure the perfection of the vow of
poverty. .See Ballerini, Opus Thcologicuni Morale, vol iv. page 88.
CHAPTER VI.
Religious Chastity.
IT is not only lawful and good, but it is also better than a
good thing which is merely good, to observe virginity,
which, although it is not prescribed, is most certainly
counselled in the evangelical law. This is of faith.
It is also of faith that not only is it better than a good
thing which is merely good to observe virginity, but that
it is best of all to consecrate virginity or perpetual chastity
to God by vow. This is best of all, both by reason of the
excellence of the matter of the vow, and by reason of the
farther excellence of whatever is done under vow.
A vow of perpetual chastity being privative binds, so
far as the matter of it is concerned, after the manner of a
negative precept, that is, of a precept which forbids, — as
it is distinguished from an affirmative precept, or a precept
which prescribes. A vow of chastity therefore binds always
and at every moment, continuously and without inter
mission.
The matter of chastity is twofold. There is necessary
chastity, and there is voluntary chastity. The necessary
matter of chastity is abstinence from every foul act, and
from every exercise of lust outside the state of matrimony.
To this every man is bound in virtue of the natural law,
and apart from any vow. This necessary matter falls,
Religious Chastity. 137
nevertheless, under a vow of chastity, which adds to the
natural and therefore necessary obligation, another and a
voluntary bond of obligation. Hence a man who violates
a vow of chastity will sin not only against temperance, but
also against religion, as violating a vow. This is certain, It
is certain not only as regards external acts, but also as re
gards internal consent. It extends to all voluntary desires
which are contrary to chastity, and to every lingering and
voluntary delight in an act of uncleanness, even if it is
indulged apart from desire, and without purpose to commit
any external act.
The voluntary chastity which, along with necessary
chastity, forms part of the matter of a vow of chastity, is
abstinence from acts which might be lawful, and which are
lawful, in the matrimonial state, and the foundation of the
lawfulness of which is the bond of matrimony.
A vow of perpetual chastity, therefore, binds him who
makes it not to contract matrimony with the intention of
consummating it. To do so on one's own authority, and with
out dispensation, would be intrinsically evil and a grievous
sin of sacrilege. In order not only to lawful but to valid
dispensation, a just cause is necessary. Mere want of will
to persevere in the state of chastity which has been vowed
does not suffice as a cause for dispensation, since this want
of will to persevere in chastity has its root in simple
wickedness.
2.
The bond of matrimony is not, in itself, formally con
trary to a vow of chastity. The vow, in itself, concerns not
the not contracting matrimony, but the not doing anything
which is contrary to chastity. In the intention to contract
matrimony there is not necessarily included an intention to
138 Elements of Religious Life.
consummate the matrimony which has been contracted.
The virtual intention of consummation, which it ordinarily
includes, may be excluded by a contrary formal intention.
The intention to contract matrimony may have a higher
end than is the consummation of matrimony, and may have
reference to the religious state. If a virgin, for instance,
has made a secret vow of chastity, and she cannot possibly
obtain from her parents freedom for her perseverance in her
virgin state, and she does not dare to reveal to them her vow,
she can contract matrimony without any violation of her
vow, if she does so with the intention of entering the reli
gious state before consummation of the matrimony. As a
rule, however, looking to the moral risk of incontinence, and
of change of purpose, no one ought to expose herself, by so
contracting, to this peril, without the very greatest neces
sity, and without ample proof of the steadfastness of her
will, with every ground for hope of perseverance in her
purpose. Hence this case is rare, and a contract of this
kind is not readily or easily to be permitted.
When such a case does occur, there should be made a
commutation, or rather an extension, of the vow of chastity
into a vow of entrance into religion. If profession is
afterwards hindered for a reasonable cause, the person may
then without scruple return to the world, and enter without
sin on fulfilment of matrimonial duties. The reason is
because, in virtue of the commutation or extension of the
vow of chastity into a vow of religion, the vow does not
bind to absolute continence except in the religious state.
There is no injury done to the other party to the con
tract by the one who contracts matrimony with such a vow,
since in every marriage there is understood by law to exist
on both sides the tacit condition — Unless I should resolve
(before consummation of the matrimony) to pass to the
Religious Chastity. 139
religious state. Neither of the contracting parties is bound
to immediate consummation, and both of them have right
to deliberation and action with regard to the religious state
within the time prescribed by Canon Law, which is two
months after celebration of the marriage.
3-
A simple vow of virginity or of continence does not in
validate subsequent matrimony, although it renders it un
lawful. A simple vow is purely a promise, and by a mere
promise of a thing the ownership of that thing is not trans
ferred. If an owner should give to one person a thing
which he had previously promised to another person, the
donation, however unlawful, will be valid. Matrimony which
is subsequent to a simple vow of chastity is the donation of
that which was previously promised to God. As a donation
it is valid, although it is at variance with the fidelity which
is due to God. It is valid, as matrimony is valid as against
espousals, or as against a promise of marriage to another,
even if that promise has been made under oath ; or as a
donation of a sum of money to a friend is valid, although
unlawful, as against a vow to give that sum in alms.
Although matrimony contracted wrongly by reason of a
previous vow of chastity is valid, the vow is nevertheless
not thereby extinguished, nor is the obligation of the vow
entirely removed. Although the vow may be over and
over again violated, the obligation of it always remains,
since this obligation is in itself perpetual. Although the
vow of chastity cannot possibly in all things be observed,
by reason of the change of condition of him who made
it, it nevertheless continues to bind him, at least as
regards those matters which still remain within his power.
A previous vow of chastity invalidates espousals, since
140 Elements of Religious Life.
espousals are at variance with the already existing obliga
tion of that vow. The vow is of its nature a graver matter,
and the obligation of the vow, moreover, preceded the
obligation of the espousals. There is in this case an
obligation of promise against promise, and not, as in the
case of matrimony, a donation prevailing against a promise.
An obligation of continence is annexed to Sacred Orders,
that is, to the Orders from the sub-diaconate up to the
episcopate, reckoned in accordance with the present usage
of the Latin Church.
No Sacred Order received before matrimony disables a
man from contracting matrimony in virtue of divine law
alone. Neither is there any divine precept which forbids
persons in Sacred Orders to take wives. Further, there
exists no precept of divine law which forbids to clerks in
Sacred Orders the use of matrimony, if they have con
tracted it before ordination.
That persons in Sacred Orders should be bound by the
Church to perpetual continence — either by abstaining from
matrimony, if they have not previously contracted it, or by
abstaining from the use of matrimony, if they are already
married — is not contrary to divine law, either natural or
positive. It is, on the contrary, very much in accordance
with divine law. This is of faith.
No man is compelled to make such a vow of continence,
since every man is free not to be ordained. No injury is
done to any man, for to no man does the Church owe
ordination. She has the power to deny ordination to any
man without such conditions and such a quasi-covenant
as she may deem to be expedient.
Religious Chastity. 141
From the time of the Apostles no man who has already
been ordained priest has been free to contract matrimony.
It is certain, and of faith, that priests in the Latin
Church, ordained after matrimony, are bound to abstain
from the use of matrimony, although this precept is not
binding in the Greek Church, That is by reason of con
trary custom, which lawfully prevails. Hence it is clear
that the precept is not properly apostolic, although it is
certain that it has sprung from apostolic tradition. It was
always observed in the Church of Rome, as St. Gregory
expressly affirms. That it was received in the Western
Church is clear on the evidence of various very early Pro
vincial Councils. The intention of the Church is that he
who voluntarily receives Sacred Orders should make a vow
of chastity, and this she binds him to make. She imposes
this burden through the voluntary covenant between her
and him who from her receives Sacred Orders. He is
bound, either from obedience or of justice, to fulfilment of
the condition under which he was admitted to Orders.
The Church might by means of a law bind him to observe
chastity without any promise of chastity on his part, but
she prefers to impose this obligation through the interven
tion of a vow, and to bind him to fulfilment of this vow, in
order that the obligation should be at once more sacred
and more immutable. If the obligation were only through
precept of the Church it might more easily be dispensed,
and dispensation of it without cause would, although
unlawful, be valid. A vow intervening, dispensation is
more difficult, and if given without cause would not be
valid.
This vow, although it is not made explicitly by him who
is ordained, is nevertheless made implicitly. After the
142 Elements of Religious Life.
law has once been sufficiently established and made known,
it is itself an admonition to all who receive Sacred Orders
of the condition and burden subject to which they are
admitted to these Orders. In this therefore that they have
the will to be ordained in accordance with the laws of the
Church, they make a sufficient implicit vow, even if there
is not made any express act of promise.
If a man receives Sacred Orders with an express inten
tion not to vow, he does not make a vow of chastity,
although he remains ordained. His sacrilegious sin in so
doing is a sin of disobedience, as it is the sin of trans
gression of a most grave precept. It is a sin of faithless
ness, as it is a most grievous lie, and a lie which is
pernicious to the Church. It is a sin of injustice, as
contrary to the covenant entered into by him with the
Church. Hence arises an obligation of restitution. A
man so ordained remains bound to reverse his intention,
and to make a vow of chastity. The obligation under
which he lay on the day of his ordination is not extin
guished by his transgression of that obligation. The
obligation perpetually and increasingly urges, since the
vow exists, not by reason of the ordination, as it is a tran
sient act, but by reason of the permanent state which the
ordination constitutes.
A person so ordained, although he has not made a vow
of chastity, is nevertheless disabled for validly contracting
matrimony. This disability springs proximately from the
will and institution of the Church. The Sacrament of
Order by itself, or a vow by itself, has not force so to dis
able. The Church might have in this case disabled apart
from the vow, but her intention is to disable by means of
a vow which is solemnized through sacred ordination. Since,
however, she does not judge with regard to the hidden,
Religious Chastity. 143
and since, moreover, a man ought not to profit by means
of his fraud, she has ordained that this disability should
not depend essentially on there being a true vow, but that
a vow which is at once both presumed and due should
suffice to constitute the disability. The implicit vow in
Sacred Orders is not merely a vow not to marry, but is
simply and absolutely a vow of chastity, which binds the
cleric to abstain not only from matrimony, but from every
act and desire which is libidinous and contrary to chastity.
In order to the solemnity of a religious vow of chastity
there are two conditions which are required. The first
is that the vow should be absolute and perpetual, and
this of the intention both of him who makes it, and of
him who accepts it. The second condition is that the
vow should disable a man for matrimony, and destroy not
only matrimony to be contracted, but also matrimony
already contracted, but not yet consummated. This last
effect the solemnity of a religious vow adds over and above
that which the solemnity of the vow of continence, which is
annexed to Sacred Orders, effects. The latter, although
it disables for contracting valid matrimony, does not destroy
matrimony which has been already contracted but not
consummated.
It is certain, and of faith, that a solemn vow of chastity
made in an approved religious Order renders a man
incapable of subsequent matrimony. It is certain also that
a vow of chastity, however solemn, does not dissolve
consummated matrimony. Consummated matrimony be
tween baptised persons is wholly indissoluble, and that
of divine law. A solemn vow of religious chastity dissolves
matrimony which has not been consummated, and this
144 Elements of Religious Life.
apart from the consent, or even against the will of the
other party to the matrimonial contract. This is a truth
of faith, defined by the Council of Trent. The reason
why this effect does not belong to that vow which is
included in Sacred Order is not defect of power^ but
defect of will on the part of the Church.
The Church has reason in so dealing, since, in the
first place, wedlock and religious profession are, of the
very nature of them, at variance with each other. Not
so wedlock and Sacred Order. Wedlock and religious
profession are mutually subversive of each other, not
as regards the bond and the obligation of each, but as re
gards the acts which belong to each, and the manner
of life which the bond of each requires. Religious
profession demands absolute renunciation of the world,
abnegation of one's own will, and surrender of one's own
body and of all things else. Wedlock, on the contrary,
demands life in the world. It is fitting therefore that, as
far as possible, the two bonds should not coexist. The
clericate, on the other hand, does not of itself demand
renunciation of the world. Neither the obligation nor
the exercise of the clerical office is of its nature sub
versive of wedlock, or of the use of wedlock. It is
subversive of these only by ordinance of the Church.
This is true not only of the priesthood, and of the Sacred
Orders below the priesthood, but also of the episcopate.
Although the episcopate is a more perfect state, it
nevertheless does not of itself bind to acts of the counsels.
The religious state is, moreover, the state of perfection
to be acquired. It therefore requires separation from the
use of matrimony, and from other exercises of secular
life. Power to profess the religious state could not be
Religious Chastity. 145
freely granted to one party to a matrimonial contract
independently of the other party thereto, without injury
to that other, except through dissolution of the matri
monial bond. That party would otherwise remain always
bound to observe perpetual continence.
Sacred Order, on the other hand, does not constitute
a man in the state of perfection, or in the way thereto.
Although from reverence for the sacred ministry it is
expedient that a man who has been ordained should not
pass to wedlock, it is nevertheless not expedient that
on the ground of ordination — which does not of itself
require profession of perfection — the bond of a matrimony
which has been already contracted, should be dis
solved.
The episcopate, although it is a state of "perfection to
be exercised" perfection being supposed to have been already
acquired, does not of itself however include means which
are efficacious for the acquiring of perfection. It is
not therefore given to reception of the episcopate
to dissolve unconsummated matrimony. The end of
this privilege is the setting of a man free to profess the
way of " perfection to be acquired."
Finally, religious profession is a civil or spiritual death.
Hence it is given to religious profession to dissolve the
bond of matrimony so long as that bond remains merely
spiritual. If the matrimony is consummated, the bond
is also carnal, and it is not dissolved except by natural
death of the body. In ordination, and in episcopal
consecration, there is no civil death. There is no abso
lute renunciation of one's own will, or of the ownership
of one's property. To neither ordination nor episcopal
consecration, therefore, has it been given to dissolve
the bond of matrimony.
K
146 Elements of Religious Life.
6.
It is certain that before the time of Gregory XIII.
the vows of chastity made by scholastics of the Society
of Jesus did not invalidate subsequent matrimony, although
they rendered it unlawful. Invalidation is not annexed
to a vow of chastity, except by constitution of the Church.
Before that Pontiffs time the Church had never attached
invalidation of subsequent matrimony to any vow that
was not entirely absolute. Looking to the intention of
the subject — to the acceptance of his vow by the Society
— and to the approbation of the Apostolic See, the vow
of scholastics was in the beginning of the Society an
entirely simple vow, and in no way invalidated subse
quent matrimony.
It is as certain that, by a decree of Gregory XIII.,
the simple vow of scholastics of the Society, so long
as it lasts, through perseverance in the Society, renders
a scholastic incapable of contracting valid matrimony.
CHAPTER VII.
Religious Obedience.
OBEDIENCE, as it is matter of a vow, is not that obedience
only which is due to God and to His precepts, nor is
it that obedience alone which is otherwise due by a man to
his fellow men, who possess and exercise true jurisdiction
over him, and power to prescribe to him. Of such
obedience it is evident that it is not only good, but also
necessary in order to avoidance of sin. This obedience
is not, therefore, of the number of those goods which
are of supererogation and counsel.
Besides this obedience there is another obedience, by
means of which a man subjects himself to the will of
another man in matters which are not otherwise pre
scribed, but which nevertheless may lawfully and rightly
be done. This obedience, as it is the subordination by
a man of his own will to the will of another, is one of those
goods of supererogation which fall under counsel. As
offered for the service of God by special vow, this
obedience is not only one of the evangelical counsels,
and matter of one of the three vows by means of which
the religious state is essentially constituted, but it is the
matter of the chief of these vows. Among these vows
it is the chief, both by reason of the excellence of the
matter which is consecrated to God, and by reason
also of the greater extensiveness of the offering. Poverty
offers to God external riches. Chastity offers to God
148 Elements of Religious Life.
certain pleasures of the body. Obedience offers to God
the soul, the understanding, the will, the whole man, as
not only a sacrifice, but an holocaust or whole burnt-
offering. By means of a vow of obedience a man subjects
to God, and offers, all his riches, his pleasures, and all
his actions, nay, and the whole of himself along with
them, to the perpetual worship and service of His
Divine Majesty. Hence St. Augustine calls obedience
not only the greatest of virtues, but the source and
mother of all virtues.
2.
A vow of obedience may be made with a double
promise, or with a single promise only, at the will of
the man who makes it. When the promise is twofold,
transgression of it involves two distinct species of wicked
ness. There is a sin of sacrilege, as against the vow,
which is made to God, while there is a sin of unfaithfulness,
or of injustice, as against the promise which is made to
man. By this double promise two distinct debts are con
stituted. Either of these debts suffices that violation of
the promise should be morally evil, and at variance with
a distinct and particular virtue.
Obedience may be promised by a promise which is
made to man alone, apart from any vow, or promise
made to God. A promise of obedience, if it is accom
panied by a vow, falls materially under the vow, and
is confirmed by the vow. A man may however chance
to content himself with a promise only, without the
addition of a vow. A vow is purely voluntary, and it
has no necessary connection with a promise made to
man. A promise induces obligation, although the bond
Religious Obedience. 149
of the obligation of a promise is less than is that of a vow.
A promise of a sacred thing, if it is made to man
only, and not to God, is not a vow. The proper
notion of a vow is derived, not from the matter which
is promised, but from the nature and character of him
to whom it is promised.
Obedience may, on the other hand, be promised solely
by a vow made to God, and this even if it is a man
who is to be obeyed in virtue of that vow. The
matter of the vow is not the promise made to a man,
but the obedience which is in future to be paid to him.
In order that one man may have power to prescribe
to another man, and to bind him to obedience, a vow to
God to obey that man will suffice. The obligation arises
not from the dominion or the jurisdiction of him who pre
scribes, but immediately from the simple obligation of
fidelity to God. He who in this case prescribes is only
applying the matter of the vow. When the matter of
the vow has been placed within the sphere of the vow,
then the obligation of the vow urges. In order that he
who prescribes should not only do this, but have power
also to exact and compel observance, there must either
be a promise made to him, or he must be in possession
of jurisdiction.
The will of a Superior may be manifold. It may be
a will of simple complacency, or desire that a thing should
be done, and it may amount to no more than a wish.
This will is inefficacious and does not suffice to induce
obligation. It does not consequently suffice to cause
sin by non-fulfilment.
Even an absolute and efficacious will in a Superior
may be twofold. It may refer to the action only which
is prescribed, and, put into words, would be equivalent to
150 Elements of Religions Life.
— " I will you to do this," or it may refer formally to the
obligation of obedience, and be equivalent to — " I will to
bind you to do this." These two wills in a Superior are
so distinct, the one from the other, that in making laws
the first of these wills is not necessary, nor does it suffice
in order to obligation. The second is necessary, and it
is sufficient. When this will to bind the subject is suffi
ciently signified, it suffices in order that the vow should
bind, and that disobedience should consequently be a
sacrilege, as against the vow.
There must be preceptive will, which is — not a will of
the work to be done, but — a will to bind to ttie doing of the
work. The Superior is constituted as in the place of
God to exact a debt which is due to God. Until he
exacts it as a debt, he does not apply the obligation of
the vow. He does not exact it as a debt until with
sufficient clearness he makes manifest his will to bind
his subject.
Further, in a man who makes a vow of obedience we
distinguish a purpose of doing from a will to bind himself
to do. It is not that purpose, but this will which is
necessary in order to the vow. When, therefore, a man
promises obedience, although he has the intention of
binding himself to obedience, yet, as regards the obliga
tion of the work to be done by obedience, he remits it
to the will of him to whom he promises obedience. He
consequently intends to bind himself then only when the
Superior shall have the will to bind him.
4-
An action which has not been prescribed by a Superior
with intention to bind his subject to the doing of it, is
nevertheless not deprived of all the merit of obedience.
Religious Obedience. 151
Obedience is wider in its sphere than is obligation, and
perfect obedience does not wait for the spur of obligation.
There always exists a certain relation between any pre
cept of a religious Superior, and the previous vow of a
religious subject. The act prescribed has been enjoined
by one who has power to prescribe, and who, if he so
wills, has power to constitute that act under the rigorous
obligation of his subject's vow. The act is, moreover,
done by the subject chiefly from the motive that it will
redound to the better observance of his vow. The
act itself has in it therefore some trace and flavour of
obedience.
In order that disobedience should be a mortal sin grave
matter is required. The mere will of the Superior to bind
under pain of grievous sin does not suffice to constitute
a grievous sin. If, supposing grave matter, the Superior
should sufficiently make manifest his intention to bind
his subject as far as he can, there will be a concurrence
of all things which are necessary in order to obligation
under mortal sin.
The intention of him who prescribes is chiefly to be
gathered from two things, from the words of his precept,
and from the grievousness of the penalty which is annexed
to non-fulfilment of the precept. He, however, whose
power to prescribe is derived solely from his subject's
simple vow, and who has no jurisdiction over him, has
not power to annex to his precept the penalty of ex
communication, suspension, or the like. It is his words
therefore which have alone to be considered.
By the common and received usage of Religious Orders,
if a Superior prescribes in simple words, even if the
152 Elements of Religious Life.
matter should be grave, he is held not to have the inten
tion to bind his subject under pain of mortal sin.
A Superior is supposed then only to have the inten
tion to bind his subject under mortal sin, when he
prescribes — " in virtue of obedience," — or in equivalent
words by which he sufficiently signifies his intention
to bind him as far as he can.
6.
It is certain that in the religious state there exists a
true and proper vow of obedience, since the vow is not
only one of the three vows which are of the essence and
substance of the religious state, but among these vows
the vow of obedience holds the first place.
A vow of obedience is formally distinct from the dona
tion and delivery of oneself to a Religious Order, which
is included in religious profession. By means of dona
tion and delivery, the Order acquires a proper right and
an ownership of the religious. By means of the vow a
right is acquired not to the Order, but to God, since a
vow, as a vow, binds a man to God alone. By a man's
donation and delivery of himself made to the Order, and
accepted by the Order, he is incorporated into the Order
as a member into one body.
In order to perfect evangelical abnegation, both thr
vow and the donation are required. A man must despoil
himself of his dominion over himself, and over his own
will. This absolute despoiling he must offer as a holo
caust to God, and consecrate it to His worship and
service. The despoiling is done proximately by his
donation and delivery of himself. The consecrating is
done by means of his vow of obedience. The donation
which is made proximately to man is, by means of the
Religious Obedience. 153
vow of obedience, raised to the level of a religious dona
tion, and a spiritual holocaust offered to God Himself.
A man would not be bound, as by a religious and sacred
obligation, to fidelity in his donation of himself, unless it
had added to it a vow of obedience. This vow is the reli
gious bond by which the donation is consecrated to God.
The matter of a religious vow of obedience may be
either a law, or written constitution — or a passing pre
cept imposed by man. The latter is that to which obe
dience is more expressly promised by the vow. The
matter, therefore, of a religious vow of obedience consists
chiefly of the precepts of Superiors.
The religious Rule, or observance of the Rule, is also
contained under the matter of a vow of religious obe
dience. The vow of obedience does not, however, add
to the Rule obligation under mortal sin, unless in the Rule
itself this obligation of it is either supposed or expressed.
A vow of obedience may in two ways add force of
grave obligation to observance of the Rule — (i) when
in the Rule itself there is expressly exacted the debt of
the vow, by the words — " In virtue of holy obedience,"
or other equivalent words; (2) when the matter is of
itself sufficient to induce grave obligation, and the inten
tion of him who prescribes is sufficiently manifest — even
without the words, " in virtue of holy obedience," — from
some other declaration, or from the custom and usage
of the Order, or because the precept has been given
under pain of the greater excommunication ipso facto to
be incurred.
A religious Rule may bind in two ways under venial
154 Elements of Religious Life.
sin only. It may bind under venial sin only through
smallness of matter. A Superior has not the poiver to
bind under mortal sin, where there is smallness of matter,
even if he should have the will to bind as far as he can.
Secondly, a Rule may bind under venial sin only, through
direct intention of the Superior. He may not have the
will to bind under pain of grievous sin, even if, so far as
graveness of matter is concerned, he has power to do so.
If the Rule itself binds under venial sin, then the vow
of obedience adds another obligation also under venial
sin. This venial sin is, however, of a higher species,
since it is at variance with a more excellent virtue.
When the Rule does not of itself bind under either
mortal sin or venial sin, then the vow of obedience does
not add any obligation under sin, whether mortal or
venial. A Rule which of itself does not induce any
obligation in conscience is not a true and proper precept.
It is not such a precept as is required in order to the
obligation and exercise of the virtue of obedience.
This is that which authors of religious Rules mean,
when they declare that it is not their intention that their
Rules should bind under either mortal or venial sin.
Their intention is to exclude that particular sin which
has its roots in the vow of obedience. To arrange this
is within their competence. They have power to pre
scribe, and they have equally power not to prescribe,
but simply to make manifest their will or counsel, and
this is a very different thing.
8.
There is no proper religious Rule which does not bind
in conscience, at least as subjecting the transgressor of
that Rule to punishment in accordance with religious
Religious Obedience. 155
discipline. This punishment the religious subject is in
conscience bound to endure.
A transgression of the Rule, even when it does not bind
in conscience, is an imperfection which is at variance with
the virtue of obedience. Although the religious does not
absolutely break his promise, he nevertheless deviates from
the more perfect observance of his promise.
9-
The matter of obedience is twofold — remote and proxi
mate. The proximate matter of a vow of obedience is the
precept of the Superior. The remote matter of a vow of
obedience is every act which the Superior has power to
prescribe.
Two things, besides will to prescribe, are necessary in
order to the validity of a precept. These are, in the first
place, power in him who prescribes — and, secondly, matter
which is capable of being prescribed.
In a religious Superior there exists a threefold power to
prescribe. There is, in the first place, the power of juris
diction which has been bestowed upon him by the
Sovereign Pontiff. There is, secondly, the dominativc
power which the Superior possesses in virtue of his subject's
donation and delivery of himself. There is, thirdly, the
power which arises from his subject's vow.
Whatever is not manifestly bad is to be esteemed by a
religious subject good, if it is prescribed by a Superior. In
doubtful matters the Superior occupies the better position.
He is demanding his right and a debt which is due to him,
and reason requires that he should have at least the pre
sumption in his favour.
156 Elements of Religious Life.
Anything which is undoubtedly at variance with the
Rule is not matter of a vow of obedience, even if the
Superior should venture to prescribe it. Such a precept
would not be a valid precept, or a true precept. It would
exceed the power of him who prescribed it. His power is
to edification, and not to destruction.
By his vow of obedience a religious subject is bound to
obey his religious Superior only in accordance with the
profession of his Rule. The common doctrine of the
schools, of theologians as well as of canonists, is that a
Superior cannot bind a subject to anything which is
entirely foreign to, or which lies altogether outside his
Rule. There are certain exceptions to this doctrine, which
are, however, not really limitations of it. For instance,
greater austerity may be prescribed in punishment of a
fault, than that austerity which is ordained by the Rule ;
or greater austerity may be prescribed by way of preven
tion for the future. Again, if a religious body should adopt
Constitutions which are more austere than those which it
had before, individual members of that body are bound to
observe them, even if they have not individually given
their consent to them, and were not professed in accord
ance with them. It suffices that the greater part of the
Order, that is, of the General Chapter, should consent,
even if there should be a minority which dissents. This does
not apply when there is a total change. That cannot be
made without the consent of all and every member of the
whole body. It applies only to an increase and perfection
within the latitude and limits of the same Rule and
Institute.
10.
Relaxation or mitigation of Rule may be threefold.
Religious Obedience. 157
First, by way of dispensation and privilege. This is, how
ever, a lawful moderation of the Rule, rather than a
relaxation of it. Those who enter after this moderation
has taken place cannot be bound to observance of the
primitive Rule. Secondly, relaxation of Rule may occur
through introduction of a custom, which was sinful indeed
in those who originated it, but which afterwards prevailed
so as to have force of derogating from Constitutions which
were contrary to it. In this case, a religious is not bound,
and cannot be bound to observe the ancient rigour as
against the present custom. While the custom subsists,
such obedience would not be obedience in accordance
with the Rule, the ancient rigour of which is no longer in
vigour, but has been derogated from. Such observance,
therefore, would not fall under the vow of obedience.
Thirdly, a relaxation may be brought about which is in
itself and intrinsically evil. This kind of relaxation cannot
be affected by prescription or become good through any
custom. Such a relaxation can occur only with regard to
a matter which is contrary to the vows of religion, and
which is so essential that a custom even of the whole
Order has no force to prevail in favour of it. Every
religious observance which lies outside the vows, or
beyond that which in a particular Order has been, ex
plicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, promised by
the members thereof, is of only human constitution, and
does not convey with it an obligation against which a
contrary custom has no force to prevail. A relaxation or
custom against the substantiate of religion can never
prevail. It is contrary to divine and natural law. The
vows bind to observance of all and everything which is of
the substance of religion. If the relaxation should concern
matters which are directly contrary to vow, even apart
158 Elements of Religions Life.
from any precept of obedience, there will always remain
an obligation in virtue of the vow with which the relaxa
tion is incompatible. If the relaxation should concern
observances which contribute not a little towards the preser
vation of substantials, even if the vows do not immediately
bind the religious to these observances, there will always
remain in the Superior the right to prescribe these
observances.
1 1.
In all human obedience, or obedience of men to men,
there is necessarily a twofold limitation. That which is
prescribed must not be evil, either intrinsically, or by
reason of the precept or prohibition of a Superior.
Secondly, the matter of obedience must be something
which is not contrary to the Rule, or to that state of
religious life which has been professed. If it were, it
would destroy that state, and would hinder rather than
promote the progress of the religious towards perfection.
Given this twofold moderation of human obedience,
obedience is more perfect in proportion as it is more
universal. That obedience which is most universal will
be objectively the most perfect.
All religious bodies do not profess evangelical obedience
in its most perfect form. It does not, however, follow that
the religious state, which is common to all religious bodies,
should not be the state of perfection. It is one thing to
speak of the state of perfection essentially and absolutely,
and it is another thing to speak of a perfect, or a more
perfect, or a most perfect manner of life within the limits
of the religious state, as that state is the school of per
fection, or a way towards perfection.
To the essence of the state of perfection it is not necessary
Religious Obedience. 159
that every one of the counsels, or even that the principal
counsels should be professed in the highest possible per
fection of their observance. It suffices to profess the
counsels in accordance with some prudent Rule, which
is accommodated to some perfect end. A state of per
fection which is in itself perfect, or which is the most
perfect, is not due to every particular religious state,
although a body which does not profess it in so far
lacks a greater possible perfection. In this sense, all
things else being equal, that body is less perfect than is
a body which does profess the utmost possible perfection.
12.
In virtue of a vow of religious obedience it is man only
that has to be obeyed, or God as prescribing by means of
mortal man. The vow does not bind a religious to obey
God as prescribing by Himself immediately, or prescribing
by means of an angel or a saint, or in any other extra
ordinary way. It does not bind him to obey every man.
It binds him only to obey that man to whom he has
voluntarily given and delivered himself. Hence it does
not bind him to obey the Church, or the prelates of the
Church, as such, and in virtue of their ordinary jurisdiction
alone.
The vow of obedience binds a religious to obey all the
Superiors of his Order, each in his own place. The power
of all religious Superiors is one, and it has the same
foundation, namely, the subject's vow and profession.
There is, nevertheless, among Superiors an order and
relation of dependence, without which there would ensue
confusion and perplexity. When a higher and a lower
Superior give contrary precepts, the vow of obedience
binds a religious to obey the higher Superior, without
i6o Elements of Religious Life.
heed to the precept of the lower. This follows both from
the higher Superior's power of jurisdiction, and from his
dominative power.
Jurisdiction flows to a religious Order from the
Sovereign Pontiff. It is derived with due regard to order,
so as not to be bestowed on lower Superiors, except
through higher Superiors who are their Superiors, or
at least with dependence on those higher Superiors.
Hence a higher Superior has power to restrict the juris
diction of a lower Superior, or to revoke his precept.
In that case the obligation of the vow of obedience as
regards the lower Superior ceases. When a higher
Superior prescribes the contrary of that which has been
prescribed by a lower Superior, he thereby sufficiently
revokes the precept of the latter.
The jurisdiction of a lower Superior is limited either in
virtue of the nature of the case, or by the intention of him
who bestowed it, so that the jurisdiction of a lower
Superior cannot prevail in opposition to the jurisdiction
of a higher Superior. After a higher Superior has issued
his precept, the contrary precept of a lower Superior
henceforth concerns unlawful matter, or matter which is
evil — not necessarily in itself, but inasmuch as it has been
forbidden.
It must be clear, however, that there is real and true
contrariety between the precepts of the two Superiors. It
sometimes happens that a lower Superior has power to
dispense with regard to the law or precept of the higher
Superior or to interpret that under certain circumstances
that precept is not binding.
The Sovereign Pontiff has power to prescribe directly
Religious Obedience. 161
to individual religious in any matter which is capable of
precept, and so in every matter in which religious
Superiors have power to prescribe. The Pontiff is no
less an ordinary Superior than is the General of the
Order. He is, moreover, in a sense in which the General
is not, the principal Superior of the Order.
Religious, in making their vows, are supposed to
have the intention of promising obedience to all the
Superiors by whom they may be governed in accord
ance with regular discipline. Among these the Sovereign
Pontiff holds the first place, and so it is to him primarily
that religious promise obedience.
Further, when the Sovereign Pontiff approves a religious
Order, he takes it specially under his own care and
patronage. It is he, therefore, who principally accepts
the vows and the donation and delivery of themselves
which are made by the religious. Hence it is his will that
to himself principally their vows, and their donation and
delivery of themselves, should be made. Even if this is
not specially expressed in their profession, it is never
theless therein to be understood.
Finally, since the whole of the power which is possessed
by any and by every Superior is derived from the
Sovereign Pontiff, a religious could not possibly and con
sistently with order be more bound by his vow to a lower
Superior than he is to the Sovereign Pontiff, who is the
Supreme Prelate of his and of every other religious Order.
14.
A Bishop has power, in the case of religious who are
not exempt from his jurisdiction, to prescribe and dispose
even in matters which belong to regular life. That which
the Sovereign Pontiff can do in the case of religious who
L
1 62 Elements of Religious Life.
are exempt, the Bishop can do in the case of religious who
are not exempt from his jurisdiction, as he is an Ordinary
spiritual Pastor to whom the care of their salvation belongs
more principally than it belongs to their own religious
Superiors. In virtue of his jurisdiction, therefore, the
Bishop has power of supervision of religious discipline
and observance, and he can dispose and alter in every
matter which the Pontiff has not reserved to himself, and
which is not beyond the Rule. The Bishop's precept is to be
preferred to the precept of lower Superiors, provided
always that it is to edification, and not to destruction.
Hence, religious who are subject to a Bishop promise
obedience to him as to a true and principal prelate of their
Order. Whatever the Provincial of an exempt Order has
power to prescribe with regard to regular discipline, in
virtue of his quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, that the Bishop
has power to prescribe in a monastery which is not exempt,
and which is therefore subject to his jurisdiction. The
Bishop can also impose his precept under pain of ex
communication. The Sovereign Pontiff, as matter of
course, always retains his own supreme power over
religious who are not exempt from the jurisdiction of the
Bishop, inasmuch as that supreme power belongs to him
of divine right. Hence when the Pontiff exempts religious
from the jurisdiction of the Bishop, he is not usurping
anything new for himself. He is either retaining the juris
diction which he might have communicated to another, or
he is transferring to the Superior of the Order that which
he had previously communicated to the Bishop. Religious,
therefore, who are not exempt have in their vow of obedience
regard primarily to the Sovereign Pontiff, and under him
to the Bishop, in the same way as religious who are exempt
have regard primarily to the Sovereign Pontiff, and
Religious Obedience. 163
secondarily, and under him, to their General or Provincial.
As regards the Bishop's power in Congregations which are not exempt
from his jurisdiction, it has carefully to be distinguished whether these
Congregations are merely diocesan or not. If they are merely diocesan,
and exist solely by permission of the local Ordinary, they are wholly
subject to his authority and jurisdiction. In the case of an Institute
which (although not exempt) is under the obedience of a General
Superior or Superioress, and is spread abroad in several dioceses, no
Bishop can be Superior of the Congregation, but every Bishop can
exercise his jurisdiction over the Houses which exist, and the religious
who are living within his diocese, in accordance with the Sacred
Canons, and with the Constitutions which have been approved by the
Apostolic See. The authority of the General Superior or Superioress
for the government of the whole Congregation, as determined by its
approved Constitutions, must not be interfered with, for otherwise that
unity and uniformity would be subverted for the preservation of which
a General Superior or Superioress was established. The Bishop there
fore cannot mix in matters which regard the general government of the
whole Institute or Congregation, even if the principal House should be
situated within his diocese. He has no power to induce any change in
the Constitutions, especially if they have been approved by the
Apostolic See.
The Bishop ought to be heard in the case of the expulsion of a sister
from any convent within his diocese. He has also the right to preside
at the election of a Superioress. He has this right of presiding in the
Chapter, in order that all matters may be transacted quietly and in
peace, without any violence, and without any juridical defect. He can
not however take part in the deliberations of the Chapter, nor can he
vote, and still less can he impose his vote.
The Bishop's consent ought to be obtained for the erection of a new
House, and he ought at least to be heard when a House which already
exists in his diocese is to be abandoned. He ought to examine the
novices with regard to their vocation, both at their entrance and before
profession. The Bishop has the right of inspection with regard to faith,
common life, and the reparation of scandals and abuses, but domestic
arrangements rest not with him, but with the Superioress. The right of
visitation belongs to the Bishop within the limits of his competence.
1 64 Elements of Religious Life.
A General Superioress, while she has the right of visiting all her Houses
for the preservation of religious discipline, is to abstain from visitation
of the church, or of matters which pertain thereto. This belongs to
the Bishop alone. The administration of the goods of the whole
Congregation belongs to her, and not to the Bishop ; but abuses com
mitted in administration fall under the jurisdiction of the Ordinary.
In cases of abuse he can make himself acquainted with the administra
tion, and restrain all'excesses.
If the Bishop objects to some particular sister remaining in his
diocese, the General Superioress will take pains, as far as possible, to
meet his wishes, and to substitute another sister in place of her. Kver.
though the Superioress has the right to transfer any sister from one
place to another, without the Bishop's consent, she ought nevertheless
not to use this right unless necessity, or some very well grounded cause
demands it. in that case she should not fail to inform the Bishop with
regard to the matter by letter, and that couched in the most reverential
terms. See Zitelli, Apparatus Juris Ecchsiastici, pages 243-248.
The local Superior, by whatever name he may be called,
has, by the usage of all religious Orders, power to prescribe
in virtue of obedience. This power exists in him as ordinarv
power. He possesses this power in virtue of his office.
His possession of it is necessary in every religious house, in
order to the government of that house. This power, being
ordinary, can be delegated in every case in which delega
tion is not forbidden.
Abbesses and Prioresses, or other Superioresses of reli
gious women, have power to prescribe in virtue of
obedience. Although they are not prelates, as regards
power of jurisdiction, of which as women they are in
capable, they are superiors as spiritual mothers — and as
possessing the dominativt power which arises and is
derived to them from the donation and delivery of
Religious Obedience. 165
themselves which, along with their vows, were made by
their subjects.
1 6.
Besides those matters which in observance of obedience
are of necessity of precept, there are other matters which
belong to counsel only, even supposing the existence of a
vow of obedience.
In observance of any law or precept there can and
ought to be a concurrence of three things. There should
be, in the first place, execution of that which has been
ordered. There should be, secondly, an intention to do that
which has been prescribed. There should be, thirdly, a
judgment of the understanding by the religious subject,
which dictates both that execution and this intention.
In the execution of that which has been prescribed,
either as to be done, or as to be left undone, consists the
substance of actual obedience. By execution the precept is
substantially observed. Execution of that which is pre
scribed is the proper matter of a precept of obedience. To
this the precept directly binds a subject.
Besides simple execution, there are certain conditions
which concern the mode or manner of execution. One is
that, without waiting for a precept, or for any sign whatso
ever of the intention of a Superior to prescribe, execution
of that which the Superior is known to will should at once
follow. A second condition, in order to perfection of
execution, is — promptitude. A third condition is that
before proceeding to execution there should be — no excuse.
Excuses may sometimes be contrary to the substance of
the vow of obedience, when a precept has been given, and
the excuse is either in itself at variance with that which has
T 66 Elements of Religious Life.
been prescribed, or is not true, but feigned or coloured.
Some kind of intention is necessary on the part of the
religious in order to the existence of the substance of
obedience. There is besides this another kind of intention
which belongs to perfection of obedience. Obedience, as
it is a human and moral act, or the act of a man who is
endowed with intelligence and freedom of will, cannot pos
sibly exist apart from intention on the part of the agent.
It must also proceed from his intention, as that intention
is the intention of a man whose will is subject to the will
of his Superior.
If a subject does only materially that act which has been
enjoined by his Superior, he cannot be said properly to
obey. He is not of his own intention observing a precept.
It simply happens that his intention concurs with that
precept. So far as his disposition is concerned, it is not
more borne towards observance than it is borne towards
non-observance of the precept. It is necessary, therefore,
that the will of the subject should in some way be borne
towards the act, as it falls under the will of the Superior.
Otherwise, obedience cannot strictly and properly exist,
even as regards execution.
The will may be borne in two ways towards an act, as
that act is enjoined by a Superior. The will may be borne
towards the material object only, or it may be borne towards
the proper motive also. It suffices to satisfy the precept
of obedience — so that the precept should not be sinned
against — that the will should be borne towards the material
object only. It is necessary, in order to the exercise of a
proper and specific act of the virtue of obedience, that
the will should be borne towards the proper motive also.
Religious Obedience. 167
In order that there may be such an act of obedience,
the motive for doing the action must be — because that
action has been prescribed.
A religious Superior, when he is prescribing, is simply
exacting from his religious subject the debt of that subject's
promise, which he made to God by his vow of obedience.
Not to obey is consequently to sin by non-fulfilment of
a vow. It is, therefore, while materially a disobedience, at
the same time a sacrilege.
To satisfy the obligation of a vow of obedience it is
not necessary to obey formally, from a motive of religion,
or for the purpose of fulfilling the vow. If a religious
does that which he has promised — being actuated by
an intrinsic motive of fear, or of love, or of hope of
reward, or from affection towards the particular virtue to
which the act prescribed belongs, such as, for instance,
temperance — this will suffice for the fulfilment of his vow
of obedience. By that vow he did not promise to obey
for this or for that motive. He promised simply to obey.
When the obligation of the vow of obedience is not
present, the act of a religious cannot possess that peculiar
excellence which consists in observance of that vow.
These two, the obligation, on the one hand, and the
observance, on the other hand, are correlatives. The
one cannot exist without the existence of the other.
The vow of religious obedience does not, in itself and
immediately, bind a religious to any act whatsoever,
except through intervention of a precept of his Superior.
Until the Superior gives a precept, the practice of the
subject's vow has no place. The vow has for the matter
of it the precept of the Superior. Hence, so long as a
1 68 Elements of Rchgioiis Life.
precept is not imposed, the vow cannot properly be exer
cised, except in affection, and in preparation of mind, and
by manifestation of prompt will for observance, if matter
should at any time be supplied.
1 8.
If it is argued that, this being so, it would be more
advantageous for individual religious if they were always
being commanded by means of a proper precept — because
in that case they would always be acting in virtue of their
vow of obedience, a mode of action which is more meri
torious — it is to be answered that, in the first place, this
would not be expedient, by reason of risk of failure. It is
possible, moreover, for the merit to be supplied by means
of the goodness of the will of him who obeys. It is in fact
so supplied by reason of the more free and spontaneous
will which is made manifest by anticipation of a precept.
It is supplied also by reason of intention and preparation
of mind gladly to fulfil the precept, if the act in question
should happen to be enjoined. Even this kind of obe
dience can have its relation, in virtue of religion, to
religious homage paid to the Divine Majesty. It can,
moreover, by intention of him who obeys, extend even to
observance of his vow, so as to participate in the excel
lence of that vow. A religious subject may have the will
to obey, even in those matters which have not been pre
scribed. He may make this intention in order to remove
himself to distance from transgression of his vow, and
also in order to habituate himself to observance of his
vow in the most perfect manner.
True and formal obedience has for its object a proper
precept. By a proper precept is to be understood even a
Religious Obedience. 169
precept which binds under venial sin only. The reason
is because obedience has reference to the Superior as he is
Superior, and not as he is a friend, or a prudent counsellor,
or the like. A Superior is constituted, as we have seen,
in his character as Superior, either by means of his
dominative power, or by means of his power of jurisdiction.
Apart from these, men are equal. Obedience, therefore,
has reference to the Superior as to a man who is exercising
either his dominative power, or his power of jurisdiction.
If he is not exercising either the one power, or the other
power, he will not be acting as Superior. Actual obedience
to him will not, therefore, have any place, although there
may exist an aptitudinal obedience, that is, a readiness
to obey. When a religious Superior wills something to
be done by his religious subject, but does not have the
will to bind him in any way under sin, then that Superior
does not really move his subject as he is his Superior,
or as he is a man who possesses either dominative
power or jurisdiction over him. He is acting only as
if he were nothing more than a moral cause, counselling
and morally impelling his subject to some action by
that subject's own judgment, and by his own simple
will.
In this case the religious subject does not make a
proper act of the special virtue of obedience. He makes
at most an act of charity, or an act of humility. He may
make an act of charity, if he does the action simply for
the sake of union with his head. This may, in a wide
sense, be called obedience. It is a movement of one
man's will at the will of another. It will nevertheless not
be an act of obedience, as obedience is a special virtue.
It may be called an obedience of charity in the sense that
if a man were to know that it was the will of God that he
170 Elements of Religious Life.
should do some action — although God did not will to
prescribe that action — that man's willing to be in con
formity with the divine will, although it would not be
an act of the special virtue of obedience, would certainly
be an act of charity towards God. In the same way, an
act of will to do works of counsel, precisely on the ground
that they are better pleasing to God, is an act of charity,
although it is not an act of obedience.
A specific and formal character of obedience may,
however, be added to such an act, and that in two
ways. First, if the act is done with the view of perfect
disposition and preparation to obey precepts whenever
these may be given, and of removing every peril of
resistance to formal obedience, if obedience should be
demanded, then this act will have the character of specific
and formal obedience.
This intention is not an intention which it is just
possible to excogitate. It is not an extraordinary inten
tion. It is an intention which is of ordinary occurrence
in religious life. When religious subjects act at the nod of
their religious Superiors, without waiting for a proper
precept, they are looking to the shadow which is thrown
by a possibly coming precept. For the better observance
of their vow, they are obeying, as it were, by anticipation.
Secondly, when a religious Superior simply commands,
and has not the will to exercise his power of jurisdiction,
or even his dominative power, he nevertheless does not
have it in his power to divest himself of the authority
with which he is clothed, and which belongs to him
as he is Superior. As he is head of a religious body, his
will has necessarily annexed to it a peculiar dignity and
excellence, from the personal circumstance of his superi
ority. By reason of this a Superior's will has a special
Religious Obedience. 171
force of moral movement. This force is greater, and it is
of a different character from that of the force which is
possessed by the will of a friend. The same may be
observed in the will of a parent in relation to his child,
and in the will of a master in relation to his servant,
even when there is in master or in parent no intention of
rigorously prescribing and of binding either servant or
child in conscience. From this there follows in a reli
gious a natural obligation to conform his will to the will
of his Superior. Natural reason demands that be
tween those two wills there should be conformity and
subordination.
19.
The matter of the virtue of obedience is wider than is
the matter of the vow of obedience. A man does not vow
to obey all precepts, natural and positive, divine and
human, but only to obey the precepts of certain Superiors.
A greater number of acts, especially internal acts, can be
elicited by the virtue of obedience than is promised by
the vow of obedience.
Since it is sufficient in order to the substance of obedience
to have the will to execute that which is prescribed, every
affection which goes beyond this, and which contributes
towards the doing of the action more carefully, or more
promptly, or more pleasantly, belongs to the perfection of
obedience.
First, and principally, there belongs to perfection of
obedience a pure and formal intention to obey in order
to observance of a precept, and to fulfilment of the will of
the Superior — or, higher still, to fulfil the will of God, which
in and by means of the will of the Superior is applied.
Obedience of this kind is exercised under the influence
172 Elements of Religious Life.
of no ordinary virtues. It is universal by reason of the
universality of its motive. Hence it most excellently
disposes a man to obey in all matters of obedience. This
perfection is set before us in the words of Christ to His
Eternal Father—" Not My will, but Thine be done ; " and
again — " My meat and My drink is to do the will of Him
who sent Me."
St. Ignatius says that that obedience is very imperfect,
and not worthy the name of virtue, in which a subject
does not make the will of the Superior his own, and does
not so agree with it that there is not only execution in
effect, but also consent in affection of the will, so that the
wills of both Superior and subject should be the same.
It is for this chiefly that St. Thomas sets obedience
above all other moral virtues, that obedience subjects
and immolates a man's will to the divine will.
Secondly, it belongs to perfection of obedience that the
will to obey should not only be absolute, but also entire.
That will is absolute which is efficacious to operate. This
belongs not only to the perfection, but also to the necessity
of obedience, since without this there cannot be execution
of the precept. That will is entire in which there is
no conflict or contradiction, or contrary affection or
desire.
An affection which is at variance with the ordinances
of obedience may be merely natural, and compatible
with a well ordered and regulated nature. This natural
affection does not in itself imply imperfection. If it does
not retard or diminish the efficacious affection to obey,
it will in no way diminish perfection of obedience. Thus
we find that Christ, in His obedience unto death, per
mitted to Himself the exercise of the affection of shrinking
Religiotis Obedience. 173
from death. This in no way retarded Him from prompt
will to obey.
A man may also have an affection at variance with the
matter prescribed, which arises from some inordination
either of nature or of habit. This is the case when a
man, from a vehement impulse of the sensitive appetite,
desires something other than that which has been pre
scribed, or when he is affected with too great a love
for something which is contrary to that which has been
prescribed. If, in spite of this contrary impulse and
affection, he promptly and efficaciously obeys, his
obedience — although it may be accompanied with some
imperfection in virtue of another kind — will nevertheless
in itself be perfect. Obedience in such a case may some,
times be even more perfect than it would otherwise have
been. Since, however, as a rule and morally speaking,
repugnance must in some way retard willingness to obey,
that obedience is said to be imperfect which is accom
panied by immoderate contrary affections. It will be
the more imperfect, the more voluntary these are.
Thirdly, it also belongs to perfection of obedience that
a man should, as far as possible, be affected towards the
matter which is prescribed. In that case operation is more
voluntary, and this belongs to the perfection of virtue.
When the affection for a matter prescribed is merely
human, and of a lower order, it may easily incline the
will to operate from a human motive, rather than from
the motive of perfect obedience. Still, even if the
obedience has in it somewhat of self, as concerning
a matter to which a man is himself otherwise inclined,
it is nevertheless possible for it to be entirely perfect.
The will can, in its freedom, with the aid of divine grace,
174 Elements of Religious Life.
operate from the pure motive of obedience, notwith
standing the presence of that concomitant natural
affection.
Fourthly, affection for the Superior himself is also of
great assistance towards perfection of obedience. It was
a counsel of St. Jerome — " Fear the Superior of the
monastery as a master, and love him as a father." St.
Ignatius exhorts us to regard Superiors with internal
reverence and love, and that we should proceed in the
spirit of love, and not with the disturbance of fear.
Although true obedience does not spring from friendship
for a man, even if that friendship is supernatural and
holy, it is nevertheless greatly aided by such an affection,
as by a most excellent disposition. Any disposition,
therefore, of the will which inclines it to love or to
gratitude towards a Superior, and which is good in
itself, is not to be rejected or to be despised. It is in
itself a help, and it does not exclude the true motive of
obedience.
Among other perfections of obedience, as regards the
will, there is this — that the act of obedience should be
accompanied with gladness and spiritual joy, and that
it should be done in humility, and with a constant and
persevering spirit.
20.
Obedience formally perfects the will, since obedience
is a moral virtue. The will is a power which moves all
the other faculties to free exercise of their actions,
and proper obedience is found only in free actions.
Hence, as the will depends on the understanding in its
action, so does perfection of obedience depend on
Religious Obedience. 175
perfection of the understanding. The will depends on the
understanding as on that which enlightens, which moves,
and which directs it. The understanding sets before the
will its object. Perfect movement and direction require,
in the first place, perfect consideration of the good to
be pursued and, secondly, removal of every cogitation
which might turn away or hinder the will from its
affection towards or its pursuit of that good.
In order to perfect obedience, therefore, there must be
contemplation of God in the Superior, and apprehension
of the precept of the Superior as proceeding from God.
By this there is not demanded from a religious subject
any false idea or estimation of the Superior and his
precept, but only a raising of the mind to consideration
of the supreme reason and motive for which obedience is
given, which is the divine authority and will. He who
so obeys forms a judgment, not that his Superior is God,
but that his Superior represents God to him, as God's
vicegerent. This is most true, since St. Paul says of all
magistrates, that they are ministers of God, and that they
have their power from God. Neither does a religious
subject judge that the precept of his religious Superior is a
divine precept, that is, a precept given immediately by God
Himself, since it is evident that the Superior is his fellow
man. He judges, however, that the reason or motive for
obeying is divine. It is the will of God which is fulfilled
when the will of the Superior is fulfilled. This is that
which ought to be the primary reason or motive of all
obedience.
In a religious, moreover, there is another and a peculiar
reason for this divine homage in obedience, and that is the
special vow by which he has consecrated himself to God.
By reason of this, the precept of his Superior is in a
176 Elements of Religious Life.
manner on the level with a precept given immediately
by God Himself.
Further, when a religious subject contemplates Christ in
his Superior, although he does not suppose that his
Superior cannot possibly err, he can nevertheless, when
no manifest evil is apparent in the precept, make a judg
ment that, as matter of fact, the Superior is not in error.
This is not a rash judgment. It is a judgment which is
founded in sufficient authority and reason. The religious
subject conforms his judgment to the judgment of his
religious Superior with a human faith. This faith is how
ever founded in a manner in hope of a divine providence
over the Superior, on account of his superiority.
Notwithstanding all this, reasons may possibly occur
which prompt or may urge a contrary line of action.
In that case perfection of obedience does not prevent
those reasons from being set before the Superior. This
must be done with a pure intention, and not from an
affection of excusing himself from the burden of the
precept, but from a desire that that should be done which
is most expedient for the end which is aimed at by the
Superior. If, notwithstanding these reasons, and even if
the reasons should appear to the religious subject to be
absolutely evident, his Superior should still persist in his
precept, that precept, since it is not manifestly evil in
itself, is to be carried out.
That this should be done to perfection, it is not necessary
to form a judgment that the matter which has been pre
scribed is useful. It is necessary only to judge that it
is useful for the subject to undertake it, and to carry it
out as far as he can. This is the practical certainty which
is not incompatible with previous speculative doubt.
In order that this practical certainty may be more
Religious Obedience. 1 7 7
constant, and consequently that the obedience may be
more prompt, the best counsel is not to discuss the fitness
of the matter in itself. With regard to its fitness,
judgment should, as far as possible, be suspended, and a
judgment made that that which has been prescribed is just.
The blind obedience which is given by perfect religious to
their Superiors, does not consist in absence of judgment.
A man is to obey not like a brute animal, or in a stolid
way, but as befits a man of right reason. The Fathers
who use this phrase require lynx-eyes in the perfectly
obedient religious. By means of them he is at once to
discern God in his Superiors, and also to discover sin
if it should exist in a precept.
Religious blindness of obedience should exclude the
human reasons by which men might be moved to obey a
Superior, because he is learned or prudent, or because he
prescribes things which are pleasing to them, instead of
being moved solely by reason of the will of God. Religious
blindness should exclude also the human reasonings by
which a religious subject might examine into why his
Superior should so prescribe, or why he should prescribe
this or that to him, and not to another.
In short, religious blindness of obedience excludes the
prudence of the flesh. It does not exclude a prudence which
is spiritual and supernatural. Since obedience is among
the most perfect of virtues, it no less requires than do
other moral virtues, in order to the right exercise of it, the
guidance of prudence. It is proper to obedience that the
prudential judgment which directs it should be founded
more in an extrinsic principle and in the judgment of the
Superior than in one's own judgment. As obedience ex
cludes one's own judgment, it is called a blind obedience.
It excludes one's own judgment, however, only in so far as
M
ij8 Elements of Religious Life.
that judgment is vitiated and imperfect, but not so far as
implies exclusion of all use of one's own understanding. As
a blind man is led by another man and sees, as it were, with
another's eyes, so is it in dealing with a religious Superior.
An obedience of this kind is necessary in order to all well-
ordered government, whether that government is political,
economic, military, or otherwise. If a servant or a soldier
ought always to perceive and to understand the reasons and
the causes which move his master or his leader, all govern
ment would be morally impossible. A religious Superior,
moreover, is not seldom moved to prescribe by reasons
which are higher and more universal than are those which
a religious subject can perceive for himself, or which it
is expedient for him to know. In the process of building,
the masons are directed and moved by the architect. It is
absolutely necessary that they should obey, even if they
should not understand the reasons for which they are moved.
The greater the concord between Superior and subject the
better, both in itself and in order to action. This can be
secured only through conformity of the subject with his
Superior, and not by conformity of the Superior to his
subject.
Obedience of the judgment is also more perfect, inasmuch
as it is necessary in order to various perfections of obedience.
Promptness, alacrity, perseverance and the like could
scarcely co-exist or be compatible with divergence of judg
ment between a religious subject and a religious Superior.
19.
By dispensation from religious profession a man becomes
from being a religious to be not a religious. He is
thereby set free from his vow of religious obedience.
Religious Obedience. 179
Without dispensation from the religious state it is not
possible for a vow of religious obedience to be entirely
and directly dispensed. This vow is of the essence of
that state. It could not, therefore, be abolished while at
the same time that state continued to endure.
The Sovereign Pontiff has power to dispense a religious
so that he could lead a solitary and private life, free from
all obligation of obedience to the Superiors of his Order,
while observing everything else which is of the substance
of the religious state.
The Pontiff would, in so doing, be dispensing, however,
not from the vow of obedience, but at most from normal
exercise of the obedience which had been vowed. The
dispensed religious would always remain under the yoke of
a special obedience. He would, in any case, remain
bound in obedience to the Pontiff himself.
For avoidance of vain imaginations and expectations, it may be
remarked that this is rather a speculative than a practical case.
CHAPTER VIII.
The Obligations of Religious.
A RULE is that which briefly expresses a law. The law is
not taken from the Rule, but the Rule is composed from
the law. It supplies a principle or norm for the direction
of moral actions. The word Rule, nevertheless, does not
signify a rigorous precept which binds in conscience. It
signifies only a simple ordinance for direction of moral
conduct. In this sense it is applied to signify a religious
Rule, as such a Rule in a stricter and more perfect manner
directs the actions of religious. For this reason religious
are called Regulars, as persons who are bound to lead their
lives in accordance with a certain Rule (regula). The
word Rule is sometimes used to signify a single ordi
nance or law, and sometimes to signify a collection of
those ordinances or laws which together form a norm of
living in accordance with evangelical perfection. In this
latter sense a Rule contains many rules. In this sense we
speak of the four Religious Rules which have been
specially approved by the Church — the Rules of St. Basil,
St. Augustine, St. Benedict, and St. Francis.
If the word Rule is taken in its single sense, every re
ligious Constitution is a Rule. If the word is taken in its
collective sense, the Rule of every religious Order com
prehends all its Constitutions which, taken as a whole,
present the norm of living which exists in that Order.
The Obligations of Religious. 1 8 1
When religious promise obedience according to the Rule,
the Constitutions are understood as comprehended. The
religious would not otherwise be bound to obey in accord
ance with the Constitutions. In this sense there are not
only four approved Rules, but as many Rules as there are
approved religious Orders in the Church. There cannot
be any religious Order without its own Rule, that term
being understood as including its Constitutions. An Order
that had not a Rule of its own would not have any ground
of distinction from other Orders. There cannot be an
approved Order without its Rule being approved, since
the whole perfection and substance of the Order depends
on its Rule.
In some religious Orders there is what is par excellence
called The Rule, which is a collection of precepts which
were delivered by the first founder of the Order. This is
regarded as the foundation of the Order, or of its mode of
life. Such were the Rules of St. Basil, St. Augustine, and
St. Benedict. These Rules were so brief as not to contain
everything that is necessary or that is useful in a religious
community, but to contain only its more principal and
substantial ordinances. Hence to those Rules there came
to be added certain Constitutions, or new statutes suggested
by the circumstances or by the necessities of the times.
Certain Rules also were in process of time adapted
to other religious ends, or to the same religious end but
with different religious observances, in accordance with
various vocations, or with the various pious affections with
which God inspired the various founders, or the reformers,
or the modifiers of the several Orders. In this way various
Orders are said to follow one or other of the Approved
1 82 Elements of Religious Life.
Rules, inasmuch as they have taken that Rule as a
foundation, and have added to it their own proper
observances and ordinances. These — to distinguish them
from the primary Rule — they call Constitutions or Statutes.
St. Francis did not take any one of the three more
ancient Rules as the foundation of his Order. He com
posed his own Rule, and he obtained for it a special
approbation. This Rule the various Orders, or rather the
various families of the one Order of the Friars Minor,
follow. The Observantines, the Conventuals, and the
Capuchins are living under different Generals, and have
each their own Constitutions or Statutes, as distinct from
the Rule of St. Francis, which is common to all of them.
Hence we see the way in which a Constitution differs
from a Rule in those Orders in which the two are distinct.
They do not differ as regards the obligation which they in
duce. The Superiors of every religious Order govern
their subjects, and have power to prescribe in virtue of
obedience, in accordance with both the Rule and the Con
stitutions. The difference between a Constitution and a
Rule is therefore only accidental, as regards their origin,
and inasmuch as a Rule is general and common, while
Constitutions are special and proper.
There are many approved religious Orders which do not
possess any Rule as distinct from their Constitutions, and
whose Constitutions form their Rule. This was not so up
to the time of Honorius III., except in the case of the
Carthusians, whose Statutes formed their Rule. Since the
time of that Pontiff they have been imitated in this by the
Society of Jesus, which does not profess any one of the
more ancient Rules, but has for its Rule the Constitutions
which it received from its founder, St. Ignatius, and which
have been approved by the Apostolic See.
The Obligations of Religions. 183
Hence at the present time there are many more than four
approved Rules in the Church. There is, moreover, no
greater approbation and no approbation of a different kind
to be ascribed to the four more ancient Rules, than that
which belongs to the Rules of approved Religious Orders
which do not follow these. All have been approved by the
same Pontifical authority, and in the same terms.
2.
At first the Rules of religious Orders were instituted
rather by way of instruction and doctrine than by way of
law. Later on they were instituted by way of conven
tional statute, which is not properly a law, but has the force
which belongs to it, in virtue of mutual promise and cove
nant. Finally, when jurisdiction was added by the Church,
a religious Rule — including the Constitutions and Statutes
enacted by the Order itself in virtue of powers derived
from the Sovereign Pontiff — became confirmed so as to
have the true and proper character of a law.
Hence a religious Rule imposes some necessity of
operation. This is of the idea of a law. In this a Rule
differs from a mere counsel. Besides that which a reli
gious Rule contains, there are many things which the
religious may do of counsel. As St. Benedict says, the
whole of perfection does not exist within the limits of the
Rule alone. A religious, nevertheless, who should omit
other counsels beyond those which are contained within
his Rule, is not to be reckoned as failing in his state and
office. If, on the other hand, he should neglect his
Rule, he is held to fail of his obligation.
There may exist in a law a twofold obligation — >an
obligation under sin — and an obligation under penalty.
184 Elements of Religious Life.
A religious Rule may induce both obligations. The
jurisdiction of religious Superiors, where it exists, is per
fect, and it extends both to direction and to compulsion.
Apart from jurisdiction, both obligations may exist in
a conventional statute. The one is an obligation of
conscience in virtue of previous covenant and promise.
The other is a liability to punishment on the same
ground, although compulsion and exaction cannot be
so rigorous in this case as it may be in a case of juris
diction.
A law, and especially an ecclesiastical law, binds
sometimes under mortal sin. A religious Rule may
so bind, if such is the intention of it, and if the
matter is sufficiently grave to be capable of so great an
obligation. Sometimes a Rule binds under venial sin
only, when the matter of it is not capable of a greater
obligation. There may, however, be a question of terms
as to whether such a Rule merits the name of a precept
or law, or whether it is only a simple ordinance. When,
so far as the matter is concerned, a Rule might be
imposed to bind under mortal sin, the author of the Rule
may, nevertheless, moderate his intention, and cause it
to bind under venial sin only. There may also be
a Rule which docs not induce any obligation in con
science, even under venial sin, but induces only a liability
to punishment. This suffices in order to the idea of a
law, since it exceeds the idea of a counsel. It may be,
and it is called by many writers — a merely penal law.
Even a merely penal law, however, necessarily involves
some obligation in conscience, or is resolved into such
an obligation. Without any obligation in conscience there
would not exist the true idea of a law, and there would
not be induced any true moral necessity. If a Rule of
The Obligations of Religious. 185
this kind imposes punishment on the transgressors of it,
it binds them in conscience to at least endure that
punishment. It gives a right to the Superior to punish
a transgression which he could not rightly punish unless
that Rule existed. The Rule binds the subject in con
science to submit to the Superior when he imposes the
punishment. The subject cannot violently resist the
Superior, if the punishment consists in suffering. If it
consists in performance of an action, and that action is
strictly prescribed, he is bound to perform that action.
3-
In order to know whether a particular religious Rule
binds under mortal sin, or under venial sin, or under
penalty only, the words of that Rule have to be weighed,
and in connection with the custom of the Order.
Certain general principles may, however, be stated.
There are four ways in which a religious Rule or Institute
may declare or not declare the manner of the obligation
which it induces. It may, in the first place, distinctly
set forth that the mind of the Order is to bind in virtue
of a precept as far as it can, and as far as the matter
will admit.
Secondly, a religious Rule may explain that it binds
under venial sin only, unless by special words a greater
rigour of precept is expressly declared.
Thirdly, a religious Rule may explain that it does not
bind in conscience under any even venial sin, but only
renders the transgressor of it liable to punishment.
Fourthly, without declaring any of those modes of
obligation, a Rule may be given simply by ordaining,
instituting or prescribing certain things as things to be
done.
1 86 Elements of Religious Life.
4-
Transgression of a Rule may be either by way of
commission, or by way of omission. In both cases there
is to be distinguished that which is either done or omitted
to be done without leave, and failure to ask leave to do
or not to do the thing in question. When an act is
forbidden by the Rule, but is not evil in itself, or evil
through ecclesiastical prohibition, there comes to be con
sidered the motive for which that act is done. If that
motive is really good, then the act is not a sin. Simple
opposition to the Rule, or failure to ask leave, is not a
circumstance which is sufficient to vitiate the act. The
prohibition is not, of the intention of the author of it,
such as to render the act evil. This he has himself
declared when he laid it down that he did not will his
Rule to bind in conscience. It rarely happens, however,
that a religious is acting from an entirely good conscience
when he is acting in opposition to his Rule. It is
generally from slothfulness or for the sake of some per
sonal gratification, and so his act is not free from all
venial sin. When a motive is good, and an omission
of that which is prescribed by Rule is not in itself evil,
there will be no sin. Venial sins may be committed apart
from any obligation of religious Rule, and by reason
simply of the irrational character of the will of the reli
gious, or his want of will.
The doctrine is the same with regard to omission to
ask leave. This omission always infers some transgres
sion of Rule, nay, in this omission the transgression
chiefly consists. If leave has been asked and not ob
tained, and a religious does or omits something, contrary
to Rule, there is then some peril of contempt of the Rule.
The Obligations of Religious. 187
5-
A religious is absolutely bound to progress in some
measure in the way of perfection, since, in virtue of his
profession, he is bound to have the will to observe a state
which in itself is of counsel only, and not of precept.
This is intrinsically to have the will to aim at, or tend
towards perfection.
A religious is not bound under mortal sin to have a
purpose to observe all or any of those things which he
has not promised or which he has not had specially pre
scribed to him. Morally speaking, however, a religious
can hardly have a due intention of his own salvation,
unless he intends this also. A man in the world can
hardly, morally speaking, have a firm purpose never to
commit mortal sin, unless he sometimes does works of
supererogation, and has either a formal or a virtual pur
pose of doing such works. In the same way a religious
cannot have a firm purpose to observe all things which
are necessary to charity and to perfection in his state,
unless he is prepared to do many things in particular
which are not prescribed. These cannot morally be
altogether severed from those things which are prescribed.
When a religious Rule does not bind under any sin, but
only under penalty, a religious does not sin mortally,
who has a purpose not to observe a rule, so long as he
is prepared to bear the punishment. If a religious were,
on the other hand, resolved to be so free from the yoke
of the Rule as not to be prepared to bear the punishment
of transgression of it, however strictly that punishment
might be prescribed by his Superior, or if he were pre
pared, if necessary, to resist his Superior, he would without
doubt be sinning mortally. He would be indulging a
disposition which is directly contrary to his vow of
1 88 Elements of Religious Life.
obedience. He would also be resisting the Rule, not only
as it is a merely penal law, but also as it resolves itself
into an obligation of conscience which is grave of its
own nature. This obligation is that of refraining from
resisting a Superior who is acting within his right and
procuring observance of the Rule. So long as a religious
is prepared to submit to punishment, he will not sin even
venially by his purpose not to observe a rule which does
not bind under sin. Morally speaking, however, there
cannot be found a religious so straight and upright in
substantial and necessary matters as to resolve to pre
serve these uninjured, who in other matters is so remiss
as to intend to observe no rule whatsoever, but always
to transgress all rules. This could hardly happen with
out contempt of the Rule.
There may easily, however, be found a religious who
is so remiss as, contenting himself with observance of
substantials and necessary matters, not to trouble himself
about other matters, and to resolve to observe the Rule
not always, but then only when religious discipline and
order should compel him by a moral necessity, or when
he could observe it without much trouble or difficulty.
It may possibly consist with such a purpose that he should
have the will, by means of certain actions, the doing of
which is either in accordance with the Rule or beyond
the Rule, to do many works of supererogation. It may
at any rate, consist with such a relaxation of life, that this
religious should have the will to love God more intensely,
and to exercise his love more frequently by acts of love
than he is bound to do, and to do this belongs to matters
of counsel.
When a Rule binds under venial sin, and not under
The Obligations of Religious. 189
mortal sin, it is a grave venial sin to form a deliberate
purpose of breaking the Rule, if occasion should offer.
Apart, however, from peril of a more grievous fall, to
which such breach of Rule should give occasion, and
apart from contempt of the Rule, this purpose will not
be a mortal sin. The case is similar to that of a man
in the world who has a purpose to keep all rigorous pre
cepts, but not a purpose to avoid venial sins, should occa
sion offer.
Venial sin may become a disposition towards mortal sin,
but it rarely happens that remissness in observance of
less important rules, even when directly voluntary, is on
this ground mortal sin. Such negligence is in itself only
a remote disposition, unless there should be particular
circumstances which cause it to be a proximate occasion
of mortal sin.
6.
There will be contempt of the Rule, if a religious should
formally despise the Rule as useless in order to his per
fection, and should on this ground transgress the Rule.
In so doing he is not necessarily in error against faith.
From the approbation of the Rule it follows only that it
does not contain anything which is contrary to morals,
and that it does contain a method which is useful in order
to perfection. It does not follow, from the fact of its
having been apostolically approved, that the Rule must
necessarily be useful in the case of every particular indi
vidual — nor does it follow that it should in itself be more
useful than are other Rules or other means of perfection.
If, therefore, a religious conceives a contempt for his Rule,
either solely as it regards himself, or solely in comparison
with other means of perfection which he excogitates, and
Elements of Religious Life.
which he believes would be more useful for him indi
vidually, he does not thereby oppose himself to the
approbation of the Sovereign Pontiff — nor does he fall
into error against faith in virtue of such contempt.
Exchanging the Rule for something of one's own inven
tion may sometimes spring from excessive presumption
and pride. It will then amount to mortal sin when, in
the judgment of the prudent, it exposes the religious to
peril of apostasy, or of failure in substantials or matters
necessary to his state — and when in spite of this he perse
veres in his own judgment and disposition.
A general intention on the part of a religious not to
subject himself to his Rule, even if this intention should
spring only from self-love and sloth, is contempt of the
Rule. It is virtual contempt, however, rather than formal
contempt. If, on the other hand, a religious not only
intends not to be solicitous about observance of his Rule,
but also intends never to observe his Rule, although he
could easily do so, this disposition will either be mortal
sin, or it will certainly be no small disposition towards
mortal sin. It can hardly be entertained without formal
contempt.
The saying that — " Not to make progress in the way of
God is to fail" — is to be interpreted as meaning that not to
make progress in substantials, and necessary matters of one's
state, is to fail substantially. Not to make progress in
accidental counsels is to fail in perfection only. This
may frequently be a venial and not a substantial failure.
So also the saying of St. Bernard — " Not to go forward
is to go backward, and not to ascend is to descend "-
is to be understood not as applying to religious only, but
as applying also to all Christians. It does not mean that
The Obligations of Religious . 191
not to grow in grace, without however falling into mortal
sin, is to go back in the way of God. This would not
be true. It does not refer to mortal sin — nor does it refer
to any diminution of grace. Grace cannot be diminished
apart from mortal sin — by which the whole of grace is
lost. It refers to venial sin, or to an increase of in
ordinate affections which hinder the course or the easiness
of virtue.
The Fathers by such sayings mean to teach that in
this life it is perilous for a man to suppose that he has
made sufficient progress, and perilous therefore to desist
from all care and effort to make more. When they
speak of failure, it is failure from perfection, and not
failure from grace, to which they refer.
Finally, a general purpose of non-observance, which
regards the whole Rule, may more easily verge on con
tempt, or will place a religious in graver peril, than will
a particular purpose with regard to this or that rule.
Frequent actual transgression of the Rule may spring
from frailty only, or from negligence. There is not in
such transgression so great a risk of arriving at contempt
as there is in formal deliberation or purpose.
The use of a religious habit is as ancient as is the
Church herself. St. John Chrysostom says that in this
matter monks imitate Elias and St. John the Baptist,
who made manifest by means of an external habit the
austerity of the life which they professed. There are
many reasons why religious should have a special habit.
Among other reasons it may be worn for the sake of
poverty, or for mortification, or as a profession of humility,
1 92 Elements of Religious Life.
abjection and penance, and in order to distinguish them
from lay persons, and from the secular clergy. Every
Order has its own special habit, to distinguish the mem
bers of it from members of other Orders.
A religious is bound under mortal sin not to lay aside
the habit of his Order. Desertion of the habit is one
mode, and a frequent mode, of apostasy. A professed
religious who rashly, or without sufficient reason, divests
himself of the habit of his Order, incurs thereby the
greater excommunication.
Obligation to wear the habit, although it does not arise
from vow, does not spring merely from Rule. If it did,
it would follow as a consequence that, when a religious
Rule does not bind under mortal sin, to lay aside the
habit would not be a mortal sin. It is nevertheless
accounted as a mortal sin by the tradition and common
consent of all religious Orders. The obligation to retain
the habit belongs in a manner to natural law. The
habit is given and is assumed, not as it is a mere garment,
but as it is an outward sign of a particular profession.
From the fact of a man's entering on an office or state
which is of perpetual obligation, there follows an obliga
tion not to lay aside the outward sign which has been
instituted and determined by public authority to signify
profession of that state. Besides this, moreover, there is a
positive precept to retain the habit. This precept is not
so much founded in any special Rule, as it is supposed by
every religious Rule. It is, as it were, a general law of
the religious state. It may be called an unwritten law,
as received by the common consent and tradition of all
religious Orders. It may also be said to belong to
canonical common law, as confirmed by the authority
and decrees of Pontiffs and General Councils.
The Obligations of Religious. 193
In order that transgression of this law, which prescribes
retention of the religious habit, should be a mortal sin,
formal contempt of it is not necessary. The virtual con
tempt is sufficient which is included in a free will to act
in opposition to it.
The obligation of a religious to wear his habit is not
so precisely necessary that it is never lawful to lay the
habit aside, at least for a time, and for a just cause, such
as preservation of life, or avoidance of grievous dishonour
or scandal. When there is a work or a journey which
cannot fittingly be undertaken in the habit, the necessity
or advantage of laying it aside is to be weighed, and may
be determined in accordance with the judgment of the
prudent.
The laying aside of the habit may be rendered lawful
by dispensation, since the wearing of the habit is not of
the substance of the religious state. There is not required
so great a cause as would in itself suffice to excuse the
change. There would then be not dispensation but
merely interpretation of the law. Neither is there needed
an extraordinary cause, such as would be necessary for
dispensation from the substantials of the religious state.
The greater the change of habit, or the longer the time
for which it is to be made, the greater the cause which is
required in order to justify the change.
The Sovereign Pontiff alone can grant dispensation
from wearing the habit. It is one thing to give leave
in the case of a work which cannot fittingly be done
without a change of habit, and it is another thing directly
to dispense from wearing the habit. The first a religious
Superior has power to do, and does daily. The other,
since it is a dispensation not from Rule, but from common
law, a religious Superior has no power to grant. When
N
1 94 Elements of Religious Life.
a religious subject asks leave of his Superior to lay aside
his habit on account of some journey or ministry, the
Superior gives a leave which is rather an authoritative
interpretation than a dispensation of the law. The doubt
with regard to the obligation of the law might in this
case have been determined by any prudent person. The
subject, however, is acting rightly in having recourse to
his Superior. To the Superior it belongs, in virtue of his
office, to declare whether or not the law is binding in a
doubtful case. By this authority which belongs to the
Superior he supplies practical certainty to his subject.
8.
To depart from the monastery with the intention of
apostasy, or of escaping from obedience to Superiors, is
intrinsically evil in the case of professed religious. It is
of its own nature a mortal sin, as directly contrary to the
grave obligation which is begotten by religious profession.
It is certain that enclosure, or remaining within the
bounds of the monastery, is not so prescribed to religious
that for no reason whatever it should ever be lawful for
them to go out beyond the cloister. It is lawful by leave
of their Superior, as the Rules of all religious Orders sup
pose. It is not contrary to common law, and the practice
is confirmed by common custom. It is certain also that
religious Superiors can, in virtue of their common and
ordinary power, grant this leave, unless the special law of
some particular Order should restrain the power which
would otherwise belong to the Superiors of that Order.
Obligation to enclosure does not arise from the simple
ordinance of a Rule which binds under penalty, and not
under sin, but is an obligation in conscience. It exists in
The Obligations of Religious. 195
virtue of a proper precept which binds in accordance with
the character of its matter, and which, when, as in this
case, the matter is grave, binds under mortal sin.
If a religious departs without leave, to live outside his
cloister for any length of time, and in, as it were, a settled
way — even if he has not the intention never to return, or
has not an intention to abandon religion altogether — his
flight is, in the view of all religious Orders, a grievous trans
gression, and it is not free from the guilt of apostasy, if he
intends his absence to be a long one. The same is true of
any departure from the monastery, which is made secretly,
even if the time spent outside should not have been very
long. A sign of the grievousness of this transgression is
the scandal and dishonour to the religious himself, and to
his Order, which such a flight is wont to beget. The
Council of Trent declares that it is not lawful for regulars
to depart from their convents, even on pretext of going to
Superiors, unless they have been either sent, or sent for.
The Council orders those who do so to be punished, as
transgressors of their Institute.
The root and ground of the grievous character of trans
gression of enclosure is the right of the Superior to govern
and to guard his religious subject. This right is seriously
injured by the subject's departure. A religious ought to be
so subject to the authority of his Superior that he may be
governed, commanded, and guarded by him. From such
subjection he withdraws himself by flight or departure from
the monastery against the will or without the knowledge of
his Superiors.
To go outside the cloister is, nevertheless, not in itself so
grave a sin that it cannot in a particular case be venial, by
reason of the smallness of its matter.
Under certain circumstances departure without leave may
196 Elements of Religious Life.
even be lawful, if it is made for a just cause, and when it
would have been lawful if made with leave. It may,
especially when it is but for a short time, be sometimes
necessary, by reason of charity towards a neighbour, in
order to defend him, or to succour the dying, or the like.
In such cases, however, presumed or tacit leave may gene
rally be supposed, and this, as we have seen suffices
in place of actual leave. Leave of the Superior which
has been obtained without fraud or force, always excuses
from a mortal sin of violation of enclosure, even if
the leave should have been given imprudently and without
cause, nay, even if the Superior is forbidden by the Rule to
give it. Departure from the monastery is in this case neither
apostasy nor flight. It is not furtive, since it is not made
unknown to the Superior, or apart from obedience to
him.
The Superior's leave is not a dispensation from common
law. It is a condition of the precept in question. The
law forbids not departure simply, but departure without
have. The law does not demand that the leave should be
prudently given. The law supposes this, and it does not
impose on the religious subject the burden of examination
into the prudence of the Superior's leave. The end of the
prohibition is rather that the religious should not depart
from his Superior, than that he should not depart from a
place. Whenever he departs by the will of his Superior, he
does not depart from his Superior, even if his Superior
ought not to have had the will to let him go.
A Superior, who has himself no Superior in the place
where he is living, does not violate enclosure by going
out without leave, for either that which he can give to
others he can also take for himself, or the law regarding
leave refers only to subjects, while he as Superior retains
The Obligations of Religious. 197
the liberty which he possesses in virtue of his office.
The Carthusians are forbidden by their Statutes to go
outside the enclosure without leave of the Prior General,
except in the rare cases which are enumerated in their
Constitutions. There is a similar prohibition among the
Camaldulese. Nearly all Monastic Orders profess a greater
enclosure, in virtue of their Rules, than do Mendicant
Orders, since Monks, as such, do not profess either mendi
cancy or ministries which cannot well be accomplished
without issuing from the cloister. Among monastic bodies,
some observe a more strict enclosure than do others.
Even within the same Order, some monasteries are, in
virtue of their Constitutions and custom, more strict in
this matter than are others.
9-
As regards the second part of Enclosure — by exclusion
from the monastery of seculars or externs — the Rules and
Constitutions of the Orders concerned are to be observed,
along with the natural obligation which springs from re
ligious decency, or from necessary care to avoid scandal.
The scandal might be either the scandal which seculars
should give, or the scandal which seculars might themselves
take from the religious, and this often without any fault of
theirs.
Superiors are therefore bound, in virtue of their office,
even if no special rule enjoins it, to take fitting precautions
in view of the circumstances of particular cases, that
secular persons should not easily be admitted within the
cloister, and especially into its more interior parts.
With due moderation and prudence, however, intercourse
with seculars has never been forbidden. St. Ambrose says
that, if seculars need our aid or ministry, it is more expedient
198 Elements of Religious Life.
that they should come to us, than that we should go to
them.
If a special Constitution of any religious Order prescribes
enclosure by prohibiting the entrance of seculars, three
things have to be considered — and, first, with regard to the
persons to whom the precept has reference. Very
frequently it is the entrance of women only that is
forbidden. Secondly, with regard to the places to which
the prohibition refers. Ordinarily it does not refer to the
church, even as regards women. The Carthusians are
said to have this prohibition. Hence their churches have
their doors within the bounds or outer walls of the monas
tery. In other Orders, while entrance is generally pro
hibited to women into any part of the cloister, entrance is
not prohibited into the church. Thirdly, there has to be
considered in particular Orders the nature and mode of the
obligation of enclosure. It is not the same in all Orders.
The degree of obligation will be declared by the words of
the Constitutions, and by the custom of the various Orders.
The obligation with regard to enclosure falls directly on
the religious, or on their Superiors, since a Constitution of
any religious Order cannot possibly bind secular persons.
Certain religious Orders, however, have, by means of
Indults of the Sovereign Pontiff, power to impose the pro
hibition directly on seculars themselves, and that even
under censures ip so facto to be incurred.
There are two kinds of enclosure — papal and episcopal. Papal
enclosure is that which is constituted by authority of the Holy See.
Apart from express intervention of this authority, there is no papal
enclosure. Episcopal enclosure is that which is established by au
thority of the Bishop, and is regulated at his discretion. It may be
more or less strict. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, vol. iv.
P- 97-
The Obligations of Religious. 199
10.
Special enclosure is not of intrinsic necessity to the
religious state in women. In ancient times virgins fre
quently professed religion in their own paternal homes. The
three substantial vows suffice in order to the existence of
the religious state. Without any law or vow of enclosure,
it is possible to observe chastity and a religious Rule, and
a manner of life which is in accordance with the
evangelical counsels. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted
that enclosure is most fitting for the religious state in
women.
The Church had always most certainly the power so to
institute a religious state for women as to prohibit them
from any longer professing religion in their own houses, or
paternal homes, and to permit them to profess it only in
monasteries or convents which have been approved by her.
The Church has power also not to admit women to
religious profession, unless they at the same time vow or
bind themselves not to go outside the monastery in which
they have professed stability, without lawful dispensation.
The obligation of Nuns to observe enclosure, by not
going outside the bounds of their monastery, includes more
than does the obligation of religious men to ordinary
enclosure, since it does not contain the condition —
" without leave of the Superior " — and is an absolute
obligation not to go outside the monastery.
The Council of Trent prescribed to all Bishops that,
by their ordinary authority, in all monasteries which are
subject to them — and by the authority of the Apostolic
See in all other monasteries which are not subject to
them — they should diligently restore enclosure of Nuns,
where that had been violated, and that, where it had
2oo Elements of Religious Life.
not been violated, they should provide for the continued
observance of it.
ii.
It is no less necessary in order to the purity and
perfection of the religious state in women that seculars
or externs should not enter within their cloisters, than
that they themselves should not go outside their cloisters.
The sacred canons forbid the one no less than the other.
The Sovereign Pontiff alone can give leave to enter
monasteries of women without necessary cause. All
other and inferior prelates can, by the law of the Council
of Trent, give leave only in necessary cases. They have
no power to derogate from either Pontifical or Conciliar
law.
That which has been said with regard to the enclosure of Nuns
refers only to religious Orders, strictly and properly so called, that
is to say, to Orders of religious women who make solemn vows,
and not to Congregations of religious women who make only
simple vows. Such Congregations, which are of modern institution,
have their Constitutions approved and confirmed by the Apostolic See.
Various graces have been granted to them by that See, which holds
them in great esteem and favour. It regards them as of signal
service for the supply of the needs of the Church at the present day.
These Congregations have a mitigated form of enclosure, subject to
the Bishop, and according to their Constitutions.
With regard to the law of Enclosure, as it affects missionaries who
are members of Religious Orders, there exists the following Decree of
the Sacred Congregation DC Propaganda Fide, 26 June, 1780 :—
Since it is becoming that men who, set free from the world, have by
means of religious vows made profession of an Institute of stricter life,
should avoid all familiar intercourse with women, it has been laid down
by decrees of both General and Provincial Councils, and of the
Sovereign Pontiffs, and specially in later days by the Constitutions of
The Obligations of Religious. 201
St. Pius V., Gregory XIII., and Benedict XIV., — that within the
bounds of religious men there should not lie open any way of entrance
to any woman whomsoever, and this under the most grievous penalties
inflicted both on the men who, under any pretext whatsoever, shall
admit women within the boundaries of Houses of Regulars, and on
women who shall violate the Enclosure of the said Houses. The
Sacred Congregation, adhering to these most wholesome ordinances,
has not ceased in the same way to admonish the Prefects of Missions,
whenever it has come to its knowledge that some of them were not in
this matter very vigilant. P'rom time to time, however, either through
forgetfulness of the law, or because of the proclivity of human in
genuity towards lessening the force of all laws whatsoever, it has
not seldom happened, as has been related by the letters of many
persons to the same Congregation, that women have been admitted
into the stations and hospices of missionaries, and that they have re
ceived the sacrament of penance in the rooms, or in other places with
in the bounds of these hospices. Rightly recognizing how unbecoming
and how perilous this is, the Sacred Congregation — whose desire it is,
that its missionaries, who are sojourning among enemies of the
Christian name, should abstain not only from evil, but also from every
appearance of evil, so that, in accordance with the warning of the
Apostle, they should be without offence both to Jews and Gentiles and
to the Church of God — has laid down and commanded that the hospices
and stations and all Houses whatsoever of every Order, Congregation,
or Regular Institute, wheresoever they may exist in missionary coun
tries, in which two or three missionaries of the Latin rite are living to
gether, or might happen to be living together, are subject to the law of
enclosure, so that it should be altogether unlawful for any Regular whom
soever to introduce any woman into the private bedrooms, dwelling-
rooms, or closets of the said hospices or stations on the ground of
any title, or apparent reason, or on any pretext whatsoever — and much
more unlawful to administer to her therein the most holy sacrament of
penance. Neither is it lawful for women, under cover of any leave
whatsoever, to enter the private bedrooms, dwelling-rooms or closets of
the said hospices, and this under the penalties inflicted by the afore
said Sacred Canons, and Constitutions of Pontiffs, on the violators of
enclosure.
In order, however that entrance may be open for women to the
Oratories in the interior of these hospices, to the Churches and to places
2O2 Elements of Religious Life.
where mass is said, so that they may be present at the most holy sacri
fice of the mass, and at other ecclesiastical functions, and may receive the
sacrament of penance, the same Sacred Congregation declares and
decrees that women can be admitted into churches, chapels and public
Oratories in the interior of the aforesaid hospices. To these however
they must go by the direct way, and not turn aside into either bed
rooms or private dwelling-rooms, and they must also return the same
way by which they came.
The Sacred Congregation, moreover, commands and prescribes that
the confessions of women shall be heard openly in churches and chapels
or public Oratories, where these exist ; and where they do not exist}
in some other open and accessible place, as near as may be to the gate
of the hospice, to be designated by the respective Ordinaries, and in
default of them, by the local Superiors of the Missions, and that the
penitents should be heard with an iron grating or other screen inter
posed between the mouth of the confessor and that of the woman.
Those who shall do otherwise, and act in defiance of these most whole
some ordinances, will incur the penalties which have been decreed
against violators of enclosure, and against those who contemn the
foresaid Sacred Canons and Apostolic Constitutions.
This Decree of the Sacred Congregation, when related to Our Most
Holy Lord, Pope Pius VI., was benignly confirmed by His Holiness,
who added to it the force of His Apostolic authority, and commanded
it to be inviolably observed by all, under the foresaid penalties.
CHAPTER IX.
Religious Superiors.
IT is impossible that any community of men should
subsist without a governor. If this is true of every com
munity, with still more reason is it true of a religious
community, in which order of the highest kind is neces
sary as a means towards progress in perfection. In the
religious state obedience is necessary on a special ground,
and for a special reason, and consequently a Superior is
necessary to whom obedience may be paid. All founders
of religious Orders have laid it down in their Institutes
that there should be some Superior whom the other
religious should perfectly obey. A Superior, on the one
hand, and obedience, on the other, are correlatives.
Although it is not of absolute necessity that superiority
should be restricted to one person, since superiority
might be vested in a council consisting of several persons,
it is nevertheless, morally speaking, necessary that the
exercise of superiority should be committed to one person.
Every particular matter which may occur to be transacted
or prescribed could not possibly be regulated or ordained
by a common council composed of many persons.
An ordinary and even immediate power might reside
in the community only or in a council, even if it should
be proximately administered by means of vicars. Such
a mode of government, however, would not be suitable
for a religious Order. It is imperfect, and would be but
204 Elements of Religious Life.
ill adapted for any community of such a character. In all
religious Orders, therefore, monarchical government, at
least as regards the proximate exercise of government, has
been received in practice. Monarchical government is,
according to Aristotle and to St. Thomas, of all govern
ments the most perfect. Christ Himself taught this when
He willed that in His Church there should be perfect
monarchy. Nature itself declares it by admitting one
only Supreme Prince of the Universe, namely, His Divine
Majesty. The religious state, by reason of its perfection,
specially demands monarchy. It requires not only one
governor, but also one head, who should be one person.
In this it is that a monarchy differs from other polities.
2.
In the Superiors of religious Orders there may exist a
twofold power — a power of jurisdiction, and a dominative
power. It is necessary that a religious Superior should
possess dominative power. It is not so necessary that he
should possess jurisdiction. The donation and delivery
of himself, which is made by a religious to his Order, and
his vow of obedience are of necessity to the constitution
of the religious state. The existence of dominative power
in a Superior is also, as we have seen, necessary
in the religious state. These two are correlatives or, as it
were, cause and effect. From the delivery of himself by
the religious to the Order there emerges in the Order
dominative power. From the Order this dominative power
is transferred to the Superior.
It is not necessary ft&X. jurisdiction should be conferred
on a religious Order, or on a Superior who is a religious
of the same Order and profession. Among Nuns there
does not exist any spiritual jurisdiction. Nuns as women
Religious Superiors. 205
are incapable of possessing jurisdiction. There exists,
however, in every one of their convents an Abbess, or a
Prioress, or other Superioress, who possesses dominative
power, such as is necessary and sufficient for all purposes
of religious government.
The ancient monks were not as a rule clerics, and no
laymen, however holy they may be, are capable of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. These monks had nevertheless
their Superiors who were in possession of sufficient power
for religious government. St. Benedict himself does not
appear to have been a priest, and he was certainly an
Abbot, that is, a Father and Superior of monks. The
excommunication of which he speaks in his Rule was
not that ecclesiastical censure which is an act of eccle
siastical jurisdiction, but an external separation from the
society of the brethren, either in choir, or in other occu
pations and exercises, or in common conversation. This
separation was effected simply by an ordinance or prohibi
tion of obedience, and it did not bind either the religious
himself or other persons in that way in which an eccle
siastical censure binds those persons on whom it is
inflicted.
Although it is not necessary that ecclesiastical juris
diction should exist in a Superior of the same sex or
Order, ecclesiastical jurisdiction over every religious
Order must nevertheless exist in some one prelate
of the Church. He is, by reason of this jurisdiction,
the prelate of that Order. There cannot exist any
state in the Church without that state's being subject
to the jurisdiction of the prelates and pastors of the
Church. Thus Nuns are subject either to religious men
of their own Order who have jurisdiction over them, if
2o6 Elements of Religious Life.
their Order is exempt from the jurisdiction of the
Bishop ; or to the Bishop, if it is not exempt. In the
latter case the Bishop is no less the proper prelate of
those Nuns than the Provincial or Prior of the men of
their own Order would be, if they were exempt from the
jurisdiction of the Bishop. In like manner those ancient
monks who were laymen were subject to the jurisdiction
of the Bishop, as their own proper prelate.
In exempt Orders, such as nearly all religious Orders
of men now are, prelates properly so called — that is to
say, who possess spiritual and episcopal or <7//^5/-episcopal
jurisdiction — are necessary. When an Order is exempted
from the jurisdiction of the Bishop, it remains subject
immediately to the jurisdiction of the Sovereign Pontiff
alone. Since, however, the Order could not fittingly be
governed by the Pontiff in person, or through his com
missaries or delegates — for in every Congregation there
should exist ordinary pastors, on whom the care of it
should be incumbent in virtue of their office, — it follows
that, if the proximate pastors of that Order are not the
Bishops, there must be proper prelates in the Order
itself.
The General, the Provincial, and the local or conven
tual Superior in every Order which has been approved
by the Sovereign Pontiff, and which is exempt from the
jurisdiction of the local Bishop, are truly and properly
Prelates, with ordinary jurisdiction. This jurisdiction they
possess in virtue of their office, and their jurisdiction
they can also delegate.
It does not follow from the institution or approbation
of a religious Order that it should possess jurisdiction.
Religious Orders do not possess jurisdiction in virtue of
Religious Superiors. 207
common law. It is conferred on them by way of special
concession.
3«
The prelates in a religious Order may be distinguished
as — the lowest, the highest, and the intermediate prelates.
The lowest prelates in an Order are those who are called
conventual or local prelates. These preside over one
monastery only. They exercise in that monastery an
immediate prelature in the sense that under them there
exists no other prelate. Although they may have, and
commonly do have a vicar, who is subordinate to them —
who in some Orders is called the Prior in his relation to
the Abbot ; in other Orders the Superior in his relation
to the Prior ; and in other Orders, the Minister in his
relation to the Rector or Provost — this vicar is never
theless not a prelate. A vicar of this kind does not
possess any proper and ordinary jurisdiction. He either
has no jurisdiction, but only power of economic adminis
tration — or whatever jurisdiction he possesses has been
delegated to him.
The highest prelate in a religious Order — who within
that Order has no Superior, and who has as his subjects all
other prelates of the same Order — is the General. In
some Orders the General is called the Prior-General, and
in others the Abbot-General, or the Master-General, the
Minister-General, or the Provost-General. He is called
the Supreme Prelate of his Order, not as if he himself
were not subject to any man, but inasmuch as he is
supreme in his relation to all other prelates of the same
Order. The Sovereign Pontiff alone is absolutely the
Supreme Prelate of all religious Orders.
The General of a religious Order possesses a jurisdiction
208 Elements of Religions Life.
which is in a manner more universal than is the
jurisdiction of a local Bishop. Monasteries are subject to
him in various dioceses, and even in various provinces
and kingdoms. For this reason the General of a reli
gious Order could not well be subordinate to the various
Bishops of all these countries. If he were, he would not
be able, morally speaking, to govern in a uniform way
the various monasteries which are subject to him.
Properly speaking, there can be only one supreme
prelate in one religious Order. The very idea of the
supreme includes the idea of the single. In those Orders
in which there are several prelates who have the name
of General, all of them, save one who is independent, are
Generals only in name. They are so called because of
the great extent of the district which they govern, or
because of the smallness of their subordination to the real
General, who is the only General in the strict and true
sense. The Order in which they are Generals is called
one, not as being one with that perfect moral oneness
which demands union under one head, but as being one
merely with the oneness of following the same founder,
with profession of the same Rule in principal matters,
with similarity of habit, and with greater fraternal com
munication and charity, such as similarity is wont to
beget. Of this we have an example in the Order of
St. Francis. Within that Order we find the various
religious families of the Observantines, the Conventuals,
and the Capuchins, each of them with its own General.
What we have called intermediate prelates are those
prelates who are subject to a superior prelate within the
same Order, but who are, at the same time, universal
prelates, as having under them many houses, along with
Religious Superiors. 209
the inferior prelates of those houses. Of this kind are
the Provincials of the Mendicant Orders, and of other
Orders which imitate the Mendicants in their mode of
government. In the Monastic Orders intermediate pre
lates do not exist. The Carthusians have, besides their
General, no common prelate of one province or nation,
but only the Priors of the various individual convents.
These hold at certain times a guasz'-pTOv'mcia,} or national
Chapter. This Chapter, so long as it continues, may be
said to have the authority of a ^7/#.$7-provincial or national
prelate. In this Chapter they elect Visitors, but these
are not Provincials. They are not ordinary prelates, or
prelates with ordinary jurisdiction in virtue of their office,
and such as they can delegate. These Visitors exercise
a special commission at certain times and places.
The other Monastic Orders have commonly only one
ordinary Prelate over all the Abbots or Priors, and him,
for this reason, they call their General. A threefold
order of prelates is, therefore, not absolutely necessary in
the religious state, even as that state exists in the Church
at the present time.
In the Mendicant Orders, by reason of their wide
diffusion and their special manner of life, the threefold
^//^/"-hierarchical order of Superiors is always observed.
There always exists, between the conventual Superior
and the General, an intermediate Superior — the Provincial.
The Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars will not recog
nize, besides the General Superioress and the local Superioresses in
Orders of women, any third or intermediate grade of Provincial
Superioresses, after the manner of the Provincials in religious Orders
of men. The utmost that it has allowed is that a General Superioress
should have power, until'the next Chapter, to depute such sisters as
O
2 1 o Elements of Religious L tfe.
seem to her best fitted, to act in her name in the Houses of certain
districts. These may be called Provincial Vicaresses. See Zitelli,
Apparatus Juris Ecclesiastici, p. 253.
The Provincial is himself under the General, and he has
under him various convents along with their Superiors.
These constitute one Province. The Province, although
it is a part of one religious Order, is nevertheless in itself
one body-politic, consisting of all its convents along with
the Provincial as the head of them. In religious Orders
there do not, as a rule, exist any other intermediate and
ordinary prelates, besides the Provincial. If Commis
saries or Visitors are sometimes created, they are not
ordinary, but extraordinary Superiors. They possess a
merely delegated jurisdiction, which expires on the death
of the granter. There is one exception, namely, the
Order of St. Francis, in which there are other inter
mediate prelates. These are the Cismontane and Ultra
montane Commissaries-General, who, under the General,
are Superiors of all the Provincials of their respective
religious families. The Commissaries-General are true
prelates, with ordinary jurisdiction.
Generals, Provincials, and local or conventual Superiors
are equal in some things, and in some things they differ.
They are equal in this, that all of them have spiritual
jurisdiction over their respective subjects, both in the
internal forum of penance and in the external eccle
siastical or religious forum.
Secondly, all of them have ordinary and not merely
delegated jurisdiction. As regards the forum of penance
all of them are ordinary pastors on whom, in virtue of
their office, is incumbent the care of the souls of their
religious subjects. In relation to their subjects superior
Religious Superiors. 2 1 1
and universal prelates are guasi-Bishops, while the inferior
local prelates are quasi-parish priests (parochi). As
regards the external forum, external jurisdiction is neces
sary in order to the government of a religious body.
Although, strictly speaking, dominative power might
suffice for external government, and especially for the
economic government of one house, this power will never
theless be more efficacious if it has power of jurisdiction
combined with it. Supposing exemption of an Order
from the jurisdiction of the Bishop, there must exist
within that Order effiicacious external jurisdiction, since
the Order cannot be left without a proper governor under
the Sovereign Pontiff.
Since, moreover, the General cannot possibly preside,
immediately and in person, over the various provinces,
jurisdiction must exist in the various Provincials. For
the same reason it is necessary that there should exist
in every separate house a proper governor. Possession
of jurisdiction by him is morally necessary.
Thirdly, all three — the General, the Provincials, and
the local or conventual Superiors — have quasi-episcopal
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may be called episcopal in two
senses — first, by reason of the person who is invested
with jurisdiction, and as jurisdiction is due to the epis
copal office, and demands as the subject of it a person
who has been consecrated to the episcopate — secondly,
by reason of the actions to which the jurisdiction extends,
and which are, of common and ordinary right, proper to
the jurisdiction of Bishops. There are certain acts of
spiritual jurisdiction which of themselves belong to
Bishops, and which belong to others only inasmuch as
they share in somewhat of the jurisdiction of Bishops.
The jurisdiction, therefore, of the religious prelates of a
212 Elements of Religious Life.
religious Order is called episcopal, because it really extends
to acts of episcopal jurisdiction over their own subjects.
Among such acts are excommunication and suspension,
absolution from those censures, and from cases and cen
sures reserved in certain events to the Sovereign Pontiff,
dispensation from certain vows, absolution from certain
irregularities, and the like.
The episcopal jurisdiction of religious prelates is called
<7#0.«-episcopal, in the first place, because those prelates
are not Bishops. Their jurisdiction, moreover, does not
suffice for all episcopal acts, nor does it extend to all acts
of the jurisdiction, considered even as it is merely juris
diction, which belongs to Bishops.
Fourthly, the three kinds of religious prelates are all
of them equal in this, that they all have immediate juris
diction over all the religious who are subject to each of
them respectively.
The three kinds of religious prelates — the General, the
Provincial, and the local or conventual Superior — differ
one from the other in their jurisdiction in various ways,
and especially as regards the extent of their jurisdiction,
and as regards dependence or subordination in the exer
cise of their jurisdiction. In extent of jurisdiction, and
as regards persons and territory, the lowest prelate has
jurisdiction only over his own monastery and the persons
whom it contains. The intermediate prelate, or Pro
vincial, has jurisdiction only over the persons and monas
teries of his province. The General has jurisdiction over
all persons and places of his Order.
The more universal the jurisdiction of a religious pre
late is over persons and places, the greater is the
number of acts affecting both which he has power to do.
Religious Superiors. 2 1 3
A Provincial can remove a religious from one house to
another. This a Prior cannot do. The General can
remove a religious from one province to another. This
a Provincial cannot do.
Individual religious are subject to an universal prelate
in more respects than they are subject to a particular
prelate. They are subject to the universal prelate not
only as they are members of a house, but also as they
are members of a province, or of the whole Order, to the
universal advantage of which they ought to contribute
and minister.
The three kinds of religious prelates — Generals, Pro
vincials, and local or Conventual Superiors — differ also in
their dependence. They differ, in the first place, as regards
their origin. Inferior prelates derive their origin from
superior prelates. The Provincial derives his origin from
the General, and a Rector derives his origin from the Pro
vincial.
This does not apply to Rectors of Colleges in the Society of Jesus.
These are appointed by the General.
When a General is elected by the Provincials or Abbots,
or when a Provincial is elected by the Priors or Guardians,
the Provincials or Abbots in the one case, and the Priors
or Guardians in the other, do not elect the General or
Provincial respectively, as they are Provincials or Abbots,
or as they are Priors or Guardians, but as they are electors.
The two offices of prelates and electors are formally dis
tinct. A superior prelate, therefore, never depends on an
inferior formally as on a prelate, while an inferior prelate
does depend, as regards his origin, on his superior
prelate.
Besides dependence of origin, there is dependence also
214 Elements of Religious Life.
in operation. While a superior prelate does not depend, as
regards his actions, on an inferior prelate, an inferior pre
late does in his action depend on the superior prelate. The
superior prelate can restrict the jurisdiction of the inferior
prelate, while the inferior prelate has no power to limit
the jurisdiction of the superior prelate.
An universal prelate can prescribe immediately to all his
subjects. He can prohibit them from obeying, in this or in
that matter, inferior prelates. He can also prescribe to in
ferior prelates not to interfere in a particular matter, and
they will be bound to obey him. An universal prelate can
reserve to himself absolution of certain sins, judgment in
certain causes, certain dispensations, and even the sub
jection of certain persons. An intermediate prelate can
do the same, so far as prelates who are subject to himself
are concerned.
Such restrictions cannot lawfully be made without just
cause, inasmuch as every prelate has a real right to his
own ordinary jurisdiction. The restrictions are, neverthe
less, valid, even if made without cause. The will of the
Superior prevails, and there is no law to invalidate this
exercise of his will.
Magistracy or mastership may be created in two ways,
either by election, or by the will of a superior prelate.
Hereditary succession has no place in transmission of
spiritual power. Nomination by a prelate of his suc
cessor, although it does not absolutely involve any
intrinsic evil, is not practised in the Church. It is not
practised in the Church, lest prelature should have the
appearance of being a legacy, and also in order to
avoid the risk of election through private affection. It
Religious Superiors. 215
is, moreover, forbidden by the Sacred Canons. Nomina
tion of a vicar by a dying or by an outgoing prelate,
to preside in the interim till the election of his successor, is
not, properly speaking, succession. It is not open to the
same objections, and it is not forbidden by the canons. In
the Society of Jesus it is granted to the General to
nominate a Vicar, who immediately after the death of the
General will assemble the Society, and will also preside
over it until a new General is elected.
The General, or supreme prelate, in every religious
Order is created by means of election, since he has not
within the Order any superior by whom he might be
appointed. The Sovereign Pontiff might, indeed, reserve
the creation of a General to himself, and he might insti
tute and approve an Order with this reservation. The
Pontiffs have, however, refrained from so doing, in order
to the greater content of the Order, and for the greater
benefit of its head. The General will have in his election
a public testimony from his future subjects of his sufficiency
and worthiness for the office, and he will be received with
greater love and confidence by the whole Order. For a
similar reason the Sovereign Pontiffs will not nominate
their own successors, but leave the election of them to the
Church. So also the ancient Abbots, who were supreme
within their own Orders, although subject to the Bishop,
were elected by the monks, although they might have
been nominated by the Bishop or by the Pontiff alone, if
the Church had so willed it. In the same way, at the
present day, the Abbesses, in those Orders of religious
women which are subject to the Bishop, are created by
election of the nuns, and are not appointed by the Bishop.
The election of a General must be lawful, since it has
2 1 6 Elements of Religious L ife.
force chiefly from the law. He must be of lawful age,
that is, at least twenty-five years of age. He must have
been professed within the same Order. He must be a
priest, or at least he is bound to receive the priesthood, as
necessary for cure of souls. He must in any case have
already received the tonsure, so as to be a cleric and
therefore capable of spiritual jurisdiction.
The election of the General belongs to the Order, which
should be assembled by the person who is deputed by and
has authority from the Order for this purpose. All those
should be called who, in accordance with the Statutes of
the Order, have a right of suffrage. Electors must be
already professed within the Order. They must be in
Sacred Orders, in the case of Clerks Regular, and also
in the case of Monks, as Monks exist in the Church at
the present day.
In order that the creation of a General should be valid,
the due forms of election must be observed. All who have
the right of electing must be called. It is not so necessary
that they should all be present. They are not compelled
to elect, but only have power to elect, if they please. The
election should be made in common congregation, in order
that it may proceed with better examination, and know
ledge of persons, and with greater certainty both as regards
the suffrages, and as regards the merits of the person to be
elected. Moreover, that which is the act of one corporate
body, which has power to constitute for itself a head,
should be done by its members in common congregation.
This is a substantial condition.
Before the election three of the electors must be ap
pointed as scrutineers of the votes. By these three the
votes are secretly and singly collected, and reduced to
Religious Superiors. 2 1 7
writing. The votes are then to be published immediately,
without any moral lapse of time. The names of persons in
favour of whom the votes have been given, or how many
votes have fallen to this or to that person, is not to be
declared. The number of persons who have voted for
the same individual is alone to be mentioned. This is a
substantial solemnity. It is ordained for the greater
certainty of the collation of votes which follows, and to
preclude all subterfuges and tergiversation.
A majority of votes is required, that is to say, a majority
of the votes of the whole Chapter. It does not suffice for
one person to have more votes than have all the others, if
the number of votes given in his favour should not amount
to a majority of the votes of the whole Chapter. After the
collation of the votes, the election is to be made. Although
the election might seem to have been already made by
the voting, it has, nevertheless, not yet been made. The
election is an act of the Chapter, as the Chapter is one
whole. This is not held to be made or completed until
one person, in name of the whole Chapter, speaks and
elects the future prelate. This is of the substance of the
election, or rather this is the substance of the election.
The election is not held as made until this is done.
No right is conferred if this is omitted. The Council of
Trent strictly forbids the names of the electors ever to
be published. This, however, since the publication of
them would always be subsequent to the election, cannot
be of the substance of the election, and cannot affect its
validity.
All that is required after the election, in order that the
person elected should have full right of prelature, is con
firmation. Confirmation is necessary by common law, and
it belongs to the immediate superior of the prelate-elect.
218 Elements of Religious Life.
In the case of a General, or supreme prelate, confirmation
belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff alone. If any one should
exercise prelature without having obtained confirmation, he
will be deprived of the right which he has acquired by
election.
In many religious Orders, however, in virtue of Privileges
and Indults, special confirmation is not necessary. Since,
in virtue of those Privileges, the election is made by
authority of the Apostolic See, when a religious is publicly
declared to have been canonically elected, he is held also
as having been confirmed by the same Apostolic au
thority. To him all the religious then do homage as to
their supreme prelate, and he proceeds forthwith to
preside over the General Chapter, and to exercise his office.
5-
All prelates inferior to the General can be created by
means of election. Election is not, however, necessary as
a means in order to the creation of inferior prelates, as it
is necessary for the creation of a General. After the whole
Order has been once made subject to one supreme internal
head, inferior prelates, both intermediate and lower, can be
created by him. He could either immediately appoint
both kinds of prelates, or he could appoint intermediate
prelates and then, through and by means of them, appoint
the lower prelates. In the Universal Church the election
of one Vicar of Christ is necessary. In order, however, to
the existence of inferior prelates, such as bishops, arch
bishops, and patriarchs, election is not strictly necessary
These could be provided by the Vicar of Christ, if he
chose to do so by himself alone.
The monarchy of any particular religious Order differs
from the monarchy of the Universal Church in this, that
Religious Superiors. 219
in the Universal Church the supreme power of govtrn-
ment resides absolutely in its Head, and cannot be limited
by any one under Christ. In a religious Order, on the
other hand, the whole power of jurisdiction flows from
the Sovereign Pontiff, and although a principal power is
communicated to the General, it is, nevertheless, given
with limitation to this or to that mode of regulation.
When, therefore, the Institute of an Order, which has
been approved by the Pontiff, requires election of its
prelates, this mode of their creation is to be observed.
According to the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, all
inferior prelates are created not by election, or by the
suffrages of subjects, but by the will and provision of the
General. It was not without a special providence of God,
and an inspiration of the Holy Ghost, that St. Ignatius left
this mode of government to the Society. It is one of the
means which are principally necessary for its preservation
and progress, and especially for its peace and tranquillity.
Besides the authority of the Founder and his companions,
and the continuous consent of the whole Order, we have in
confirmation of this the authority of the Sovereign Pontiffs
Paul III. and Julius III. Long experience, moreover, has
shown that no inconveniences of any moment have hitherto
followed from this mode of government ; — nay, rather, that
by reason of it the Society has been governed with great
peace, and with observance of the due order of justice and
of charity. It is therefore well adapted for the Institute of
the Society of Jesus, in accordance with its special mode of
life, whatever may be the case as regards other Orders or
Congregations, whose customs its practice is in no way in
tended to condemn.
The reasons for preference of this mode of government
220 Elements of Religious Life.
are drawn chiefly from consideration of the evils which fol
low from any other mode of creating prelates, and which
are avoided by means of this mode.
There are three ways in which it is possible for inferior
prelates to be created. They can be created by election
made by the whole community. They can be created,
secondly, by some superior prelate along with a definitive
council. Thirdly, they can be created by one supreme
prelate, with whom alone this power resides, although he
ought in exercising his power to avail himself of the pru
dence and counsel of his ministers.
The first mode is attended with great danger of beget
ting the spirit of ambition, which is a very pest in a
religious Order. The more democratic an election is,
the less perfect it is, and the more exposed it is to this
vice. In every state in which men live, the prudent, and
those who are free from private affections, are in the
minority. When the electors are a whole people, or a
congregation, or a multitude of men, many of them will
be either young, or somewhat less than prudent, or with
affections which are not under sufficient control. It will,
therefore, be easy to corrupt or to deceive many. Hence
might arise a spirit of ambition in those who had a chance,
through corruption or deception, of securing the prelature.
Elections, moreover, are often fruitful in divisions and
parties. There is also danger of a prelate who is elected
being offended with those who have not voted for him.
This may have its further result in his conniving and wink
ing at faults in others which ought to be punished, and,
what is far more serious, in his promoting to offices and
dignities in the Order men who have not merited them, or
who are unworthy of them.
Religious Superiors. 221
By reason of the many disadvantages which have been
discovered by experience to attach to this mode of election,
and in order to avoid them, many religious Orders have
abandoned it, while there are not a few who hold and
desire that it should be abandoned. In the Universal
Church we find that the elections of Bishops, which were
of old made by the people or by the clergy, have been put
a stop to ; while the election of the Sovereign Pontiff is
made by a small number of persons, and those are select
persons.
Against the second mode of election, namely, election
by a Council of Definitors, there are the same objections.
No less prudence and rectitude would be necessary in
electing the electors than that which is required in
electing the prelate himself.
A supreme prelate is, in making his appointments,
more likely to be free from private affections, by reason
of the greater responsibility of his office, and his less
dependence on others. Secondly, perfect subordination,
and the union of the whole body with its head, which is so
necessary in order to its welfare, is hereby better pre
served.
In order to valid creation of inferior prelates these
must be at least twenty-five years of age, and must have
been professed in the same Order, although it is not
necessary that they should belong to the same house
or province. The corporate unity of the Mendicant
and similar Orders is such that distinction of places
and provinces is, so far as they are concerned, a
very accidental matter. More weight is given to locality
in Monastic Orders, although even in regard of this
the Monastic Orders are now nearly all reduced to the
222 Elements of Religious Life.
same standard, so that identity of Order, profession
and habit is alone necessary. Variety of habit is reckoned
substantial when the variety proceeds from diversity of
Rule, just as a change of habit is substantial when the
change is contrary to the disposition of the Rule. A
substantial difference of habit therefore rightly hinders
election. An accidental difference of habit, whether in
colour or in shape, which is not contrary to the Rule,
but is permitted under the same Rule, will not hinder
election. During his period of office, however, the
prelate should conform at least his outer habit to the
habit of his subjects, so that there should not exist any
external diversity between head and members.
The Council of Trent supposes, with regard to Nuns,
that the Abbess should, as far as possible, be elected
from the same monastery. The Council concedes only
that, under certain circumstances, she may be elected
from another monastery of the same Order. The Council
adds two conditions to the election of an Abbess or
Prioress, which are not necessary in the case of men.
She should be forty years of age, and she should have
lived eight years in religion since the date of her pro
fession. These conditions are not, however, declared by
the Council to be substantial, so that absence of them
would invalidate an election. They amount to simple
prohibition, and they are prescribed only when it is
possible for them to be observed. When this is not
possible, the Council grants that an Abbess may be
elected who is thirty years of age, and who has lived
in religion five years since her profession.
A third condition which is necessary in a religious
Religious Superiors. 223
who is to be elected prelate, is that he should be a priest,
or at least in Sacred Orders. This condition is as neces
sary in the case of an inferior prelate as it is necessary
in the case of supreme prelates.
6.
Religious prelature is not, of the nature of the case,
either perpetual, or temporary. Either mode of institu
tion is possible. There does not exist in the Catholic
Church any prelature which is, of divine law, absolutely
perpetual, so that he who is in possession of that prelature
cannot possibly be deprived of it against his will. The
sole exception is the Sovereign Pontificate. There is not,
moreover, any precept of common law which defines
that religious prelatures should be perpetual. It is equally
true that there does not exist any precept of common
law which forbids perpetuity of prelature.
By reason of the special laws of the various Religious
Orders there exists great variety with regard to the
duration of religious prelatures. The appointment of
the General is frequently temporary, and he continues
in office for a longer or a shorter time. In some Orders
the office of General is perpetual, or for life.
As regards the advantages and disadvantages of
perpetuity of prelature, and of temporary prelature
respectively, it is argued on the one hand, that temporary
prelature is prejudicial to the spiritual welfare and tran
quillity of souls, by reason of the disadvantages to which it
gives occasion. It is urged that with temporary tenure
of office prelates are in a manner rendered dependent
on their subjects, and that in consequence the authority
224 Elements of Religious Life.
of the prelate is lessened, and that temporary superiors
fear their subjects rather than rule their subjects, by whom
they may be either raised up or cast down. It is further
argued that temporary prelature is to many persons a
source of ambition, which is a very pest in religion, and
that from ambition springs enervation of discipline, since
religious who nourish a desire to be elected may dissemble
in order to ingratiate themselves with the voters, and that
the consequences are collusions, compacts, hatreds, in
testine dissensions, murmurings and the like.
It is also urged that in perpetuity of religious prelature
— which has in favour of it the analogy of the universal
custom of the Church with regard to Bishops, whose
appointment is perpetual, so that translation of Bishops
is as a rule discountenanced — there are not only avoided
the disadvantages and perils which flow from frequent
elections, but there are also secured many advantages
which arise from the long continuance of the same person
in the same office. Among these advantages are — the
greater love which is begotten by long association and
a perpetual bond — the greater care which a man has
for the interests of the office in which he is to continue —
and the greater experience which it enables him to have.
All of these advantages are absent in the case of tem
porary prelates who are liable to removal just as they
are beginning to gain experience in their office. They
may come to care but little for matters of enduring
interest and importance, resting content that there should
be peace in their days.
On the other side it is argued that the alteration of the
ancient custom is a matter of greater weight than is the
previous existence of that custom. The alteration,
Rcligiotts Superiors. 225
however, has taken place not here and there, but through
out the Church. This, it is maintained, is a sign that the
alteration was introduced because it was found by ex
perience to be advisable. The Apostolic See, it is added,
has always shewn itself more favourable to religious
prelates being temporary, and has changed prelatures
from being perpetual into being temporary, while it
has never changed prelatures from being temporary
into being perpetual. It is asserted also that the dis
advantages which are alleged to arise from temporary
prelatures, do not arise so much from the brief term of
the prelature as from the mode of election. Further, it is
urged that while a religious superior should be a father
rather than a lord and master, he is easily led by
perpetuity of tenure to forget the paternal spirit, and
by degrees to beget the lordly spirit. It is also main
tained that since, in order that a religious prelate may
prescribe in the way that best becomes him, it is very
necessary that he should be habituated at intervals to
obey, so that he may have compassion and sympathy
with the necessities and even with the frailties of his
subjects. It is urged that he should himself from time
to time be living dependent on another prelate, and
have to suffer from the difficulties of obedience. Finally,
it is argued that, if one and the same person is always
governing, the other religious will have no opportunity of
being trained, and of gaining experience in govern
ment, and that therefore the number will be small of
those who when occasion arises are found fit for office.
It is therefore maintained, that if various persons were
successively to govern, a greater number of persons
would be recognized as fit for governmeut, who would
otherwise remain unknown. " Magistracy shews the
P
226 Elements of Religious Life.
man," and by experience and practice men are made
perfect. The Order would in this way, it is said,
abound with men who are well fitted for superiority
and office.
Where elections — especially if made by a Chapter or by
a congregation of many persons — can be avoided, it is
in itself more fitting, and it is more in accordance with
the religious state, that prelatures should not be perpetual.
The religious state is not in itself a state of prelature.
It is a state of subjection and of humility. It admits
of prelature only from necessity. By temporary prelature
there is, moreover, presented that equality which is
necessary in order to religious charity. When he who to
day is governing may to-morrow be himself a subject and
on a level with the rest, he will not be over-elated now and
they will then be edified. If religious government is
founded in charity, rather than in any merely human
motive, it will be entered upon and exercised with no less
care when it is temporary, than it would be if it were per
petual. If it is otherwise, it is so much the more expe
dient that the government should not be perpetual. In
that case the longer it lasted the more it would
degenerate. The inexperience of new Superiors will find
a remedy in following the example of their predecessors,
in listening to the counsels of prudent advisers, and in
submitting to the admonition of superior prelates.
Guided in this way, new Superiors will not go far
wrong.
Where, on the other hand, prelatures are conferred by
means of election, it is, morally speaking, more advisable
that those prelatures should be either perpetual, or of
Religious Superiors. 227
long continuance. This is on account of the disad
vantages and dangers which from human frailty are
apparently so intrinsically connected with elections. It
is more difficult to avoid the evils which spring from
elections than it is to avoid the evils which are wont to
arise from perpetual or from long-continued prelature.
Hence it is that many religious Orders, in which the
prelatures are temporary, have either done away with
elections, or have confined election to a council com
posed of a small number of persons, and those grave
persons. Those Orders which retain frequent or triennial
conventual elections have done so, either because they
could not well make any other provision, as in the
case of monasteries of Nuns, or because they have not
as yet experienced the disadvantages which so commonly
beset elections, being in the habit of conducting their own
elections with simplicity and religious purity of intention.
When temporary prelatures are conferred by one
Superior, the term of their continuance may be left to
his judgment and discretion. It is nevertheless better
to have it fixed, as leaving him more free to make a
change without offence or suspicion of censure of the
outgoing prelate.
Where temporary prelatures are, on the other hand,
conferred by election, it is almost necessary that the
term of their continuance should be fixed. To leave it
indefinite, and at the discretion of any one, would be
virtually to commit to that person a new election.
In many Orders it is ordained, and approved by the
Apostolic See, that the same prelate should not be re-
elected immediately, but only after the lapse of a certain
time.
228 Elements of Religious Life.
7-
In every government the first and most necessary
power is directive power. To directive power it belongs
not only to give counsels (these may be given apart
from any special power), but to give laws or precepts.
It is therefore certain and, looking to the universal
practice of the Church, it is of faith that the prelate
of a true religious Order has power to bind his subjects
in conscience by means of a law or just precept.
There is a twofold title to or foundation of this power.
The first is the vow of obedience, by which a religious
is bound to obey. Since this vow does not in itself bind
to any particular act, except through the intervention of
a command of the Superior, the Superior is therefore
rightly said to have power to so prescribe that his sub
jects should be bound in conscience to obey. The second
title or foundation of the power of a religious prelate to
prescribe to his subjects is the ecclesiastical jurisdiction
which has been granted to him. This jurisdiction suffices
in order that his subjects should be bound in conscience
by his laws or precepts.
A personal precept is, however, one thing, and a statute
by way of law is another thing. By personal precept all
Superiors who have any power of jurisdiction can, more
or less, in accordance with the mode of their jurisdiction,
prescribe so as to bind in conscience. It is not every
Superior, on the other hand, who can so prescribe by way
of law. Those Superiors alone can prescribe by way of
law who possess principal jurisdiction, such as is required
in order to make laws. In a religious Order, therefore,
it belongs to all the prelates of the Order to direct their
subjects by means of precepts which bind in conscience,
and this in proportion with their respective powers of
Religious Superiors. 229
jurisdiction. Conventual prelates can exercise jurisdiction
over only the religious of their own monasteries — the
Provincial over the religious within his province — the
General over all the religious within the Order.
Neither inferior prelates nor Provincials have ordinary
power to make perpetual statutes which should have the
character and force of laws. It is true that Provincials
have ^#dtf/-episcopal jurisdiction, but there is a difference
between Provincials and Bishops. Bishops derive their
jurisdiction immediately from the Sovereign Pontiff, and
they are themselves immediately under him. They have
jurisdiction, therefore, to make statutes, being as it were
Princes of the Church under its Supreme Head. Pro
vincials of religious Orders derive their jurisdiction not
immediately from the Pontiff, but either from the General
or from the Order, and their jurisdiction is subject to and
dependent on the General. Jurisdiction, therefore, is not
granted to Provincials to make statutes without reference
to the General. To make statutes is a most weighty
matter, and one which concerns the whole body of the
Order. It consequently requires the action of its organic
head.
Not even to the General himself, apart from the
General Chapter, is so great a power in the habit of being
granted. The General is, as it were, the proper Bishop
of the whole Order, constituted immediately under the
Sovereign Pontiff, but nevertheless the General is not
absolutely the supreme tribunal of the Order. The
General Chapter is superior to him. To the General
Chapter, therefore, power to make statutes is, as a rule,
reserved.
One religious Order, enlisted under the standard of one
230 Elements of Religious Life.
General, and at certain times assembled in one General
Chapter, forms one body-politic. It ought to observe
oneness as far as is possible, and therefore not only the
substantial of the Rule, but all the perpetual statutes
and laws or constitutions should be the same throughout
the whole Order. When a difference is necessary, and
especially if this difference is to be perpetual, it ought
not to be made without the action or consent of the
head, or of the whole body.
This, however, although consonant to reason and to
the well ordered existence of the religious state, is not of
common law, or of necessary obligation in all cases.
Hence the Institutes and Indults of particular Orders are
to be consulted, and that is to be observed which is
ordained in them, and which has been either expressly or
tacitly confirmed by the Apostolic See.
For precepts which are imposed on individual religious
or particular persons, unless these should be very
grievous, burdensome, or extraordinary, the authority and
judgment of the prelate will of itself alone suffice without
other counsel. Such precepts are ordinary and easy, and
it would be very irksome to have to assemble a council
for the sake of every single action or of every individual
religious.
In the case of very grievous precepts, even if they affect
one person only, religious prelates should not impose them
without sufficient counsel, and such counsel at the least as
the Order prescribes, and still further counsel if the matter
demands it. Prudence itself requires that a weighty matter
should not be transacted without mature counsel, since a
right judgment depends on many circumstances and rea
sons, and sometimes on special laws. When obligation to
Religions Superiors. 231
take counsel arises from positive law, the obligation is equal
as regards all concerned. When the obligation arises from
natural law, the obligation is not equal but proportioned.
One prelate may stand in need of counsel more than does
another prelate. With still more reason is counsel to be
taken if a precept is to be imposed upon a whole commu
nity, and especially if the precept is to continue for any
length of time, since it then becomes a momentous
matter.
When the government of a religious Order is not
purely monarchical, but is partly aristocratic, counsel be
longs to the substance and validity of a precept. What
would otherwise be counsel is then not merely counsel, but
is a judgment and definition. The suffrages are in that
case not only consultative but definitive, and therefore
power to prescribe is vested not in the one person of the
prelate, but in a council. The power of a prelate is
rarely, however, limited in this way as regards particular
or transitory precepts which have reference to a single act.
When the government of a religious Order is purely
monarchical, power to prescribe is vested in the prelate
alone, although it may depend upon the Constitutions of
the Order whether counsel is or is not of the substance
of the prelate's precept. Sometimes it is of the substance
of his precept to have taken counsel, although, after having
listened to counsel, whatever the prelate ordains is valid,
even if it is contrary to the suffrages of his consultors.
If, in this case, counsel should not have been taken, the
precept of the prelate will not bind. If, on the other hand,
counsel has been taken, his precept will bind, even if it is
contrary to the counsel given. When counsel is prescribed
232 Elements of Religions Life.
only in order that the act should be rightly done, the
precept will be valid without previous counsel.
Counsel is still more necessary in order to prescribing
by means of law or perpetual statutes Such statutes can
not be made by a prelate apart from his Chapter, nor by
the Chapter apart from its prelate. There is a difference,
as regards this, between a General Chapter and a General
Prelate. A General, in order to make a perpetual statute,
requires the concurrence of the Chapter to this extent
that, unless a majority should concur, the law cannot be
made. A Chapter on the other hand, although it cannot
without the presence and presidence of the prelate, either
by himself or through his vicar, make a law, yet the mak
ing of the law does not depend on the consent or affirmative
suffrage of the prelate. If the majority of the Chapter is
in favour of the making of the law, even if the General
should be of another opinion, the vote of the Chapter will
prevail, and the law will be made. The reason is because
the power which is vested in the Chapter is adequate, and
WITHIN the Chapter the General is only one of the voters.
His suffrage is at most equivalent to two, or is decisive
then only when there is an equality of votes.
In this the Chapter of a religious Order, as compared
with the General of the Order, differs from a General
Council, as compared with the Sovereign Pontiff. It
differs also from the Chapter of a Cathedral Church, as
compared with the Bishop. In a General Council a law
cannot be made, even if the whole Council should be in
favour of it, if the Pontiff is against it. The same is true
of a Cathedral Chapter, as regards more important laws.
These it cannot make without consent of the Bishop.
The reason is because the Pontiff is superior to a Council,
Religioiis Superiors. 233
while the General Chapter of a religious Order is superior
to its General Prelate. A Bishop also, in comparison
with the Chapter of his Church, is to be regarded not as
giving an individual suffrage with regard to this matter
of making a law or a capitular constitution, but as he is a
Superior with power to confirm or to invalidate a law.
The General Chapter of a religious Order has power,
during a vacancy and before the election of the General,
to make perpetual laws. This the Chapter can do, of the
nature of the case or by common law, if it is not hindered
by any special law of the Order, or by Pontifical Indult.
The reason is because the Chapter possesses supreme
jurisdiction over the Order, derived immediately from the
Sovereign Pontiff. Even if an Order has for the time
being no General, it cannot be without a Vicar or President.
He, for the time being, has along with the whole Chapter
the same power to prescribe or to make statutes which the
Chapter, along with a General already elected, would
possess.
There is no similarity between this case and that of an
acephalous or headless General Council, assembled during
a vacancy of the Apostolic See. Such a Council does not
possess power which is equal to that of the Sovereign
Pontiff, nor to that of a General Council in which
Pontifical authority is present. An acephalous Council
cannot therefore make universal laws which will be of
perpetual obligation. That those laws should have obli
gation, they must be approved by the Pontiff after his
election.
There is a greater similarity between the General
Chapter of a religious Order, during a vacancy and before
the election of its General, and the Chapter of a Cathedral
Church during a vacancy of the episcopal See. A
234 Elements of Religious Life.
Cathedral Chapter has power during the vacancy to make
diocesan laws which will endure and bind even after the
election of the bishop. The reason is because a Cathedral
Chapter, during a vacancy of the See, possesses ORDINARY
episcopal jurisdiction. The statutes of the Chapter may,
however, be revoked by the Bishop after his election.
The power of the Chapter is not more than equal to the
power of the Bishop, and a Bishop can revoke the law of
his predecessor. A statute made by the General Chapter
of a religious Order during a vacancy of the Generalate
cannot, on the other hand, be revoked by the General
after his election, without consent of the same or of a
similar Chapter. The power of the General is not equal
to the power of a General Chapter.
A precept must be sufficiently set forth, for otherwise
it is not applied so as to bind. If it is a private precept, it
must be sufficiently intimated to the particular person on
whom it is imposed. It is not necessary that the
Superior should prescribe in person. It is sufficient if he
prescribes by means of a messenger who is worthy of
credit, or by letter under his hand.
In the case of statutes, solemn promulgation is
necessary, as in the case of laws, since statutes are truly
laws. Before promulgation, a statute will not bind in
conscience even if the existence of it should be privately
known.
Laws, if they are to bind in conscience, must apply to
subjects. Novices are not of the number of those subjects
who can be bound in conscience by the precepts of their
prelates, either in virtue of the dominative power of those
prelates, or in virtue of their power of jurisdiction.
Religious Superiors. 235
Novices have neither made a vow of obedience, nor have
they subjected themselves as properly religious. Since
however novices are, during their noviceship, under the
pastoral care of their religious prelates, they can be bound
by them in matters which of themselves fall under epis
copal jurisdiction. Novices are bound, for instance, to
tell the truth in a case in which they are lawfully inter
rogated, or to avoid such and such an occasion of sin, or
to make restitution. This they can be compelled to do
by means of censures. Such and similar matters belong
to the ordinary jurisdiction of Bishops, and this juris
diction cannot be exercised by the Bishop in the case
of novices of exempt religious Orders. Novices fall
therefore under the ^w/'-episcopal jurisdiction of their
religious prelates.
The Supreme Prelate of a religious Order is himself
Abound by the statutes of the General Chapter. The
Chapter is superior to him. Its statutes bind him not
only as regards their directive power, but as regards also
their coercive power, as they are the laws of a Superior.
With regard to religious prelates, therefore, the principle
has no place that a prince is bound by his own law as
regards its directive force, but is not bound as regards its
coercive force. Hence in those Orders in which the
Generals are temporary, they are rightly punished at
the end of their term of office if they have transgressed
the Constitutions. During the period of their Generalate
they cannot be punished, except by the Sovereign Pontiff,
since they have no Superior within their own Order. Even
during their Generalate, if a General Chapter should be
assembled, it can take cognizance of and punish their
transgressions. If by reason of any special Institute a
236 Elements of Religions Life.
Chapter does not possess this power, this must be in
virtue of a special concession or reservation of the Pontiff.
In that case recourse is to be had to him for the correc
tion of such offences.
If a General Chapter were, as it is one whole and a cor
porate body, to offend against religious observance, it could
be punished, but only by the Sovereign Pontiff, for want of
any superior within the Order.
8.
That in religious prelates there must exist some coercive
power is manifest, both from the fact of the exercise of
coercive power by them in universal practice, and also
because directive power without some coercive power would
be feeble and almost useless. Without fear and discipline,
no human community, however good, can in this mortal life
be kept up to its duty. The corruptible body bears down
the soul, and the flesh lusts against the spirit and often
conquers, and so even the just man falls seven times.
Coercive power is therefore necessary in order to regularity,
and peace, and preservation of the religious state.
We must distinguish between that which is of the nature
of the religious state and intrinsic to it, and that which has
been extrinsically superadded to it by the provision and
at the free will of the Sovereign Pontiff.
As regards that which is intrinsic to the religious state, a
religious prelate has, in virtue of the religious profession of
his subjects and their vow of obedience, power of coercion
only in a paternal manner, and within the limits of his re
ligious Rule. He possesses not jurisdiction but only
dominative power, similar to that power which the father of
a family possesses within his household. He differs from
that father in this, that the father is occupied about external
Religiotis Superiors. 237
and temporal matters, while the Superior is chiefly concerned
with spiritual matters. Neither of them as such possesses
proper jurisdiction. Neither of them, therefore, has power
to impose either corporal or spiritual punishment of a
grievous character. Both of them can administer only
such correction as may have place within the sphere of
the family.
This is apparent in the case of Nuns. Among Nuns
there exists coercive power in accordance with the Rule,
although the Superioresses have no jurisdiction, of which
as women they are incapable, and in their religious dis
cipline they make use of only the lighter punishments. If
more grievous punishment is found on occasion to be neces
sary, recourse must be had to the prelate to whom the
community is subject. It was the same in the case of
religious Orders 'of men in the ancient times, when the
superiors were not priests, and had no jurisdiction.
In prelates of religious Orders which possess eccle
siastical jurisdiction there exists, in virtue thereof, a perfect
episcopal or ^w#s/-episcopal coercive power. This is mani
fest both in their practice, and from the Privileges of all
exempt Orders.
There exists in an ecclesiastical prelate a twofold power of
coercion, to wit, a spiritual power and a corporal power.
Spiritual coercive power is exercised chiefly by means of
infliction of censures, or ecclesiastical irregularities, or dis
abilities for certain spiritual benefits, rights, ministries, and
the like. Corporal coercive power extends to corporal
chastisement, public rebukes, confinement, condemnation
to menial ministries, and deprivation of the use of certain
things which would be otherwise allowed or due to the
individual in accordance with the Rule.
238 Elements of Religions Life.
Prelates of exempt religious Orders have power to
coerce their subjects by any ecclesiastical censures what
soever, which could otherwise be justly imposed on persons
guilty of the same crimes. Since this power resides in
bishops, it resides also in exempt religious prelates. As
these prelates have power to excommunicate, they have
power also to inflict other censures.
Abbesses, or other Superioresses, have power to inflict on
the Nuns, their subjects, such punishments as separation
from the common table, or from the choir, or from the
society of their religious Sisters, and the like, if such
punishments are otherwise conformable to their Rule or
custom, and if they do not exceed the ordinary mode of
religious discipline. Such punishments are not properly
spiritual, but are rather corporal punishments, being by
way of exile or separation.
The coercive power of Superioresses may extend even to
something spiritual, as when a Nun is commanded not to
communicate on a certain day, or not to give herself to
prayer, but to occupy herself in some laborious work by
way of punishment. Such punishments, if sometimes
permitted, are not imposed by any exercise of jurisdiction,
but only through exercise of dominative power. Th ey are
inflicted, not as properly spiritual privations, but as convey
ing rebuke, or as causing shame. Looking, therefore, to
ordinary and common law, Superioresses cannot impose
spiritual punishments, inasmuch as they do not possess
the necessary jurisdiction.
Leo XI 11. on December 14, 1890, issued a Decree, through the
Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, by which His Holi
ness invalidates, abrogates and declares to have no force in future all
dispositions whatsoever of any Constitutions, Pious Societies, or In
stitutes of women, whether under simple or under solemn vows, and
Religious Superiors. 239
also those of men who are merely laymen, even if these Constitutions
have received the approbation of the Apostolic See, and that even in
the most special form, as far as regards intimate manifestation of heart
and conscience in any manner, and under whatsoever name. He,
therefore, strictly enjoins the Superiors and Superioresses of such
Institutes, Congregations, and Societies entirely to delete and wholly to
expunge such dispositions from their Constitutions, Directories, and
Manuals. He invalidates also and obliterates all practices whatso
ever in this matter, and even immemorial customs. 2. He strictly
forbids both Superiors and Superioresses, of whatever grade or pre
eminence, to attempt directly or indirectly, by precept, counsel, fear,
threats, or blandishments, to induce persons subject to them to make
manifestation of conscience. He also orders subjects to denounce
lesser Superiors to their higher Superiors, if they dare to induce them to
manifestation. In the case of a General Superior or Superioress, the de
nunciation of them is to be made to the Sacred Congregation of Bishops
and Regulars. 3. This, however, in no way hinders subjects from
freely opening their minds to their Superiors for the purpose of getting
from their prudence counsel and direction in their doubts and anxieties,
in order to acquirement of virtue and progress in perfection. 4. His
Holiness warns Superiors not to refuse to their subjects an extraordinary
confessor, as often as they are driven to ask this for the settling of their
consciences ; and Superiors are not to enquire into their reasons for the
request, or to show that they take it ill. Further, lest this provision
should be made in vain, His Holiness exhorts the Ordinaries that, in
those places of their dioceses in which communities of women exist,
they should designate suitable priests, and furnish them with faculties,
so that recourse may easily be had to them for the sacrament of
penance. 5. As concerns permission or prohibition with regard to
Holy Communion, His Holiness decrees that it belongs only to the
ordinary or extraordinary confessor, without the Superiors having any
right to interfere in the matter, except in a case where a subject has,
since his or her last sacramental confession, given scandal to the com
munity, or committed some grave external transgression, and until the
delinquent can again approach the sacrament of penance. 6. All are
admonished to take care diligently to prepare themselves for Holy
Communion, and to approach on the days appointed by their Rule.
As often as the confessor may judge it expedient that any one, for his
spiritual profit, should go more frequently, this may be permitted by
240 Elements of Religious Life.
him. Those, however, who have got leave from the confessor for
daily, or for very frequent Communion, are bound to inform the Superior
of this. If Superiors think that they have weighty reasons against an
individual religious going so very frequently to Communion, they are
bound to manifest those reasons to the confessor, and in his judgment
they are entirely to acquiesce. 7. His Holiness further commands all
and every General, Provincial, and Local Superior of such Institutes,
whether of men or women, studiously and accurately to observe the
dispositions of this Decree, under the penalties ipso facto to be in
curred by Superiors who violate the commands of the Apostolic See.
8. Finally, His Holiness commands that copies of this Decree, trans
lated into the vernacular, should lie inserted in the Constitutions of
these Pious Institutes, and that they should be read aloud and intel
ligibly, at least once a year, and that at a stated time in every House,
either at public table, or in a Chapter specially convened for this pur
pose. All this his Holiness has constituted and decreed; notwithstand
ing all things to the contrary whatsoever, and even such as are worthy
of special and individual mention.
By this Decree power is given to the confessor to permit a Nun, or a
religious in an Order of religious laymen, to go to Communion more
frequently than the rules of the Order prescribe.
A Declaration of this Decree, given by the Sacred Congregation of
Bishops and Regulars on August 17, 1891, says that those Constitu
tions are to be held as abrogated, by which it is forbidden to such
religious, or to Nuns, to receive the Sacred Eucharist except on certain
and stated days.
It is true that Abbesses have sometimes, in virtue of
special Privileges, had power to confer benefices, and right
to institute to them, and consequently to suspend from
possession or enjoyment of them. Abbesses have even
had power to suspend from the exercise of Orders, in the
sense at least of prescribing to clerics that they should not
say Mass. This subjection to Abbesses was not, however,
in virtue of any proper spiritual jurisdiction, but by reason
of a jurisdiction which, while substantially temporal, was
at the same time connected with ecclesiastical goods and
Religious Superiors. 241
persons, and so might be called ecclesiastical, and to this
extent spiritual. In this way Abbesses have sometimes
had the entire administration and government of all the
goods of a monastery, and these goods are ecclesiastical
goods. Among them were often included towns and castles.
Temporal jurisdiction over these belonged to the monastery,
and the exercise of it was committed to the Abbess. This
temporal jurisdiction extended sometimes even to the per
sons of clerics, so far as regards prescribing to them and
chastising them. At most, however, there was entrusted to
Abbesses an act which was a condition. Given a fulfilment
of this condition, a spiritual act was done by the ecclesias
tical prelate to whose power the doing of it belonged.
When leave is granted to a penitent to choose a confessor,
this leave does not give the penitent power to bestow
jurisdiction on the confessor. The leave gives him power
only to designate the person to whom jurisdiction is to
be given. When, in like manner, an Abbess is said to
have power to confer a benefice, or the right to institute
to a benefice, or the like, this is to be understood of her
right of presentation, or of designation of the cleric on
whom the benefice or ecclesiastical jurisdiction is to
be bestowed. To bestow jurisdiction, or to bestow a bene
fice, so far as the spiritual right which a benefice includes is
concerned, is an act of the Keys, the power of which is
not, according to the ordinary and perpetual law of the
Church, communicated to women. Deprivation of a
benefice, by way of punishment, is also, when entrusted to
an Abbess, not properly an act of spiritual jurisdiction. It
is an act on her part which is a condition. Given fulfilment
of this condition, the Pontiff deprives the priest of
his spiritual jurisdiction.
Although it does not exceed the power of the Pontiff to
Q
242 Elements of Religious Life.
grant power of excommunication to Abbesses — not directly
indeed, and so far as the effecting of a spiritual bond is
concerned, but by her designating a person whom the Pon
tiff straightway binds — this power is not as a rule granted
to Abbesses. Power to excommunicate by means of their
officials has sometimes been granted to Abbesses. In
such cases the officials received their power of excom
municating not from the Abbess but from the Spvereign
Pontiff, although that power was to be exercised at the
mandate or by designation of the Abbess.
The Pontiff can, in the plenitude of his power, delegate even to
women some spiritual jurisdiction, so long as it does not include power
of Order, such as the power of making a law, imposing a censure,
dispensing from vows, etc. The reason is because such spiritual
rights can, by the plenitude of papal power, be communicated to lay
men, and so there is nothing to hinder their being granted, at least in
an extraordinary case, to women. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum
Morale, vol. iv. p. 385.
9-
To appeal from the sentence of a religious prelate who
has inflicted a grievous punishment, in a case in which it
would be lawful for a secular cleric or for a layman to ap
peal from the sentence of a lawful judge — in the belief that
the sentence was either unjust or was over severe, and in
hope of its being justly mitigated by a superior tribunal — is
as a rule forbidden to religious subjects. It is an axiom
that " amongst good religious the word appeal is not to
be heard."
It is one thing, however, to appeal, and it is quite
another thing to have simple recourse to a superior. To
appeal'^ to have recourse to a superior prelate in such a
way as to suspend the jurisdiction of the inferior prelate,
both as regards its force of obligation through the precept
Religious Superiors. 243
or sentence which is appealed against, and as regards his
power of proceeding with the cause which is being
tried.
By simple recourse neither effect is produced. Simple
recourse to a higher prelate is nowhere denied to a
religious subject. To deny it would be against all reason,
since no injury is done to the proximate prelate, who in the
meantime is obeyed. A religious subject is in this, more
over, simply using his right. While the General of a religious
Order has universal jurisdiction over the whole Order, he
has at the same time immediate jurisdiction over his sub
jects individually. It is, therefore, lawful for them and for
any one of them to have recourse to him. It is lawful not
only when the punishment imposed appears to be exces
sive, but even when, although the punishment was just and
was in accordance with the Rule, the case is such that a
higher prelate might justly grant some grace and favour, or
^^/-dispensation.
Simple recourse may lawfully be made, not only to the
higher prelates within a religious Order, but also to the
Sovereign Pontiff. It is not lawful for religious subjects to
have even simple recourse to externs. Externs are not their
religious superiors, and externs have no jurisdiction. Inter
cession of externs is a source of great disturbance in religious
Orders. It brings a certain moral violence to bear upon
superiors. If those intercessions are not condescended to,
enmities are begotten, or friendships are lessened. If on
account of those intercessions there is shewn a too great
indulgence, religious discipline is enervated, and that with
no small damage to religion. Hence upright superiors are
not only not biassed in favour of discontented subjects
through intercession of externs, but they are rather inclined
to resent intercessions, and to show themselves harder and
244 Elements of Religious Life.
more difficult to the religious in favour of whom the
intercessions have been made.
Sometimes, nevertheless, appeal itself — as appeal is dis
tinguished from simple recourse — is really necessary, as the
only means to counteract a grievous injury. It is not suffi
cient to justify appeal that the justice of the sentence should
be doubtful The injustice of the sentence must be clear.
The punishment which is appealed against must, moreover,
be a grievous punishment. Ordinary corrections, which do
not entail any dishonour, or cause extreme suffering, are
not matters of appeal. These corrections ought to be
borne with a humble and a devout spirit by those for
whose welfare they are enjoined. If appeals were allowed,
with regard to ordinary corrections, from Conventual
Superiors to the Provincial, or from the Provincial to the
General, it would breed no slight disturbance, and religious
discipline would be speedily at an end. The reverential
fear which is due to lesser superiors would ere long vanish.
It would be impossible for higher superiors to give them
selves up to the settling of all the causes and appeals which
might be brought before them by individual religious.
When there really exists a reasonable cause which would
be sufficient as a ground for appeal, if that cause is repre
sented to the same superior, and he is humbly petitioned to
remit or to modify his sentence, this will, morally speaking,
afford a sufficient remedy. Religious superiors may be
presumed to be, as a rule, guided by right reason, and to
proceed in accordance with the obligations of their state.
Even if some dishonour should follow from an ordinary
but an unjust correction, this dishonour will be not only
counterbalanced, but will be entirely undone by humble
obedience, and by patient endurance. Any such pain can
Religions Superiors. 245
be easily borne by those who have already made profession
of perfection. They can and they ought to reckon it among
the other penances and austerities which they voluntarily
undertake, and which superiors may sometimes prescribe
to them solely for the sake of their spiritual exercise.
In exempt Orders an appeal to the Bishop is, in virtue
of their exemption from his jurisdiction, prohibited. An
appeal to the Sovereign Pontiff is not prohibited. An
appeal to him is, by divine and common law, open to all
Christians. It has, nevertheless, been rightly granted to
certain Orders, and specially to the Mendicant Orders, that
even this appeal to the Sovereign Pontiff should not be
admitted. This is in no way inconsistent with the supreme
authority of the Pontiff. It is from the Pontiff himself that
the prohibition springs.
For a religious subject to go in person to a higher
superior, against the will or without the knowledge of his
proximate superior, is forbidden by the Council of Trent.
The Council ordains that if such a religious should be
found wandering about without a written mandate, he is to
be punished by the Ordinary of the place as a deserter of his
Institute. This prohibition includes even appeals to the
Sovereign Pontiff. The Pontiff's desire is that, even when
he is approached as Supreme Pastor, due order should be
observed, and that the common good of religion should
be safeguarded. A superior is bound to grant this leave
to a subject who asks for it with reasonable cause. If
the superior refuses, the subject can complain to the
Sovereign Pontiff.
It is greatly for the welfare of an Order that its private
affairs should be arranged within the religious household,
as between fathers and brethren, and that they should be
246 Elements of Religious Life.
shrouded in deepest domestic silence. The interests of
individual religious are sufficiently provided for by the
existence of a number of religious superiors — from the Con
ventual Superior up to the General. These are better able
to ascertain the truth of a cause which has arisen within
their own Order, than are any judges from outside that
Order likely to be.
The special Privileges by which the Apostolic See grants
that appeals should not be made even to itself, are to be
understood as referring to verbal appeals in person, or
appeals properly so-called.
10.
Power to dispense must necessarily exist in prelates of
exempt religious Orders. Without power to dispense, the
government of those Orders would be morally impossible.
In Orders which are not exempt from the jurisdiction of
the Bishop, it is not so necessary that dispensing power
should exist in the superiors of the Order, and they do not
possess this power of ordinary right. They have dispensing
power only in so far as the Bishop to whom they are subject
has entrusted it to them — or in so far as it has been commu
nicated to them by special Pontifical Privileges — or in so
far as it has been acquired by them through prescription
and lawful custom.
Prelates of exempt Orders have, on the other hand,
power to dispense their subjects of ordinary right, and not
by delegation. In virtue of their exemption from episco
pal jurisdiction, they themselves possess ^##.r/-episcopal
jurisdiction. Exempt religious have no other bishop than
their own prelates, except the Sovereign Pontiff. The
power of prelates of exempt religious Orders, if it has not
been limited by the Pontiff, is equal to the episcopal power
Religious Superiors. 247
to which it succeeds. There exists in those prelates all
the power to dispense their subjects which exists in bishops,
as such, to dispense their subjects of ordinary right. In
virtue of Pontifical Privileges, moreover, granted to religious
Orders, and specially to the Mendicant Orders, the prelates
of those Orders have a much more ample power to dispense
their subjects than bishops have for dispensing their own
subjects, whether clergy or laity.
Power of dispensation, as possessed in virtue of
common law, belongs to all religious prelates. It belongs
to every one of those prelates within his own sphere,
unless it has previously been limited by some special law
of his Order. This power may be granted by common
law in two ways, — either by special concession or declara
tion of the power itself — or by a general concession of
^dtfj-episcopal jurisdiction.
In the times when Abbots were subject to the Bishops,
Abbots could do nothing except that which their state
of its nature and intrinsically demanded, or that which
had been expressly granted to them by law. The power
of Abbots extended only to the securing of regular obser
vance. This was included and rooted in their dominative
power, and they possessed no other power. Even this
power could be limited by the Bishops, through their
reserving to themselves certain dispensations even in the
matter of religious observance. The Bishops were then
invested with greater power, not only by reason of their
jurisdiction, but by reason also of the vow of obedience
which was made to them by the religious, as to their
own proper prelates.
In this sense it is possible that there should exist at
the present day in Abbesses, Prioresses, and other
248 Elements of Religious Life.
Superioresses, a dispensing power, in accordance with the
terms of their Institutes, and with the permissions of their
prelates. In the same sense a dispensing power may
exist in those Orders of men which are subject to the
Bishop, and the Superiors of which, being laymen, are
not in possession of any jurisdiction. Whatever in the
matter of religious observance is dispensable, in accor
dance with the nature and terms of their Institute, their
Profession and their Rule, can be dispensed by their
religious Superiors, unless this dispensation has previously
been prohibited by the Bishop.
An exercise of this power is, however, an act of in
validation, or an act of simple faculty, rather than an
act of dispensation. The obligation is taken away only
either by removing the matter of the obligation, so
that the obligation itself ceases — or by the supplying
of a condition, given which, the obligation of the precept
ceases. In the case of vows, for instance, the Superiors
of such Orders have power to invalidate certain vows of
their subjects, while they have no power to dispense them,
vows being of divine and natural obligation. So far
as the Rule, however, is concerned — since a religious Rule
has the character of a law, from the obligation of which,
whether coercive or directive, the Superior has power,
in virtue of his office, to exempt a subject, apart from
any condition or change of matter, by immediately re
moving the obligation — this power has the character of
dispensation.
This power of dispensation is intrinsic to the religious
state. The power exists in its entirety in every religious
prelate, whether universal or local, unless a higher prelate
shall have specially reserved some part of the power to
Religious Superiors. 249
himself, as it is competent for him to do. The power is
confirmed and increased by means of ecclesiastical juris
diction, when that is superadded. There is thereby
bestowed another and a fresh power of dispensation.
n.
The prelates of religious Orders have ordinary juris
diction to absolve their subjects from their sins. These
prelates are the ordinary pastors of the souls of their
subjects. To these prelates is transferred that cure of
souls which Bishops and parish-priests exercise (PAROCHI)
with regard to their secular subjects.
This jurisdiction exists, with reference to the same
subjects, in the various religious prelates who are sub
ordinate one to the other. Conventual prelates possess
this jurisdiction with regard to the religious of their
convents. The Provincial has the same jurisdiction, and
that equally immediate with regard to those same reli
gious. The Provincial can absolve them, if he pleases,
independently of the will, and even against the will, of
the conventual prelate. In the same way the General
has immediate jurisdiction over all the subjects of the
whole Order.
Conventual prelates are likened to Parish priests
(PAROCHI) as they are the ordinary proximate pastors of
their subjects. Provincials are likened to Bishops.
Generals are not quite in the same way likened to the
Sovereign Pontiff. The Pontiff himself is absolutely the
supreme ordinary pastor of the religious, while Generals
are themselves subject to the Pontiff.
Generals are therefore commonly likened to Arch
bishops or to Patriarchs. Generals differ, however, from
Archbishops in this — an Archbishop does not possess
250 Elements of Religious Life.
ordinary jurisdiction in this forum in the dioceses of his
suffragans, unless during his visitation of them ; while
a General is always the ordinary pastor of all his subjects,
with ordinary jurisdiction, and with immediate exercise
of that jurisdiction over all and every one of them.
Were it otherwise, the General's prelature would be
forensic and external, rather than spiritual and paternal,
and such as the religious state demands in every degree
and order of its prelature.
Every religious prelate has power to delegate his juris
diction to others, in favour of his subjects ; that juris
diction being ordinary. Although a Superior should be
prepared to hear the confessions of all his subjects, if
they themselves wish to confess to him, he ought not
ordinarily to compel them to do so. It is therefore,
morally speaking, necessary that the Superior should dele
gate his jurisdiction to those persons to whom the religious
can confess with freedom.
Sins, in the case of religious, may be reserved in two
ways, — either by the Sovereign Pontiff — or by the Order.
The prelates of a religious Order can reserve to them
selves the absolution of certain sins in the same way as
a Bishop can reserve certain sins of his own subjects.
Reservation is an act of jurisdiction. It does not in itself
depend on episcopal character, any more than does
absolution. Exempt religious, moreover, are not bound
by the reservations of the Bishops. It is but just there
fore that they should be subject to the reservations
of their own prelates.
An exempt religious cannot confess to the local Bishop
Religious Superiors. 251
without leave of his prelate. The Bishop cannot absolve
him, however much the religious may have the will to
subject himself to him. Exemption exists in favour not
of individual religious as they are private persons, but of
the whole Order and of the prelates of the Order. No
religious therefore can renounce his right of exemption,
nor can he constitute to himself a judge who is not
his own proper prelate.
12.
Besides his power with regard to persons, a prelate
of a religious Order must also possess power with regard to
the temporal goods which belong to his Order. An
Order cannot exist entirely destitute of temporal goods,
along with ownership, possession and use of them, or at
least simple retention and actual use of them.
Power of administration of temporal goods does not
belong to jurisdiction. It is a dominative power, com
prehending under it a ministerial power, and it is derived
from the owner of the goods. In the case of a religious
community, the owner of its goods is the community itself.
Acts of administration may be reduced to three heads
— accepting — preserving — and alienating. Accepting
comprehends every acquisition of goods to the Order.
Preserving comprehends every act which belongs to
government, improvement, increase, and guardianship of
goods. Alienating comprehends all consumption, dis
tribution, alienation, and every actual use of goods.
A religious prelate has power to accept whatever is
offered to his monastery. Whatever is given to him he
acquires not for himself but for his monastery. With the
252 Elements of Religious Life.
Superior's leave his subjects can acquire for the monastery,
although they cannot acquire for themselves. Without
his leave they cannot acquire either for themselves or for
the monastery.
As regards the preserving of goods, a religious prelate
possesses the whole of the power which is necessary
for due preservation and management of the goods of the
monastery, and the whole of that power which he would
have had if the goods had been his own. This is
necessary for well ordered rule. Otherwise the common
goods would by and by and easily perish. This is,
moreover, the intention of the owner of the goods, to
wit, the convent. From the convent the power of its
prelate emanates. Hence, according to the measure of
a prelate's power is the measure of his obligation to
administer goods faithfully, so that they may be preserved
for the better service of God, and for the greater advan
tage of the monastery.
Since it is impossible for a Superior by himself and
immediately to overtake the whole of this charge, he has
power also to create officials and ministers, by means of
whom he can fulfil his charge. On these his delegates
there will lie the same obligation of faithful administra
tion. To all the religious there extends a negative
obligation, namely — not to squander and not to misuse the
common goods. This obligation may pertain also to
poverty, and it may pertain sometimes even to justice.
Power of alienating extends, in the first place, to ex
penditure of money for all things which are either neces
sary or fitting for the divine worship, due regard being had
to the means of the monastery, and to the manner of life
and the Institute of the Order. Power of alienating
Religious Superiors. 253
extends also to all things fitting for the support of the
religious in accordance with their state.
The Superior has no power to make gratuitous donations
from the goods or funds of the monastery, simply of
liberality. He is not the owner, and he ought to be the
prudent and faithful dispenser of those goods. In making
purely gratuitous donations he will be acting contrary to
his office, sinning against justice, abusing his power, and
breaking his vow of poverty. He has power, however, to
give alms, as an act of mercy. This the monastery can
and ought to do, if it is able. He has power also to make
a gratuitous donation on the ground of gratitude, or by way
of remuneration which, although not due by an obligation
of justice, is, nevertheless, a moral debt. It is a debt, more
over, payment of which is specially becoming in the re
ligious state. Remuneration may also redound to the
advantage of the monastery. Hence the Superior has
power not only to remunerate services or benefits already
received, but also to anticipate future services or benefits
by acts of present benevolence. By consideration of both
the end of a contemplated gift and the means of the
monastery, due measure in the bestowal of gifts will be
arrived at, in accordance with the rules of prudence.
Alienation of goods by way of barter or sale falls within
the power of the Superior, subject to the same rules and
restrictions. The Superior has no power to dispose of real
property, so as entirely to deprive the monastery of the
ownership of it, without an equivalent or a greater com
pensation. He has power to lease real property, or to
enter into similar contracts, by means of which the use or
usufruct is, either for a certain time or in perpetuity,
alienated under burden of some rent or revenue.
254 Elements of Religious Life.
By canon law there is required a special observance of
solemnity, without which a Superior cannot, and with which
he can, alienate real property or precious moveable goods.
There must be a sufficient cause for the alienation. It
must be preceded by a conference of the Convent or
Chapter with regard to the necessity or the advantage of it.
There must be the consent of the Chapter, as that consent
is an act of will following on the act of judgment of the con
ference, that the alienation should be made. A majority
of the Chapter will be sufficient for this, along with the
Superior. Apart from the Superior the consent of the
whole Chapter will not suffice. In this way the Superior
is not deprived of his power. His power is only limited,
so that he cannot exercise it without consent of the
Chapter.
Every religious prelate can and ought to administer the
goods of his monastery or of his Order in accordance with
the Indults and Privileges which have been granted to it
by the Apostolic See, and in accordance with its Rule
and Constitutions, which have been approved by the
same See. Apostolic Indults give power to derogate
even from common law. The Constitutions of an Order
form a law which its prelate is bound to observe.
CHAPTER X.
Ministries entrusted to Religious.
THE ministry of preaching the Word of God is common to
all the Mendicant Orders. It belongs in a special manner
to the Order of St. Dominic, which has, therefore, its dis
tinctive name of — The Order of Preachers. To the
Society of Jesus this ministry belongs in virtue of its
Institute.
Faculty from some prelate of the Church is necessary for
religious men, in order that they may lawfully exercise the
function of preaching. St. Paul wrote to the Romans —
" How can men preach, unless they are sent ? " To send
men belongs to the pastors of the Church, whose office it
is to feed the flock of Christ. Justice demands that no
man should without their authority usurp their office and
jurisdiction. Mission is, moreover, absolutely necessary
for the preservation of due order in the Church, and for
the avoidance of divisions, and of sowing the seeds of
error. Hence, all men are excommunicated who without
authority, either from the Apostolic See, or from the local
Bishop, presume to usurp the office of preaching either
publicly or in private.
It is certain that faculty to preach which has been
bestowed by the Apostolic See is abundantly sufficient,
since the Sovereign Pontiff is the supreme and universal
Pastor of the whole flock of Christ, and he is indepen
dent of all lesser superiors.
256 Elements of Religious Life.
The Society of Jesus holds its faculty for preaching
from the Apostolic See, by the Bull of Paul III.,
A.D. 1554, which declares — " We have taken the Society
under Our protection, and that of the Apostolic See, and
to every one of you who is found fit, and has been deputed
by the Superior of your Society for the time being, We by
these presents grant free faculty, by Apostolic authority, and
at Our good pleasure, and that of the Apostolic See, to
preach, set forth, and interpret to both clergy and people
the Word of God everywhere, and in all churches whatso
ever, and in common or public places and streets, and to
teach them the way of truth, and of a good and holy life,
so that through you, both by word and by example, they
may be edified, and to exhort and admonish them in the
Lord."
Although this Privilege is given absolutely and without
restriction, it is nevertheless to be understood as limited by
dependence on the consent of the Bishops, and by absence
of objection on the part of parish priests (parochi), to both
of whom it belongs, in virtue of their office, to preach
and to teach the people. Although, of the plenitude of
his power, the Sovereign Pontiff could give faculty to
preach everywhere without leave of the Bishops, or even
against their will, and against the will of the parish
priests, yet when this is not expressly declared, the grant
of faculty to preach is to be understood with reservation
of the rights of these Ordinaries.
The Council of Trent declares with regard to all
regulars in general that, even if they have been approved
by their own prelates, they are bound, before they begin to
preach even in churches of their own Order, to present
themselves to the Bishop, and to ask his blessing. In
Ministries entrusted to Religious. 257
churches which do not belong to their own Order, they are
bound to have, besides the leave of their Superior, the leave
also of the Bishop. It is ordained also that no one is to
presume to preach even in churches of his own Order, if
the BISHOP SHOULD OBJECT.
It has been argued that this Privilege of Paul III.
confers nothing, since if a Bishop gives leave to a reli
gious of the Society of Jesus to preach in his diocese,
there is no need of the Pontiffs faculty, because the
Bishop's faculty suffices; while, on the other hand, if
the Bishop refuses leave, the Pontifical faculty is useless.
There is, however, this difference created by the Pontiffs
faculty that, apart from that Privilege, the Bishop might,
solely by an act of his own will refuse leave to the
religious to preach — the leave being in that case simply a
grace and favour on his part — whereas, in face of the
Pontifical Privilege, a Bishop cannot JUSTLY refuse leave,
if the religious is fit to preach, because this would be
contrary to the Pontiffs will and intention. Faculty for
the religious to preach emanates from the Sovereign
Pontiff, and therefore an inferior of the Pontiff cannot
without just cause hinder it. It is of the benignity of the
Pontiff that the consent of the Bishop is required as a
necessary condition.
2.
The administration of any sacrament cannot be lawfully
undertaken by religious without either Privilege from the
Apostolic See, or faculty from the local Bishop. Faculty
for hearing confessions emanates to the Society of Jesus
immediately from the Apostolic See itself, although with
that manner of subordination to the Bishops which right
reason and the sacred canons demand. It is certain that,
R
258 Elements of Religious Life.
since the date of the Council of Trent, it is not sufficient
that a confessor should possess every qualification which is
required by divine or natural law for the exercise of this
ministry, unless he has also the special APPROBATION of
the Church, as decreed by that Council. The Council lays
down two ways in which a priest may be " approved " or
declared jit for reception of jurisdiction in order to the
hearing of confessions. Either of those two ways will
suffice, but one or other of them is necessary, and no other
kind of approbation will suffice. The one is appointment
to a parochial benefice. The other is approbation by a
Bishop. The first was not introduced, but was simply
retained by the Council. Inasmuch as there is com
mitted to a parish priest the cure of souls, his fitness to
hear confessions is sufficiently declared by the very fact
of his appointment to his benefice. The second mode
of ecclesiastical approbation of confessors was introduced
by the Council. All priests who are not in possession of
a parochial benefice, of whatsoever state, order, or dignity
they may be, require approbation by the Bishop, in order
to hear the confessions of seculars, even if those seculars
are priests.
A Bishop may approve a priest as fit to hear con
fessions, while at the same time he does not delegate
jurisdiction to him. A grant of jurisdiction is a grace or
favour, which a Bishop bestows of his liberality, and
which he is therefore free to refuse. Approbation is a
just judgment by which is declared the fitness of a person
to hear confessions, and this the Bishop gives as an act
of justice.
Approbation and jurisdiction differ widely one from the other, and
stand far apart. Approbation authoritatively declares a priest to be
fit, and thereby makes a priest fit in law for receiving jurisdiction. By
Ministries entrusted to Religious. 259
jurisdiction the priest is constituted a judge in the sacramental
tribunal. The necessity of approbation was introduced by the Council
of Trent. The necessity of jurisdiction is of divine law.
Although both approbation and jurisdiction are very often given by
the same superior — as in the case of secular priests ; yet approbation
may be derived from one superior, and jurisdiction from another
superior — as in the case of regulars. Regulars derive their jurisdiction
from the Sovereign Pontiff, while they have their approbation from the
Ordinaries in whose dioceses they are to hear confessions. Approba
tion for hearing Nuns is given by the Ordinary, or local Bishop.
Jurisdiction for the hearing of Nuns, if they are exempt, is given by the
prelates of their own Order. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale,
vol. v. p. 271.
A Bishop who is not yet in possession of jurisdiction
cannot give " approbation," since the giving of approbation
is an act of jurisdiction. Hence a Bishop who is con
secrated, but who is not in actual possession of a bishopric,
cannot give approbation, because he has no juris
diction. A Bishop, on the other hand, who has been
elected and confirmed, although he is not yet consecrated,
can give approbation. He is already a true Bishop, and
he can exercise acts of jurisdiction. The Bishop's Vicar is
reckoned as one with the Bishop, and exercises the
Bishop's jurisdiction. A Cathedral Chapter has power
to give approbation through the Vicar-capitular during a
vacancy of the See.
By ordinary law it is necessary, in order to hear con
fessions, to have obtained approbation. It is not sufficient
to have applied for it, even if it is unjustly that it has
been refused. If a Bishop were unjustly to give appro
bation, and to sin in so doing, the sacrament would
nevertheless be valid, so far as approbation is concerned.
The moral reason why the Council of Trent willed to
reserve the approbation of confessors to the Bishops, was
260 Elements of Religious Life.
because Bishops are ordinary pastors, and they are
superior to parish priests (paroeht), although these also
are ordinary pastors. It was moreover to be presumed
that, as a rule at any rate, Bishops would rightly exer
cise this power.
It does not suffice that a priest should be known to
be fit to hear confessions, even by the Bishop himself,
for this is a judgment which belongs only to the under
standing. He must obtain from the Bishop actual
approbation, or leave to hear confessions, an act which
depends on the will.
It will be observed that there is a real difference between giving
leave to hear confessions, and empowering to hear confessions. Leave
is equivalent to approbation, as it is a condition which is necessary to
the empowering of the confessor. The confessor is empowered by
means of the jurisdiction which is afterwards conferred upon him.
This jurisdiction is not necessarily bestowed by the Bishop who,
through his approbation, has given him leave to hear confessions if he
should be empowered to absolve.
Bishops are bound of justice not to refuse approbation
to Mendicant religious, without just cause. They will
sin grievously by doing otherwise.
The privilege of exemption from the jurisdiction of the local Bishop
bestowed on a religious Order does not of itself involve, or necessarily
carry with it, delegation of jurisdiction immediately from the Sovereign
Pontiff for hearing the confessions of seculars, since it is possible for
the one privilege to subsist without the other. As matter of fact,
however, all Mendicant religious, and those who communicate with
mendicants in their Privileges through Indult of the Apostolic See,
receive jurisdiction from the Roman Pontiff, through the prelates of
their respective Orders. See Ballerini, Opus Theologiaim Morale,
v. p. 271.
If a Bishop refuses without sufficient cause to approve Regulars, or
Ministries entrusted to Religious. 261
to admit them to examination of their fitness, he will be proceeding
unjustly against the right which Regulars have to hear confessions,
since in virtue of the Privileges of their Order they are quasi-parish
priests (parochi), delegated by the Sovereign Pontiff for the hearing of
confessions. See Lugo, De Pcenitentia, Disp. 21, n. 54.
Bishops have power to give approbation with limitation
as regards persons and places. This is reasonable,
because they might judge a priest to be fit for hearing
the confessions of certain classes of persons, or the in
habitants of certain towns or places, and not fit to hear
the confessions of other persons, or fit to hear the con
fessions of men, but not the confessions of women.
Approbation once given continues, so long as it has
not been recalled. It is not therefore extinguished by
the death of him who gave it. It can be recalled for a
just cause, since the grounds of it are not unalterable,
consisting as they do in learning, moral qualifications, and
other necessary conditions for the hearing of confessions,
with regard to all of which the priest is liable to
change. If, moreover, it should turn out that the appro
bation had proceeded on notable error, it may be
recalled.
A priest who has been approved by one Bishop may
be judged unworthy on the new examination which his
successor has a right to institute. In rigour of law, and
of his absolute power, a Bishop might recall to examina
tion those of his own subjects whom he has already
approved. He ought not, however, to do this to the
injury of any one, or without reasonable cause. By
special privilege of the Pontiff, Mendicant religious can
be examined once only by the same Bishop.
To regulars the Bishop does not give jurisdiction, but
only "approbation," which is not a favour on the
262 Elements of Religious Life.
Bishop's part, but a juridical declaration, which is due of
justice, of their fitness to hear confessions. This declara
tion is simply a condition, albeit a necessary condition,
which renders them capable of receiving the jurisdiction
which flows to them from the Apostolic See, by means of
their Privileges.
As it is a judicial declaration, " approbation " is an act of the
Bishop's will, as well as a judgment of the Bishop's understanding.
A regular who happens to stand high in the Bishop's estimation for
his learning and skill and dexterity in moral matters, and for other
qualifications which pre-eminently fit him for the hearing of confes
sions, cannot on the strength of his own knowledge of this fact, or
even of the notoriety of the Bishop's esteem for him, proceed to hear
confessions in the Bishop's diocese, unless by an act of the Bishop's
will his fitness has been j 'iiridically declared through "approbation"
in conformity with the Trent decree.
The faculty in an approved priest of a religious Order,
to which jurisdiction has been communicated by the
Sovereign Pontiff, for hearing the confessions of secu
lars, is dependent on his religious Superiors. He is
dependent on them not only inasmuch as that, by reason
of the subordination of obedience, it should not be lawful
for him to exercise this function contrary to the will of
his Superior ; but also because substantial faculty to
hear confessions, and the necessary jurisdiction, is be
stowed upon him by his religious Superior. All faculty
and jurisdiction for this ministry descends from the
Sovereign Pontiff to the priests of a privileged religious
Order, to whom it is communicated through the General,
either immediately or by means of the Provincials or
other Superiors to whom, either of ordinary right or by
delegation, this power of creating confessors is granted.
It follows that a religious Superior has power to withdraw
Ministries entrusted to Religious. 263
from his religious subject all faculty and jurisdiction for
hearing confessions. He has power also to grant the
faculty in part, and not in whole, for the hearing of
certain classes of persons, such as, for instance, men
only and not women.
If, besides approbation, which a Bishop is of justice bound to grant,
he should also ex abundantid, and of his own liberality, and as a
grace and favour, grant jurisdiction to a regular, as he certainly can
do, and as is very commonly done at the present day, the regular
will have two distinct grants of jurisdiction, or, in other words, he
will have jurisdiction through two distinct channels. It follows as a
consequence that the regular's absolutions of seculars will be valid, in
virtue of the jurisdiction gratuitously delegated to him by the Bishop,
even if he should have been forbidden to hear the confessions of
seculars by his religious Superior, that is to say, by that Superior
who had power to communicate to him the pontifical jurisdiction
bestowed upon his Order. Besides sinning grievously against obe
dience, the regular is also in hearing confessions deprived of all power
to avail himself of the faculties which, by privilege of the Apostolic
See, belong to his Order, such as those for absolving from certain
cases and censures. His absolutions, so far as these are concerned,
will be absolutely invalid. He enjoys those special faculties which
belong to his Order, only as communicated, and in so far as they have
been communicated to him through the Superior who has power to do
so, in accordance with his Institute, or with the terms of the Pon
tifical Privilege. These special faculties having been withdrawn by
his Superior's prohibition, and his consequent withdrawal of the juris
diction which he had previously communicated to his subject, that
subject's faculties will be no greater than are those which the Bishop
had it in his power to bestow, and did as matter of fact gratuitously
bestow. See a Declaration of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops
and Regulars, March 2, 1866 ; and Gury, ed. Ballerini, 1866, vol. ii.
p. 442.
3-
No one can lawfully minister the Sacrament of the
Eucharist to the faithful, unless he has for so doing
264 Elements of Religious Life.
jurisdiction, either ordinary or delegated, or the leave of
an ordinary pastor of souls. The ministration of the
Eucharist is one of the principal acts of feeding of the
faithful. It belongs therefore to their pastors, and cannot
lawfully be usurped by any other person on his own
authority. The Sovereign Pontiff has power to grant this
faculty independently of all inferior prelates or pastors.
This is most certain, and of faith. It follows from the
fact of the Pontiff's possession of supreme power, which
is absolutely independent of all inferiors.
The Sovereign Pontiff, as Universal Bishop, cujus diocesis cst orbit
terramm, has by divine right ordinary and immediate jurisdiction
throughout the whole of his world-wide Diocese. A Declaration of
the Sacred Congregation of the Council [see Fagnanus, c. Omnis
utriusque sexns, n. 79] says that Regulars have their jurisdiction from
the Pope, whose jurisdiction is not restricted within the limits of any
territory, since the whole world is his Diocese.
He is Universal Bishop not merely in the sense that he is Bishop of
Bishops, but in the sense also that he is the immediate Bishop of every
one of the faithful, omnium Christifidtlium. [See the Vicar of Christ,
by William Humphrey, S.J., London. Art and Book Co., 1892,
page 44.]
Power to minister the Eucharist to the faithful was
granted to the Society of Jesus by Paul III., so that
the priests of the Society can minister, and the faithful
can lawfully and freely receive the Eucharist at their
hands, at any time of the year, except at Easter and at
the hour of death, and that without the leave of the
Rectors of parochial churches being required. Of course
those fathers cannot minister the Eucharist in a church
which is not their own, against the will of its Rector,
since this would be to the prejudice of his rights.
It is to the ordinary pastors of souls that the care of
the sheep belongs, especially as regards observance of
Ministries entrusted to Religious. 265
the precepts. Hence ordinary pastors are held to have
special rights on two occasions, namely, at Easter and
at the hour of death, when the precept of communion
binds the faithful. It would be to the prejudice of pastors
if without their leave or consent the Eucharist were on
either occasion to be ministered by others. It is not as
if the Sovereign Pontiff could not, if it so pleased him
and such was his will, grant this farther privilege to
religious, since he could reserve this ministry to himself,
and entrust it to whomsoever he pleased. For the reason
given, however, he has not done this, and he does not
judge it expedient to be done. The limitation with regard
to Easter and the hour of death is always to be under
stood, even when it is not expressed, in general Pontifical
Privileges of this kind. Easter is to be reckoned as
including the eight days before and the eight days after
Easter-day, because, according to the more common
custom in the Church, the ecclesiastical precept of
paschal communion can be fulfilled within that time.
Where custom extends this time, the extension of time
is also to be reckoned as Eastertide. All persons can
be admitted to communion in churches of regulars who
have already fulfilled their parochial duty and who
desire again or more frequently to communicate during
those fifteen days.
The existing law, while it binds all the faithful to receive paschal
communion in the parish church (in countries where there are parish
priests \_parocht\ with ordinary jurisdiction), permits regulars to
administer the Eucharist in their own churches to all the faithful on
every day except Easter Sunday. In the city of Rome Thursday
in Holy Week is also excepted. See Gury, ed. Ballerini, 1866, vol.
ii. p. 125.
It is not forbidden to regulars to communicate a sick
266 Elements of Religions Life.
person in his bed, when he communicates for the sake ot
devotion, and not because of his peril of death, and even
if he is in peril of death, so long as he does not com
municate in order to fulfil the divine precept. That pre
cept is fulfilled by one communion made within the period
of peril. Since it is an affirmative precept, it does not
bind on any one particular day, but leaves the determina
tion of the day to discretion. So long, therefore, as the
state of the sickness and peril is not such as to bind the
sick man to communicate at once, and on the same day,
it will be lawful for regulars to administer the Eucharist to
him, if he desires to communicate from devotion, without
intention thereby to fulfil the precept, and with a purpose
of asking for viaticum on another day from the parish
priest (parochus) if his peril should increase and his obliga
tion should appear to be more directly urgent. Similarly,
if the sick man has already communicated within the
time of peril, so as to fulfil the divine precept, and
with the intention of so fulfilling it, he can afterwards
again and again during the same sickness receive the
Eucharist from devotion at the hands of regulars.
There are three classes of men who are bound to say the Canonical
Hours, or, better still, there are three reasons from which this obliga
tion springs, namely, Sacred Order — religious profession in an Order
which is dedicated to Choir — and an ecclesiastical benefice.
It is not all religious, or all professed regulars, who are bound to say
Office. It is the professed religious of those Orders only which in virtue
of their Institutes are devoted to Choir. There may exist true religious
Orders apart from any obligation to Choir. This obligation is not
necessarily connected with the religious state. Among the religious
who are bound to say office are included those Nuns who belong to
Orders which observe Choir. Obligation to Choir in the old
Orders took its rise from their Rule or Institute. It was afterwards so
confirmed by universal custom that many persons could hardly be per
suaded that a true religious Order could possibly exist which should be
Ministries entrusted to Religious. 267
free from obligation to Choir. This idea was put an end to by the
Holy See, through its approbation of the Institute of the Society of
Jesus.
There are in this matter two obligations which have to be considered
in their distinctness one from the other. One is the common obliga
tion in the monastery that Choir should be kept up. This obligation
is certain. The other is the obligation of individual religious to be
present in the Choir, and to recite the Canonical Office. It is certain
that no religious man and that no Nun is bound under grievous sin to
say the Hours in Choir. The precept which binds the community to
Choir can be observed without all the religious being bound in
dividually under grievous sin to be present in Choir, and there exists
neither any law nor any custom from which such an obligation can be
proved.
A custom which depends upon a Rule is not more binding than is
the Rule itself, and the Rule in many Orders does not bind even under
venial sin. Although, however, this custom took its rise from the
Rule, or from the founder of the Order, it has, nevertheless, afterwards
and, as it were, by an imperceptible growth, been so accepted by Orders
which are dedicated to Choir, and which have been approved by the
Apostolic See, that every professed religious of those Orders is per
sonally bound to daily recitation of the Breviary.
The force of this custom is most apparent in the case of Nuns.
Nuns are -not bound by any other title, apart from this custom, to recite
the Canonical Hours, and they, nevertheless, regard themselves as
bound under grievous sin to the recitation of them.
As the obligation for clerics in Sacred Orders has been induced by
custom, so by the same custom has been induced the obligation for
professed religious, both men and women, and it has been effected,
not that every religious Order, but that every religious Order which is
dedicated to Choir, should be bound to this — that every one of the pro
fessed religious should daily pay, at least privately, his tribute of the
Divine Office. The lawgiver, whose legal consent is required to give
force of law to a custom, is in this case the Apostolic See. That See
is the ruler of all religious bodies, and this custom is of such a character
that it is not within the competence of the highest authority which
exists in individual Orders to abolish the obligation.
Novices are not bound to recitation of the Office, since they are not
268 Elements of Religious Life.
as yet bound by the laws of the Order to which they belong. Those
who after their noviceship have made simple vows in Orders in which
solemn vows are made, and which are also dedicated to Choir, are not
bound to private recitation of the Divine Office. They ought, never
theless, to assist in Choir along with the solemnly professed.
Attention, in the saying of the Divine Office, is to be distinguished
from intention. Intention is an act of the will, and by it we set
before ourselves something as to be arrrived at, or as to be done.
Attention is an act of the understanding, which is fixed in con
sideration of some particular thing. It is manifest that intention to
pray is necessary in order that there should be prayer. In order that
a man should beg something from God, or should praise God, or
should give Him thanks, it is necessary that he should have the will to
beg, or to praise, or to give thanks. Prayer, as such, is a human act.
There would otherwise be no difference between prayer and reading, or
recitation of a psalm, or study of scripture.
Intention is either formal, or virtual and implicit. The last
suffices for prayer, as it suffices in order to any other moral act.
Attention is threefold — superficial, literal, and spiritual. Superficial
attention is attention to the material words, so that they should be
uttered rightly and in their integrity. Literal attention is attention to
the sense or meaning of the words. Spiritual attention is attention
either to God to Whom one prays, or to the thing for which one
prays.
Virtual intention to pray is necessary, and prayer cannot exist with
out virtual attention. Then only does there cease to be virtual atten
tion when a man knowingly, and adverting to the fact that he is
thinking of other things and not attending, takes no pains, but
neglects to say the prayers attentively, or directly wills to say the
prayers without attention. In so doing the man no longer wills to
pray. He thereby really recalls his previous intention. To will to
speak in that way is not to will to pray. When there ceases, therefore,
to be virtual attention — that is to say, when a man knowingly and
willingly perseveres in a course of distraction to which he adverts —
there ceases also to be virtual intention, and so there is no longer
prayer.
Freely voluntary wandering of the mind excludes intention to pray.
If there is not freely voluntary wandering of the mind, there must
Ministries entrusted to Religious. 269
necessarily exist at least somewhat of virtual attention. This is that
attention which is required in order that there should be true prayer.
We must distinguish also between attention regarded physically ', and
attention regarded morally, as it is an act which is good and well
pleasing to God, and which gives God honour. As attention is a
physical act, it does not virtually remain, if it does not actually remain.
As attention is a good moral act, it is an act which has been com
manded by the will for a good end, that is to say, for the worship of
God. It is to this will chiefly that God looks, and this is that which
only voluntary distraction can avail to destroy. An actual will to
attend may, therefore, be called attention, while a still remaining
will to attend may be called virtttal attention.
A man who has said his Office with distractions is not bound to
restitution by repeating it. The penal law regards those who omit the
Office. The man who has said his Office with distractions has not
omitted his Office. Although he may have sinned, the penal law,
which is of strict interpretation, does not touch him. See Ballerini,
Opus Theologicum Morale, vol. iv. pages 250 and 311.
CHAPTER XI
Departure from Religious Life.
A PROFESSED religious cannot lawfully, at his own discre
tion, and without due leave, depart from his Order, nay,
nor from his convent ; since by reason of his state and
profession he is bound to perpetual perseverance.
The first and least degree of fault is — when a religious
goes out of his monastery or convent without the know
ledge of his Superior, but observing in other ways all that
belongs to due and ordinary going out of the house,
namely, that it should be in the day time, by the common
gate, and only for a short time.
If the religious goes out, not by the accustomed door,
or not by any door, but in some other extraordinary way,
this can scarcely be excused by any circumstance from
mortal sin, on account of the at least moral peril of
scandal and dishonour, not only to himself but to his
Order.
Much more grave will his fault be if he goes out by
night. Clement VIII. absolutely lays down among the
cases for reservation among regulars, nocturnal and furtive
going out of the monastery even without intention of
apostasy. Such a sin is against justice, and inasmuch as
it concerns a sacred thing, it includes the wickedness of
sacrilege. The monastery with its enclosure is a sacred
place, the sacredness of which is grievously violated by
furtive and nocturnal going outside it.
Departure from Religious Life. 271
The second degree of sin is — when a religious departs
from the monastery without leave, and with a purpose of
flying from obedience and subjection to his Superiors,
although not with the intention of remaining in the world,
or of abandoning the Order or habit, but on some other
occasion or pretext, with notable and scandalous absence,
although always with a purpose of returning. This is pro
perly called " flight from the monastery." It is not strictly
apostasy, which requires several other conditions.
" Flight from the monastery " is a grievous sin against
both justice and religion. A religious is, in virtue of his
state or profession, bound to remain subject to the power
and government of the Superior of his Order, and to re
main in union with that body under its head. Such flight
is, of its own nature, scandalous both to the other religious
and to externs. It is, moreover, specially prohibited by
the Council of Trent, which ordains that those who thus
fugitively depart from their convents are to be punished by
the Ordinaries as deserters of their Institutes.
The third degree of change of state, and consequently
of sin, is — when a religious deserts his Order with the
intention of not returning, even if he should not abandon
the religious habit. This may occur in two ways —
either with the intention of passing to another religious
Order — or with the intention of remaining in the world —
and this again, either with a purpose of always retaining
the habit, or absolutely with intention to conduct himself
at his own discretion and pleasure. This sin is properly
apostasy from religion. It is included as such by Clement
VIII. in his decree with regard to the reserved cases of
regulars.
A fourth degree of change of state is made — by flight
272 Elements of Religious Life.
from the Order with abandonment of the religious habit,
and with intention to remain outside religion, not for
ever but only for a time. This is a mortal sin, and by
committing it excommunication is incurred.
If the flight and abandonment of the religious habit
should be with intention to remain and live in the world
for a long time, either for a determinate space of
three or four years, or indeterminately at discretion, or
until the end of some transaction, true apostasy is
committed.
The fifth degree of change of state is — when a religious
departs with a deliberate intention of perpetual abandon,
ment of religious life, and divests himself of the religious
habit. This is the most complete act of this kind of
wickedness. He who does it becomes instantly and in
the moment an apostate, and incurs excommunication
and the other punishments of apostates.
Internal apostasy is committed simply by a deliberate
purpose of abandoning the religious life. It does not
entail ecclesiastical penalties, nor even excommunica
tion, nor is it a sin absolution from which is reserved.
External apostasy consists in actual abandonment of the
religious habit or Order.
In order that apostasy should be external, so as to
fall under the censure and reservation, there must be
departure beyond the bounds of the monastery or con
vent. Hence, although a religious should have changed
his habit, and put on secular attire, and left his cell, and
arrived at the bounds of the monastery, if he should
change his mind before he has passed them, nay, even
if he should have been captured and detained by force,
Departure from Religious Life. 273
he will not be absolutely an apostate, since he has not
completed that act which is signified by the term—
Apostasy.
2.
He is not a true apostate, nor does he incur the
penalties of apostasy, who is not a true religious. Hence
a novice does not become an apostate by departure,
because he has not yet made profession, and so is not
properly a religious. A person who contracts matrimony
after a simple vow of chastity is not an apostate. Neither
is one an apostate who has made three simple vows, of
poverty, chastity and obedience in the world, whether in
a private manner of life, or in a community with a rule
which has not been approved by the Church as a true
religious Order.
All true religious, even those who have made only
simple vows in an Order approved by the Church as a
true religious state, become by criminal departure from
their Order truly apostates, and incur the penalties im.
posed by common law. No departure from religion
which has been made without sin can be called an
apostasy.
Religious Superiors are bound to strive to bring back
fugitives to their monasteries. They are bound, in virtue
of their office, to watch over and to provide both for the
common good of the Order, and for the spiritual welfare
of their subjects. If, however, the fugitive is manifestly
incorrigible and hurtful to the Order, the pastor will be
excused from the burden of seeking after so diseased a
sheep, since the common good is to be preferred to the
•private good of the individual. Although the Order may
S
274 Elements of Religious Life.
rejoice at the amputation of a pernicious member, yet,
since this has taken place in an unlawful way, the
apostate remains always in the state of damnation until
he has been absolved, and has had leave for his depar
ture granted to him by a competent Superior. Even as
a fugitive he still remains subject to the care and
jurisdiction of the Order.
An apostate is bound, in returning to his monastery,
to carry back with him all the goods which he has
acquired, either by begging or donations, or as stipends
for masses or sermons, or by means of manual labour
or the like. These belong to the monastery or Order,
since a religious acquires nothing for himself, but all for
his Order. He cannot therefore give them away, but
can use only so much of them as is necessary.
Although a religious cannot, on account of his vow of
poverty, accept anything without leave of his Superior,
yet an apostate does not necessarily in this way always
commit sin. He is living in a condition in which leave is
morally impossible, and in which he must necessarily at
the same time accept something. Although the impossi
bility was begotten of sin, yet after the impossibility has
been created, the fact of it may excuse from fresh sin.
3-
Co-operators with apostates sin grievously against
divine and natural law, as taking part in that which is
intrinsically evil, sacrilegious and unjust. The first and
greatest degree of positive co-operation is when one excites
and induces a religious to departure or flight. This is
not only to co-operate, it is very principally to operate,
and to be the first author of the apostasy.
The second degree of positive co-operation in apostasy
Departure from Religions Life. 275
consists in giving counsel to a religious who seeks it,
and approving of the apostasy which he contemplates.
The third is to aid him in his flight.
The fourth is to receive, to conceal, or to defend the
apostate after his departure. Those who do so are so
far causes of his not at once returning to his Order.
There is negative co-operation with apostasy when one
has power to hinder either the flight of an apostate, or his
remaining in the world, and neglects to do so. This,
however, supposes an obligation to interfere, for in
omission there is no guilt where there is no obligation.
An obligation might be either one of charity — or one of
duty, which belongs to justice. An obligation of charity
does not suffice to constitute co-operation ; an obligation
of duty does.
A man who makes a religious to apostatize is in no
case bound to enter religion in order to supply his place.
Entrance into religion is an act which is so difficult, and
which is so eminently an act of supererogation, that no
man can be compelled at such cost to himself, or under
so grievous a burden. Entrance into religion is not in
itself intended for the advantage of a religious Order,
but for the spiritual advantage of the religious himself.
If, however, the monastery has lost some temporal gain
by reason of the absence of the fugitive religious, he who
caused his leaving through force or fear will be bound
to restitution in reparation of this loss.
A professed religious can be lawfully expelled by his
Order for a just cause. The common good of the Order
is to be preferred to the private good of an individual
religious. It is also morally necessary to the common
276 Elements of Religious Life.
good that the Order should have power to cut off a
putrid member, lest it should infect the other members.
No wrong is hereby done to a private religious. The
covenant of the Order with him, when it bound itself to
him by accepting his profession, included the condition
that he should study to live in accordance with the Rule,
and that he should not disturb the Order, but should
show himself obedient and open to correction. If,
therefore, he proves faithless, his Order is no longer
bound to him, and has power to expel him.
Hence it is not necessary that a religious should con
sent to his own expulsion. Expulsion is not so much
a medicinal remedy as it is a vindicative punishment
in order to the common good. It does not, therefore,
depend on the consent of the delinquent, but can be
inflicted ' against his will, if it is judged to be expedient
for the common good.
In order to the expulsion of a religious, some in-
corrigibility on his part is always necessary. Actual
contumacy, however, is not always necessary.
A religious should not always be expelled for even a
grievous fault. Other medicinal punishments should first
be administered, and tried in all ways for his amend
ment. This is much in accordance with the religious
state — which is a school of virtue and perfection, — to
which it belongs not only to promote virtue but also
to correct faults, and especially to cure the infirm. It is
therefore very foreign to such a state at once to despair
of the infirm. This would be done by expelling the
infirm without previous corrective treatment. If, however,
a religious, after having been over and over again
corrected, does not amend, and again and again relapses,
it may be that even if he should promise amendment
Departure from Religious Life. 277
he ought to be expelled, since he may be said to be
sufficiently incorrigible.
It is one thing to be incorrigible, and it is another
to be actually contumacious. Contumacy implies an
actual resistance of the will. Incorrigibility implies only
reiterated relapses after correction.
Two conditions are necessary in order to just expulsion
of a religious. One is commission of a grievous sin,
which is external, and which is such as to give scandal
to others or to bring dishonour on the Order. The other
condition for just expulsion is that admonition and
correction should have been administered without fruit
in amendment.
As expulsion is an act of vindicative justice, and is
preeminently coercive, it requires jurisdiction. First and
principally the Sovereign Pontiff possesses this power.
He possesses it not only as he is Supreme Pastor of the
Universal Church, but also as he is Supreme Prelate of
every religious Order.
A religious body itself also possesses this power. It is
not necessary that power to expel should have been
specially conferred upon it by the Sovereign Pontiff. It
suffices that this power should not have been taken away
or reserved by him. Every corporate body has the right
of severing from itself contagious members.
In solemn profession there is a perpetual reciprocal obligation
between the religious who delivers himself to an Order, and the Order
which accepts him. In profession of simple vows on the other hand,
there is a perpetual obligation on the part of the religious who delivers
himself, but there is not a perpetual obligation on the part of the
Order which accepts him. The Order reserves to itself the right
to dismiss him, if this should be seen to be expedient. This is not at
278 Elements of Religious Life.
variance with his state being a religious slate. That man is truly in a
state of bondage who cannot free himself from his obligation of service,
although he might possibly at any time be set free by his owner or
master. In like manner a religious who cannot at his own will put off
the yoke of religion, is truly in the religious state, although it remains
possible for him to be dismissed by the Order. The donation and
delivery of himself which was made by the religious was absolute and
complete.
No injury is done to the religious who is accepted on this under
standing. It is with full knowledge and free will that he agrees to the
condition, and when he is dismissed he is sent forth free from eveiy
obligation of his vows.
By a Decree of the Congregation on the state of Regulars, 12 June,
1858, it is declared that no religious can be dismissed on the ground
of an infirmity which has supervened since the date of his profession of
simple vows. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum A/ora/e, vol. iv. p. 18.
By expulsion religious profession is not dissolved as re
gards the bond of it, but only as regards practice and co
habitation. A religious, although expelled, does not
thereby cease to be a religious. If he has been solemnly
professed, he remains for life incapable of matrimony,
even if he should not be in Sacred Orders. His profession,
and whatsoever is of the substance of that profession,
remains in its entirety. Hence his three vows of chastity,
poverty, and obedience endure in the obligation of them.
An expelled religious is not morally supposed to have
sufficiently amended until he humbly petitions to be
received back again into his Order. He is bound to
amend sufficiently to satisfy his Order, so that he may
again be received into it. Even if he should have been
again and again refused, he will be bound to re-enter the
Order if he should be recalled, unless he should have
in the interval passed to another Order, and in this way
had his previous obligation commuted.
Departure from Religious Life. 279
By his expulsion a religious is not loosed from his vow
of obedience, although, for the time being, he cannot
practise obedience, being deprived of the actual govern
ment of a Superior. If he is recalled to actual obedience,
he is bound, in virtue of his vow, to return and obey.
Even if his Order should be willing to renounce its
right of recalling him, in perpetuity and without any limi
tation, it has not power to do so. That right belongs
principally to God, and it cannot be renounced by any
will of man without just cause.
When an expelled religious returns to his Order, either
at his own request and with consent of the Order, or
otherwise and by command of the Order, his reception
must be effected by some one who has sufficient power
for this purpose. The person in whom this power is
vested will be determined in the cases which occur by
the Institutes and Rules of the various religious Orders.
Nothing is in this matter ordained by common law.
When an expelled religious is again received into his
Order, he is not to make a new profession. He has
not been by his expulsion set free from the bond of his
profession, and of his solemn vows. He does not, there
fore, stand in need of new profession. He needs only a
revocation of his previous suspension, and of his actual
separation from his Order.
A religious who has merited expulsion loses his right
to his grade in profession as regards his seat in a chapter
or congregation of his Order, his voting and other preroga
tives, for which antiquity of profession is necessary.
A religious who has been expelled from his own Order
2&o Elements of Religious Life.
can freely, if he chooses, enter another Order, after he has
first used all diligence to be received back into his own
Order, and that without success. He can also, after being-
expelled, and without waiting for any leave or using any
diligence to be received back into his own Order, enter a
more strict, or even an equally strict Order. He does not
thereby do any injury to his own Order, which has expelled
him. He does not do any injury to the religious state,
since he is embracing a state which is either better than or
equal to his former state. In virtue of his previous pro
fession, however, he is bound to live, so far as lies in his
own power, in a state of the same perfection. He can
not, therefore, so far as he is himself personally concerned,
freely pass to an Order which is less strict than is the
Order from which he has been expelled.
An expelled religious is, nevertheless, never bound to
pass to another Order. He is free to remain in the world,
after he has on his amendment shown himself ready to
return, and has been rejected. In matters which be
long to counsel no man is bound, except to that to which
he has bound himself by vow.
6.
As regards the vow of chastity which had been made
by the expelled religious, there is no difficulty. The
observance of that vow does not depend on any Superior,
or on any special mode of life. This vow, therefore, can
and ought to be observed in its entirety.
An expelled religious remains a true religious. He is,
therefore, bound as far as he can to preserve his religious
manner of life, at least as regards the snbstantiah of it.
Departure from Religious Life. 281
This he cannot do unless he obeys with a special obedience.
some one man, and there is no man to whom such
obedience can and ought to be given rather than to the
Bishop. Those who in ancient times professed a solitary
religious life were thereby specially subject to their Bishop,
and all monks were specially subject to their local Bishop,
unless they were exempted from his jurisdiction by the
Sovereign Pontiff. A religious, after he has been expelled
from his Order, remains in a ^ww/'-solitary religious state,'
and he is at the same time deprived by his expulsion of
the privilege of exemption from the jurisdiction of the
local Bishop. He is, therefore, reduced to the status of
the old law, and he falls under special subjection to his
Bishop. He is subject to him not only in the way which
is common to secular clerics and to the faithful laity, but
in a special manner, and as he is a religious.
A vow of religious obedience is made by exempt
religious to the Sovereign Pontiff, as he is in a special
manner the Supreme Prelate of all religious Orders. By
religious who are not exempt this vow is made to the
Bishop, as to a prelate who is superior to all their
other prelates, although of course the vow is at the same
time made also implicitly to the Sovereign Pontiff, as
he is the Supreme Prelate of all religious. If, therefore,
an expelled religious is not exempt, it is clear that he
remains under the obedience of the Bishop, in virtue of his
vow, because at the outset he promised obedience to him
as to his own proper prelate. Although an exempt re
ligious did not in so many words promise obedience to
the Bishop, yet he promised it to all his prelates.
Although before his expulsion the Bishop was not his
proper prelate, and he was therefore not bound to him
282 Elements of Religions Life.
by his vow of obedience, yet after his expulsion the
Bishop began to be his prelate. The religious therefore
then became bound to him, and that in virtue of his
vow. Again, the vow of an expelled exempt religious
was made not only to the prelates of his Order, but also
to the Sovereign Pontiff as Supreme Prelate, nay, to him
primarily and principally, and to others as to his vice
gerents, or as holding his place. His vow, therefore,
even after his expulsion, binds him to obey the Pontiff,
and so to obey his vicegerent who in this case is the
local Bishop.
Apart from the vow of obedience, and the direct obliga
tion which is begotten of this vow, the Bishop, in virtue
of his own office and jurisdiction, has power to govern
every religious person who is not exempt, to prescribe
everything which befits the religious state, and to remove
everything which is unbecoming to that state. A religious
is, as such and in a special manner, a sacred and eccle
siastical person, and hence, on this ground alone, he
comes under the special care of the prelates of the Church,
and consequently, when exemption ceases, he belongs to
the special care of the local Bishop. He owes to the
Bishop a special obedience, very different from that of
seculars, whether lay or clerical, since this obedience is
ordained in order to a different end, and it therefore
includes different means. Hence he is bound to manifest
himself to the Bishop, and to make known to him his
state, in order that he may, as a religious, be religiously
governed by him.
An expelled religious is free forthwith to present him
self to the Bishop of the place in which his monastery is
situated, and to obey him. He can do so either by reason
of his domicile, which he then chooses and begins to
Departure from Religious Life. 283
have, or because he is then a guasi-pilgrim without any
domicile, and therefore is subject to the pastors of the place
where he is for the time being. He is not, however,
bound to do this, but may, if he chooses, go to the Bishop
of his birthplace. His choice lies between those two. As
regards other Bishops, there does not exist any ground of
subjection between him and them.
An expelled religious is not bound to recite the Divine
Office, unless he is in Sacred Orders, since he has not
specifically vowed this service. He is not bound to
observance of the Rule. Still less is he bound by any
custom which obtains inside the Order. There is no
ecclesiastical precept which ordains this. It is no ques
tion of exoneration, or of his profiting by reason of his
sin, but simply an absence of foundation for obligation.
The foundation of such obligations is not bare profession,
but profession with actual determination to Choir, and to
certain customs. This determination has been inter
rupted by his expulsion from the monastery.
An expelled religious is not bound, nay, he has no
right to wear the habit of his Order, since he has been
justly deprived of it. For him to wear the habit would be
to the great injury and dishonour of the Order. The re
ligious habit, in common conception, signifies actual union
with the Order, and life led under obedience to its superiors.
This significance in an expelled religious would be false.
Neither is an expelled religious bound to wear the
clerical habit, unless he is a cleric. He will then be bound
to wear it simply in virtue of his being a cleric. He can
not be compelled by obedience to the Bishop to wear the
clerical habit, since he neither directly vowed this, nor did
284 .Elements of Religions Life.
he vow to obey in all things without discrimination as to
whether or not they belonged to the religious state, and
the clerical habit does not belong to that state. He can
only be obliged to wear a decent dress, suitable for a man
who professes chastity and the state of perfection, and
the selection of it must in individual cases be left to
prudent judgment. Thus, if a professed Nun is expelled,
she can be compelled to wear a decent dress suitable for a
virgin, but not a dress of any special pattern
An expelled religious is not bound to live a solitary
life. He did not vow this, nor did he promise to obey in
matters of this kind, nor is this manner of life according to
the Rule in accordance with which he promised obedience,
nor is it a means which is necessary in order to preserva
tion either of the chastity, or of the poverty which he
vowed. All that the Bishop can bind him to is to reside-
in a respectable place, where he can live without moral
peril to his chastity. So also again as regards residence,
he did not vow any enclosure except religious and cenobitic
or conventual enclosure. In like manner with regard to
special acts, or exercises of virtue, such as fasts, disciplines
and other afflictions of the body, prayers, whether vocal or
mental, and works of mercy, whether corporal or spiritual,
an expelled religious cannot be bound by special obedience
to the Bishop, except in so far as these may be necessary
for the observance of chastity.
As regards expelled religious the Rule is as if it were
not. It was made not for religious in this condition,
but for religious who are living in their normal condition
of practice, as well as of obligation.
An expelled religious is bound to obey the Bishop in
three classes of matter only : first, in matters which
Departure from Religious l^ife. 285
belong to the decency or becomingness of the religious
state, as, for instance, with regard to dress, occupation,
business, intercourse and the like ; secondly, in matters
which belong to observance of religious chastity ; and,
thirdly, in matters which are necessary in order to the
practice of poverty.
A Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars,
Nov. 4, 1892 — after stating that — along with the very great increase,
through the singular beneficence of God, of Institutes of simple vows,
which have been the source of many benefits — certain inconveniences
have been begotten through the easy departure of alumni from such
societies, and their consequent return, in accordance with established
law, to the diocese of their origin ; and that these inconveniences have
become all the more grave through the want of temporal goods from
which the Church is at present suffering, so that Bishops are often
unable to provide for the leading by those men of a becoming life ; and
that some local Bishops, weighing these and other like matters, which
concern also the ahimni of Orders of solemn vows, in the light both ot
the comeliness of ecclesiastical order, and of the edification of the faith
ful, have with instant supplication petitioned the Apostolic See that some
remedy should be applied — declares : I. That the Constitution of
St. Pius V., October 14, 1568 (Romanus Font if ex} , and the Declara
tion of Pius IX., June 12, 1858, remaining in force, by which it is for
bidden to Superiors of Regular Orders to grant Dimissorial Letters
to either novices or professed of triennial simple vows, so that they
should, on the title of poverty, be promoted to Sacred Orders — the
same dispositions are extended also to Institutes of simple vows, so
that the Superiors of those Institutes cannot in future grant Dimissorial
Letters for Sacred Orders, or in any manner of way promote their
alumni to Sacred Orders on the title of Common Table, or of the
Mission, except those alumni alone, who have made vows which,
although simple, are perpetual, and have in a stable manner been
aggregated to the Institute— or who have remained for at least three
years under temporary simple vows, in the case of those Institutes
which defer perpetual profession for three years. To this end, all In
dults and Privileges already obtained from the Holy See— and all
contrary dispositions contained in their respective Constitutions,
286 Elements of Religious Life.
even if these have been approved by the Apostolic See — are revoked.
2. Hence it ought to be known that, as a general rule, it will not
in future be dispensed that an alumnus of a Congregation of solemn
vows should be promoted to Greater Orders without his having
first made his solemn profession — or that an alumnus of an Institute of
simple vows should be promoted to Greater Orders, unless he has
persevered for three years under his simple vows. If at any time there
should occur a lawful cause why some particular person should receive
Sacred Orders before completion of the three years, dispensation may
be applied for from the Apostolic See, in order that this cleric may make
solemn vows, although he has not completed his three years — and, in
the case of Institutes of simple vows, that the cleric may make perpetual
simple vows, although the time prescribed for profession of perpetual
simple vows has not yet expired.
3. The dispositions contained in the Decree of the Sacred Con
gregation of the Council, published by command of Urban VIII.,
September 21, 1624 {Sacra Congregatio), and in the Decree of the
same Congregation, published by command of Innocent XII.,
[uly 24, 1694 (Instantibus), and in other general decrees — whereby is
ordained the method to be observed by Superiors of Regular Orders
in expelling their alumni — not only remain in force, but are imposed
for observance on the Superiors also of Institutes of simple vows— as
often as there is question of the dismissal of an alumnus who has pro
fessed vows which although simple are perpetual, — or who is bound by
temporary simple vows, and has been constituted in Sacred Orders— so
that those Superiors cannot dismiss any one of these except for a
grievous fault, which is external and public, and unless the guilty
person is at the same time incorrigible. In order that any one
should be held to be really incorrigible, Superiors ought first to admi
nister, and that at three distinct times, admonition and correction,
and if this should prove to be of no avail, they ought first to
instruct a process against the delinquent— to acquaint the accused with
the result of the process — and to afford him a fitting space of time for
the preparation of his defences, either by himself, or through another
religious of the same Institute — and if the accused does not himself
present his own defences, the Superior or the Tribunal ought
to constitute some alumnus of the Institute as his defender ex officio.
After all this the Superior with his Council can pronounce sentence of
expulsion or dismissal. This, however, will have no efiect, if he who
Departure from Religious Life. 287
has been condemned should in due manner appeal from the sentence
to the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, and until
definitive judgment has been given by the said Congregation. When
ever, for reasons of weight, the aforesaid method of procedure cannot
be observed, recourse should be had to this Sacred Congregation to
obtain dispensation from the solemnities prescribed, and faculty to
proceed summarily, in accordance with the practice which obtains in
this Congregation.
4. Alumni of solemn vows, or of perpetual simple vows, or of tem
porary vows, who are in Sacred Orders, are, if they are expelled or
dismissed, to remain perpetually suspended, until some arrangement
has been made for them by the Holy See, and they have, moreover,
found some Bishop who is benevolently willing to receive them, and
have provided themselves with an ecclesiastical patrimony.
5. Those who, being in Sacred Orders, and bound by simple vows,
whether perpetual or temporary, shall spontaneously ask for and
obtain their dismissal from the Apostolic See— or who have otherwise
by Apostolic Privilege been dispensed from their simple vows, whether
perpetual or temporary — shall not leave their enclosure until they have
found a benevolent Bishop to receive them, and have provided them
selves with an ecclesiastical patrimony. Otherwise they will remain
suspended from exercise of the Orders which they have received.
This extends also to alumni of temporary simple vows, who have
already been set free from every bond of profession, through lapse of
time since those vows were taken.
6. Those who have been professed, whether of solemn vows or of
simple vows, are not to be admitted by the local Ordinaries to Sacred
Orders unless, besides other matters laid down by law, they produce
Letters-testimonial that they have studied Theology for at least one
year in the case of the subdiaconate, two years in the case of the
diaconate, and three years in the case of the priesthood, and have
previously made the regular curriculum of studies.
7-
It is certain that it is not lawful for a religious to lead
his life outside his monastery without the lawful leave
of a Superior who has power to grant it to him. It is
also certain that with lawful leave this can lawfully be
288 Elements of Religious J.ife.
done. It is not in itself intrinsically evil, and it is not
contrary to his vows. It is possible for him to observe
chastity outside the cloister, as do secular clerics. He
can also observe poverty. By means of lawful leave
there is preserved also the due subordination of obedience,
since he remains always dependent on his Superior's will
with regard to his place of abode. A religious has
there his monastery and his cloister where he is dwelling
by the will of his Superior.
In trje Sovereign Pontiff, in the first place, as he is
Supreme Prelate of all religious Orders, there resides
supreme power to grant this leave. The Prelate of the
Order has also power to grant this leave. He will, how
ever, sin grievously if he grants it without a grave and an
almost necessary cause. Dwelling within the cloister con
tributes greatly towards religious life, avoidance of perils,
preservation of uniformity, perfect union with the wholt
body, and edification of externs. Separation, on the
other hand, of a religious from his Choir, and his lead
ing a private manner of life, does not contribute to
the edification of the people, unless it is justified by
very weighty and manifest reasons.
Absolutely speaking, however, dwelling within the
cloister is not necessary to religious well-living. It is not
of the substance of the religious state. Outside the cloister
it is possible for the three substantial vows to be observed,
along with regular life, so far as the principal observances
of it are concerned.
The ancient canons were more strict with regard to
this point They had reference to monks, who were
not then permitted to exercise the ministries of clerics in
preaching to the people and in the administration of the
sacraments. Other Orders, such as the Mendicants, do
Departure from Religious Life. 289
not, in virtue of their Institutes, profess so strict an
enclosure. In the case of Mendicants, therefore, although
leave is necessary for going out, it can more easily be
granted, and that even without any very great necessity or
advantage. Sometimes a reason of friendly benevolence
or of moderate recreation will suffice.
A perpetual and irrevocable leave to live outside the
cloister cannot be granted. A Superior cannot exempt
a subject from his obedience. So long as the leave,
however indefinite, remains revocable, the subject con
tinues always under the obedience of his Superior. Such
a leave is not therefore at variance with his vow of
obedience. It is not of necessity to obedience that the
subject should be in local contact with his Superior, so
as to be proximately governed by him in every particular
matter.
A religious who is living with leave outside his cloister
cannot possess any property, or have anything as his
own, by reason of his change of life. This would be con
trary to his vow of poverty. There is, however, of
necessity granted to him a general leave to give and to
accept. That leave is nevertheless limited, either by
the expressed will of his Superior, or in accordance with
the general rules of the obligation of his vow of poverty.
Hence, in virtue of leave to live outside the cloister, leave
to dispose freely of the goods which have been acquired
in that state is not supposed, because between that state
and such leave there is no necessary connection. That
alone which is demanded by the necessities and by the
respectability of human life, or by that which becomes
it, especially by way of mercy, such as leave to give an
alms at the dictate of right reason, is granted. This is
T
2go Elements of Religious Life.
reckoned to be granted when it has not been forbidden.
8.
To pass from one religious Order to another religious
Order is not in itself, and intrinsically, or in the nature of
things evil, even if it is done on one's own authority,
so long as the religious passes to a more perfect Order.
It may be done even against the will of his own Order,
since it is not contrary to the obligation which was
contracted to God by religious profession.
To pass to an Order of less or of merely equal strictness
on one's own authority, and without dispensation, is un
lawful.
This is evident as regards an Order of less strictness,
because it is not lawful without just dispensation to
commute a vow of a better thing into a vow of a thing
which is less good. Again — and this militates also against
passing by one's own authority to an Order of merely
equal strictness — it is contrary to the right which was
acquired by the Order to which the religious first gave
and delivered himself. The condition, included in the
contract which was entered into by means of religious
profession, and which limits that right, is the condition of
greater spiritual fruit, and that only. This condition is
provided solely for the greater glory of God, and for the
greater good of the soul of the individual religious. Apart
from this, freedom to leave one's own Order would be
unreasonable. There would, moreover, be gross inequality
if the Order were bound to the religious in perpetuity,
while the religious was left free to leave his Order for
another Order of only equal strictness.
To pass from one Order to another Order, even with
Departure from Religious Life. 291
a view of greater perfection, although it is in itself lawful, is
perilous, and is rarely, if ever, to be counselled. It is
perilous, in the first place, say both St. Bernard and St.
Thomas, by reason of scandal to those who are left ;
secondly, adds St. Bernard, because it is not safe to leave
the certain for the doubtful ; thirdly, according to St.
Thomas, to leave a known good, and to begin an unknown
life is not wont to conduce to progress ; and fourthly,
St. Bernard says that such cases beget suspicion of
levity.
Further, flight from the monastery, even for the purpose
of passing to a more perfect Order, is not lawful. The
Superior has a right of guardianship both over the
monastery and over the persons of the religious, and to act
in prejudice of this right, without reasonable cause,
is inordinate. It is also in itself provocative of scandal.
It has at least an appearance of evil. The act has
about it a semblance of apostasy, or of breaking the
enclosure, while the intention of the act remains hidden
from the outside world.
If, however, a religious is unjustly hindered from carry
ing out his purpose, which he believes to be holy, or if
he has reason to fear that he will be hindered by im
portunities, and if he is himself of such known integrity
of life as not to occasion scandal, or if he takes sufficient
means to preclude scandal, his furtive departure may be
excused from blame, as it was excused in the case of
certain Saints in ancient times. Perversion of due
order and imprudent flight are, nevertheless, no small
signs that the impulse was not from the Holy Ghost.
Those things which are from God proceed with
order.
292 Elements of Religious Life.
9-
The question arises as to how it is that one Order
may be judged to be more perfect than is another Order,
so that a religious may lawfully pass to it. It arises
inasmuch as all proper and perfect religious Orders — and
it is of those alone that we are speaking — are one in
substantiate, that is, in profession of the three religious
vows.
Looking to other matters, one Order may excel another
Order in the practice of poverty — another in austerity
as regards either habit or food — another in the length of
time which is given to contemplation or to assistance in
choir — another in the extent or in the perfection of
obedience — and another in the greater excellence of the
works of charity to which it devotes itself. Again one
religious Order may offer greater security of salvation or
sanctification than does another Order. It may profess
greater solitude and more complete separation from the
society of men, and in this way may afford fewer occasions
of sin. Another Order may, however, seem to be more
perfect in supplying more means or better means for
attaining to excellence of sanctity. Again, it may happen
that one Order is, so far as its Institute and Rule are
concerned, more strict and more perfect than is another
Order ; and nevertheless a religious might, as matter of
fact, better and more easily tend towards perfection in
the apparently less perfect Order, because that Order
observes its Institute in its integrity, while in the ap
parently stricter Order there exists an actual remissness
of religious life. Finally, it might happen that a particu
lar religious Order should be in itself and in all things
more perfect, as regards both its Institute and its actual
observance, and it might nevertheless be less well suited
Departure from Religious Life. 293
for a particular person as less likely to be a means towards
his own individual growth in perfection.
In passing from one religious Order to another Order,
all the conditions of the two extremes have to be con
sidered in order to form a judgment. If all things else are
equal, and if the one Order excels the other Order in
austerity of life, then to pass to it is without doubt lawful,
so far as the perfection of that Order is concerned. If, on
the other hand, all things are not equal, then excellence is
to be preferred in those matters which are of a higher kind
and which are in themselves more well pleasing to God.
That which is chiefly to be considered is the excellence of the
end which is aimed at by the Order, since every approved
Order must necessarily possess in it means which are
proportioned towards its end. If two Orders are equal,
so far as the end aimed at is concerned, the one which
possesses more means, or better means, or means which
are better proportioned to its end in virtue of its Rule,
is to be reckoned the more perfect Order.
Greater perfection is that which is primarily aimed at
in religious profession, and there is no religious Order
which does not afford sufficient moral security, if a reli
gious is really striving after diligent observance.
In estimating the perfection of a religious Order,
actual observance is to be looked to rather than primary
institution. Primary institution and a strict Rule matter but
little, if practice is not in conformity with profession.
The perfection of an Order is, therefore, to be measured
by the state to which it has been reduced by custom,
and not merely by the rigour of its Rule.
A religious Order may in three ways have been
2 94 Elements of Religious Life.
modified from its first institution. First, by leave of the
Sovereign Pontiff, and so, as it were, by new institution,
or at least by consent of the whole Order. If so, the
case is clear.
Secondly, by custom alone, but with such prescription
as really to remit the obligation of the primitive Rule.
This case is the same as the preceding, supposing the
custom to be universal.
In a third way the Rule may have come to be not
observed, simply by abuse, and through an evil custom,
such as will not excuse from sin either individual religious
or the Order.
10.
A religious can, by common law, pass to a more
perfect Order without dispensation, but not without at
least ASKING the leave of his Superior. To ask leave
is not, however, of the substance of the act. The
subsequent profession will be valid, if it is certain that
it is made in a more perfect Order, although no leave
has been asked.
A religious cannot pass to an Order of merely equal
strictness, without leave not only asked but obtained.
The Sovereign Pontiff can grant this leave to members
of all Orders, as he is their Supreme Prelate. The Bishop,
as he is the superior prelate of Orders which are subject
to him, can grant this leave. The Provincial, in Orders
which are exempt from the jurisdiction of the Bishop, can
also grant this leave.
Two things are included in this leave. There is a
commutation of vows, and there is an alienation and
^tt&tt-amputation of a member from the religious body
which is left.
Departure from Religious Life. 295
A Bishop who has many monasteries of Nuns of
different professions or Rules, but of equal perfection,
subject to him, has not power to grant leave to a Nun
to pass from one monastery to another, in order simply to
satisfy the desire of the individual Nun, and without special
cause, since this is an act of supreme power. It does not
suffice that the Bishop is not depriving himself or his See
of the subjection of the religious, since the Bishop's power
over religious is given to him not for his own benefit, but
for that of the monastery. His power does not therefore
extend to an act which is in itself pernicious to the
monastery, and which would in this case be done without
lawful cause.
To pass to a religious Order which is less strict is not
lawful without dispensation. It is in itself contrary to the
vow of the religious, and to the covenant which, in his
profession, was entered into by him with his Order.
It becomes lawful through lawful dispensation. The dis
pensation, by whomsoever it is given, requires a reasonable
cause in order that it may be lawfully given.
A just cause may have regard either to the advantage
of the individual religious solely — or to the advantage
of the Order from which he is transferred — or to the
advantage of the Order to which he passes. If there
is a concurrence of advantages to all the three, there will
be the most complete of causes. This might happen if,
for instance, the religious would be useful to the Order
to which he passes, while he is somewhat burdensome
to the Order which he leaves. It might happen that
he is of no use whatever for the ministries of that Order,
while he might be proficient in singing in choir, of
which the other Order makes greater profession. There
296 Elements of Religious Life.
may also exist some solid ground for expectation that for
the religious himself it may be more advantageous to be
occupied in another kind of life, although it is in itself
less austere or less perfect.
When there is not a concurrence of advantages to all
of the three parties concerned, there is first, as a rule,
to be considered the spiritual welfare of the religious
himself. Whatever reason there is for prudent hope that
this will be increased by a change will suffice as a just
cause for dispensation, since it is the spiritual advantage
of the individual which is primarily and proximately
aimed at by the religious life. This advantage must be
by way of relief of personal infirmity, either in body
or in soul. The departure is sometimes expedient when
experience has shewn that, not from mere malice or de
praved habit, but from an, as it were, innate condition
of his nature, an individual has no aptitude for a
particular state, or has an exceeding difficulty in the
bearing of the burdens which it entails, and a difficulty
which before profession he had not sufficiently realised.
The Sovereign Pontiff alone, of the plenitude of his
power, could compel an Order to receive such a person.
Ordinarily he does not use compulsion, nor would it be
expedient without most grave cause.
1 1.
A Privilege has been granted to the Society of Jesus
that no one professed therein, or admitted thereto by the
three substantial vows, can pass to any other Order,
except that of the Carthusians, under pain of excom
munication ipso facto to be incurred, both by those who
so pass, and by those who receive them, on pretext
Departure from Religions Life. 297
of any Indult granted or to be granted, even under colour
of fruit in better life or more strict observance. This
is contained in the Apostolic Letters of the Society, in
the last Bull of Paul III. and in the first Bull of Pius V.,
wherein he confirms a concession of Pius IV. Pius V.
also vivA voce so limited the exception of the Carthusians
that departure to that Order can only be made once,
and that, if the religious should not persevere in that
Order up to profession, he must return to the Society
and not again pass to the Carthusians without the consent
of the Society. This limitation Gregory XIII. confirmed
by a special Bull, and he declared it to be binding under
the same censure as that which was imposed by his
predecessors.
It is most certain that the Sovereign Pontiff has power
to grant Privileges, so that it should be absolutely un
lawful to pass to another Order without obtaining leave,
even on the ground of greater perfection. It would be
impious to say that such Indults are inequitable, or that
they are granted without sufficient power. In a matter
which is so grave, and which affects the salvation or
perfection of souls, the Pontiff cannot err. Moreover, it
is not one or two Pontiffs, but many, and those most
learned and holy Pontiffs, who have, not once and again,
but very often, of their certain and plenary power, and
not merely with some probability accompanied with
hesitation, granted similar Indults to many Orders.
When the Pontiff grants such an Indult to any Order,
this implies that that Order is not inferior, as a means
towards perfection, to any other Orders which he does
not except. But even if it were manifest that another
Order is more perfect, the Pontiff could justly prohibit
298 Elements of Religious Life.
a religious from passing to it without obtaining leave
from his own Order. By insisting on such leave the
ascent of a religious to a more perfect state is not
hindered. It is only forbidden without mature counsel,
and apart from a judgment of the Superior. However
much more perfect another Order may be, a change to
it might not be fitting in an individual case, and therefore
judgment with regard to this may most becomingly be
reserved to a Superior. The difficulty thus placed in
the way of passing to another Order may prove very
conducive to the common good, in the stability of indi
vidual religious, and in the peace and union of the
various Orders one with another. Even when passing
to a more perfect Order is prevented, no one is absolutely
hindered from the possibility of becoming always more
and more perfect. In every Order there exist sufficient
means for such progress, if a man will do all that lies in
him, and will voluntarily add to his practice somewhat
which in his state is not imposed by way of obligation.
By such a Privilege the Superior of an Order is not set
free from obligation to give leave if his judgment should
l>e in favour of leave. In forming his judgment he ought
to be guided not by his own feeling and affection, for
he might thus easily err and injure his religious subject,
but by received opinions and common doctrine, or by
the counsel of the wise. In order to give leave, the
Superior must have come to the conclusion that to pass
to a more perfect Order is expedient in this particular
case, or is more for his subject's benefit. This is the
view which he ought to take whenever there exist no
reasons to persuade him to the contrary, besides the mere
fact of the change. The disadvantage of changing is
Departure from Religious Life. 299
counterbalanced by the greater perfection of the Order
to which his subject passes, when nothing else stands in
the way. When there is a concurrence of circumstances
or conditions in favour of leave, a Superior would be
doing an injury to his subject by refusing him leave, and
by compelling him to have recourse to the Sovereign
Pontiff The Pontiff himself could not in such a case
lawfully refuse leave. The case is always excepted of a
necessity for the common good. If the Superior of an
Order were to refuse leave because he believed it to be
very hurtful to his own Order, and if he were for this
reason to remit his subject to the Sovereign Pontiff, he
would not commit sin. His so doing would in fact be
one of the chief effects of his Privilege.
In this sense also a religious may rightly bind himself
in his profession, and renounce his freedom to pass to a
more perfect Order without fulfilling the condition of the
consent either of his Superior or of the Sovereign Pontiff.
Privileges are ordained not to hinder a vocation which is
is from the Holy Ghost, but to prove a vocation in order to
its constancy. There is thus no contradiction between such
a Privilege and that private law which the Holy Ghost
imposes by His inspiration.
There is a twofold difference between the effects of
Common Law and the effects of a Privilege. By common
law a Superior might prudently refuse leave — not by
reason of any doubt with regard to the greater perfection
of the other Order, but by reason of the circumstances of
the individual — either because he did not think him suited
for the Institute of that other Order, or because he
thought that he was moved not by a good spirit, but
300 Elements of Religious Life.
by some disturbance — and nevertheless his subject might
pass to the other Order, having asked leave, although
he had not obtained it. If it is manifest that the Order
to which he goes is a more perfect Order, the ask
ing of leave satisfies the law. The law requires the
judgment of the Superior then only when there is
doubt with regard to the greater strictness of the
other Order. But when an Order possesses a Privi
lege, then, in a similar case, for a religious to pass
to another Order will, in virtue of that Privilege, be un
lawful, if his departure is against the will of his Superior.
Again, so far as Common Law is concerned, a Superior
unduly refusing leave cannot bind his subject not to go.
The subject can go on his own authority, and against the
will of his Superior. In the case of a Privilege, on the
other hand, even supposing that a Superior unduly refuses
leave, his subject cannot go on his own authority, but re
quires Pontifical authority in order to the lawfulness of
his departure.
All religious who pass from their own Orders to any
other Order, on whatever ground of greater perfection, in
cases prohibited by Pontifical Indults, and without the
leave required by such Indults, are truly apostates. In
asmuch as the second profession is not valid, the religious
will be living outside the state and obedience of his own
Order, with a mind to continue in this unlawful life.
This constitutes the crime of apostasy.
12.
A religious cannot carry away with him to the Order, to
which he even lawfully goes, any of the goods which he had
acquired in his former Order by any title whatsoever,
whether by donation, or by his own industry, or in any
Departure from Religions Life. 301
other way. A benefit conferred by law is understood to be
granted without prejudice to third parties. There is, more
over, another fundamental reason. A religious acquires no
thing for himself, but all for his Order or his monastery. If,
therefore, he should leave it, he cannot deprive it, by his
own authority, of its ownership of the goods which it has
acquired through him. Similarly, the other monastery can
not accept those goods against the will of the owner of them.
In either case there would be an offence against justice.
With regard to clothing, the religious can take with him
whatever is necessary for actual use and the requirements
of decency. He ought not to go naked, and he ought
not to change the habit of his own Order, until he puts
on the habit of another Order. Since he is still a reli
gious of the first Order, he can lawfully have the use, which
is necessary in the present, of at least that which he needs
to cover him. For the same reason he can for the present
be supported from the goods of the first Order, and he
is not to be compelled to beg, unless the Order itself
professes mendicancy. He cannot, however, carry with
him a change of garments, except with consent of the
Superior whom he leaves, since necessary use of those
garments regards not the present but the future. The
second Order is in strictness bound to return to the
first Order the garments of the religious after he has
been professed, for every religious has even his garments
on loan only from his Order. This is, however, tempered
by the urbanity and the interpretative consent of all
Orders, which is sufficiently declared by custom. It
would not be becoming to display in a matter so very
small either bitterness of spirit towards the religious, or
over-affection for temporal goods.
Nuns are, ordinarily, not received into their monasteries
302 Elements of Religions Life.
without dowries, and when by leave of the Apostolic
See a Nun is transferred from one monastery to another,
her dowry remains with the monastery which she leaves.
In the case of Nuns most of all would departure to another
monastery appear to be hindered by the fact of her dowry-
being retained. This hindrance is nevertheless not im
puted to the monastery which the Nun has left. That
monastery is not bound to dower its subject, in order
that she may be received in another monastery.
If a religious should, by dispensation of the Sovereign
Pontiff, return to the world free from any and every bond
of his profession and vows, he cannot carry with him the
goods which he had previously and absolutely bestowed
upon his Order, without the consent of that Order, unless
the Pontiff has specially granted this in his dispensation.
Because a person who has been consecrated to God
happens to return to the world, it does not follow that
goods which have been consecrated to God should there
fore be profaned or alienated, or that they should also, so
to speak, return to the world. In a dispensation for the
transference of the person there is not contained a dis
pensation for alienation of goods, unless this is specially
granted. A cause which suffices for the first transference
will not always be sufficient for both.
Neither profession, nor the incapacity of the religious for
ownership, is the foundation of the continuance of the
monastery's ownership of goods which have once been
absolutely given to it by the religious. Both form merely
the occasion or the motive by reason of which such a
donation was made, in the same way as if the donation
had been made by the religious in an equally absolute
manner to the poor, or to his own relations.
Departure from Religious Life. 303
A religious, when he becomes a Bishop, does not thereby
lose his substantial state as a religious. The vow of
'chastity is annexed to the episcopal state in itself, and
apart from the religious state. In a priest who is also a
religious the vow of chastity is twofold. By episcopal
consecration this vow is not taken away, but is rather in a
measure consecrated.
There is no contradiction between the existence of a
vow of poverty and the episcopal state. That vow, there
fore, remains in a religious who has been made a Bishop,
so far as regards the vow and the substantial effect of the
vow, although in the practice of poverty greater license
is given to a religious who is at the same time a
Bishop.
A religious who is made a Bishop is not placed entirely
outside his Rule. Although poverty is promised according
to the Rule, it is afterwards of obligation chiefly from the
vow, and not chiefly from the Rule. The Rule is only a
condition or measure which determines certain limits in the
matter of the vow. The promise concerns the matter
itself. Even if, therefore, a Bishop were no longer bound
by the Rule, he might, nevertheless, remain bound by the
vow. Being, however, bound by the Rule also, a vow of
poverty binds one religious who is a Bishop more than it
binds another religious who is a Bishop, or it binds him in
another way according to the character of the Rule in
accordance with which he professed poverty. A religious
of the Order of St. Francis, for instance, if he is made a
Bishop, will be bound to a more strict observance of
poverty than would a religious of another Order. The
religious state does not endure along with the episcopal
304 Elements of Religious Life.
state, so far as those things are concerned which are at
variance with the episcopate ; such as a practice of poverty
as strict as is the ordinary practice of a simple religious.
He cannot acquire anything as if he were the owner of it.
Apart from this, and as regards actual acceptance and
retention, he can acquire in all ways in which a secular
Bishop can acquire. The ownership of goods, moreover,
he acquires not to his monastery , but to his Church.
Independence from the discretion, will, and leave of
another, with regard to lawful expenditure, is not at variance
with the vow of poverty, for it is in a manner intrinsic
to the episcopal state. The Superior who gave per
mission for entrance on that state thereby gave power
to use goods in accordance with that state. This preserves
the substance of poverty.
Although a religious who is a bishop retains his sub
stantial vow of obedience, yet he is not bound by reason of
that vow to obey the Superior of his Order. He is bound
only to obey the Sovereign Pontiff, as the Pontiff is
Supreme Prelate of every religious Order. The substance
of the vow of obedience is thus preserved, as it is in the
case of the General of an Order, who is not subject to any
Superior of that Order. To obey the Pontiff as Supreme
Prelate of his Order is not at variance with, but is in the
highest way in accordance with a religious bishop's religious
state. Since, however, the vow of religious obedience is not
without its limits, but is according to ttie Rule, a religious
bishop is not bound, in virtue of his vow, and by the
special bond of religion, to obey the Sovereign Pontiff in all
matters, but in those matters only which directly or in
directly belong to his religious Rule.
A religious who is a bishop is bound to wear the religious
Departure from Religious Life. 305
habit of his Order. This is an obligation not only of
Rule but of Common Law.
A Bishop is, strictly speaking, no longer a member of
his religious community, but it does not follow that he does
not remain a religious of his own Order rather than of
any other Order. In substantiate and in habit he always
remains a religious of the same species. If he were
deprived by the Pontiff of his episcopal office and exemp
tion, he would at once be subject to his own Order, and
not to another. This suffices to his retaining a religious
state of the same character, although he is not actually
subject either to the Superiors or to the laws of his
particular Order.
That which is true of religious who are Bishops is true
also of religious who are Cardinals, and with still greater
reason. Not only does a religious Cardinal remain
always a religious, but, unless he is a Bishop, he is not
constituted in the state of perfection as a Bishop is. He
is not so constituted in virtue of his elevation to the
Cardinalitial dignity. He retains the bond of the vow of
poverty. He is incapable of ownership. Without dis
pensation he cannot make a testament. With regard to
actual obedience, it is clear that he is subject immediately
to the Roman Pontiff alone. The religious bond of
obedience, however, he retains.
A Cardinal is, equally with a Bishop, separated by
means of his dignity from the body of his Order. He
ought, however, to wear the habit of his Order, in
accordance with the practice of the Church. From this
obligation it is only a religious who has become Sove
reign Pontiff who is set free. Even he does not lose the
substance of the religious state.
U
CHAPTER XII.
Variety of Religious Life within the
Religious State.
IT is a truth of the Catholic faith that the variety of
religious Orders belongs to the adornment and welfare of
the Church, and to the greater glory of God. This truth
is certain as of faith. If confirmation were needed, we
have it in the examples of Saints who have instituted
various Orders, in the common consent of the Church, and
in the authority of Pontiffs who have approved those
Orders. We have also the testimony of Gregory XIII.,
who, in his Constitution of Confirmation of the Society of
Jesus, says — Since the Divine Providence has, in accord
ance with the necessities of the times, produced in the
Church various and salutary Institutes of religious Orders,
and for new diseases has as these arose provided new
remedies, and for fresh assaults of the enemy has as these
occurred raised up new auxiliaries of regular Orders, and
to each of them, according to the vocation of the par
ticular grace of each, has suggested certain special notes,
particular characteristics, and means which are adapted
towards that end at which each aims, it is clear that the
variety of religious Orders has been introduced by the
Divine Providence, and is both fitting and of service to
the Church.
It may be laid down as a first principle that all
Variety of Religious Life. 307
religious Orders are necessarily one in the substantial* of
the religious state. These substantiate consist in two
things, namely — in aiming at perfection of charity towards
God, and consequently at perfection of charity towards
one's neighbour — and in renunciation of the world by
means of the three substantial vows, and the donation and
delivery of oneself which is confirmed by those vows by
which a man consecrates himself wholly to the Divine
service.
St. Thomas says that in two ways only can a difference
exist between religious Orders, namely, as regards the
proper end of them, and as regards the exercises and
means by which they severally aim at that end.
It is true that all the particular ends of the various
religious Orders are themselves also means, if we are com
paring them with the general perfection of charity which
is the one end of the religious state. They are, neverthe
less, proper ends, inasmuch as they are things which are
good in themselves, and which are therefore proximately
sought for their own sake. Those means may also be
called ends, inasmuch as they are, as it were, certain
formal exercises of charity itself. As such they are aimed
at as at ENDS, although, regarded absolutely and in com
parison with perfection of charity, they may be called means.
Charity, considered in itself, has many functions in which
it is exercised, and by means of which it is proximately in
creased. Those functions are so diverse that all and every
one of them cannot be primarily aimed at by every
individual religious Order. Some Orders have in view the
contemplation of God. Other Orders labour for the benefit
of their neighbours. Among the latter again there exists
great variety.
In order to the attainment and to the exercise of its own
308 Elements of Religious Life.
proper end, every Order makes use of its own proper
observances, such as prayers, fastings, manual work, and
the like. These observances are called its own proper
MEANS, since they are referred immediately to its own
proper end and, through the intervention of that end, to
the general end of all religious life, which is perfection of
charity.
It sometimes happens that two religious Orders have
been instituted with the same proximate end, and those two,
nevertheless, make use of different observances as means
towards that end. In this case, the two Orders are said to
be differenced by their means, and not by their end.
Those Orders are more distinct, the one from the other,
which are differenced by reason of their respective ends,
than are those which are differenced only by the -means
which they respectively employ towards the same proximate
end. The widest distinction of all exists when there is a
difference both in end and in means or exercises, and
especially when in the vows themselves, and in the mode
of observance of the vows, there exists diversity. Since it
is in the vows that the substance of religion consists, this
diversity most nearly approaches a substantial diversity.
Within the limits of the same Order there may exist so
great a variety that there should appear to be several
Orders, as among the Friars Minor. This is chiefly the
case when religious of the same Order are subject to
different Generals. They are then, as it were, distinct
armies, under different leaders, with different ensigns, and
sometimes with different weapons, although in the end of
all of them and otherwise there is in reality the greatest
agreement.
Oneness of head, or unity of members under one
Variety of Religious Life. 309
supreme head who is of the same Order, conduces to
corporate oneness. This is not necessary, however, to one
ness in itself, if there is oneness of Rule, along with one
ness of origin. The Order is then spoken of as one, not
only colloquially but in law. Thus, for instance, all
Nuns who profess the Rule of St. Clare are reckoned to
belong to the same Order, although some monasteries
of those Nuns may be subject to the local Bishop, while
some others are subject to a religious Prelate. There exists,
however, it cannot be denied, a greater oneness, when all
the religious of the same Order have not only the same
Rule but the same Prelate, since a body-politic, such as a
religious Order is, takes its oneness from the oneness of
its head.
Oneness of religious habit also belongs to the oneness
of a religious Order. Although the religious habit is not
of the substance of religion, it is, nevertheless, a sign of
a particular profession of religion. Oneness of habit is
not so necessary that within the limits of the same Order
no diversity of habit can be permitted to exist. Sometimes
the Rule determines the pattern and the material, but not the
colour of the habit. Variety of habit, however, can never
be so great within the same Order that some oneness or
similarity of habit should not be preserved to indicate the
oneness of the Order ; as in the case of the Observantines,
Conventuals, and Capuchins in the Order of St. Francis ;
in the case also of the two families of the Trinitarians, and
much more in the case of the Order of Canons Regular.
The Society of Jesus has no peculiar religious habit.
It admits as much variety as does the secular
clerical habit in different countries, observing only this
oneness, that everywhere the dress should be such as
310 Elements of Religious Life.
is respectable and not unbefitting the religious state.
The variety of religious Orders has been designed and
introduced in the Church, as very advantageous thereto, by
disposition of the Divine Providence, and through direction
of the Holy Ghost. The religious state is presented to men
as a most useful means towards the acquiring of perfec
tion, but, morally speaking, one religious Institute and
manner of life would not be adapted for all men, by reason
of the variety of temperaments and dispositions among
men. It is, therefore, of utmost advantage that there
should exist certain religious Orders which are ordained
for the quiet and leisure of contemplation, and that other
Orders should exist which are ordained for active work,
and others again for a mixture of the two, so that all
concerned may have an opportunity of choosing that
Order which is most for their own individual benefit.
So also as regards other differences. Some men find
pleasure and satisfaction in certain actions and exercises
rather than in others. Some men have an inclination
towards solitary life, and some towards a social life. Some
men are more fitted for bodily labour and corporal austeri
ties, while some are more fitted for study and spiritual
exercises. By means of a variety of religious Orders the
wants of all are provided for.
Another reason for a variety of religious Orders is
because they are, of the intention of the Holy Ghost, in
stituted not only for the benefit of the members who compose
them, but also for the service of their neighbours, and for
the general good of the whole Church. In accordance,
therefore, with the variety of ministries by which it may
.be possible for them to serve the Church, will be the
variety of religious Orders.
Variety of Religioiis Life. 311
2.
Many ancient and most perfect monks professed the
solitary life in religion. Of these St. John the Baptist is
called the Prince and Leader, under the law of grace.
Before it, and under the old law, Elias is held to have
originated that state. Of the solitary life Christ Himself
willed to give an example, when He retired to the desert
for forty days, to give Himself to fasting and to con
templation.
Among the Fathers the distinction of monks into
cenobites and anchorites was a common one. Anchorites
were again sometimes distinguished from eremites. An
eremite was understood to be a man who had from the
outset professed the solitary life. An anchorite was a man
who, after having acquired perfection in the cenobitic life,
separated himself therefrom, and betook himself to
solitude.
The cenobitic life is that life which is led in a religious
congregation, or community, of whatever Order it may be.
The cenobitic life is also called the common life, or the
social life.
That this mode of common life is most excellently
adapted for the religious state is evident from the usage of
the Church, in which this mode of religious life has so
prevailed in practice, as to be in our day almost the only
mode of religious life which is actually led. Its excellence
is evident also in its manifest fitness for the observance of
all the substantial vows of the religious state, and for the
practice of all the counsels and of all virtues.
To cenobites there most rightly belongs the name of
Monk. Although the word Monk is derived from oneness,
312 Elements of Religious Life.
and a monk is so called as being a man who is, as it were,
one and alone, yet, as St. Augustine says — monks so
live in unity as to make but one man, and they so live
that it should be true of them that while there are
many bodies, there is but one heart and one soul.
3-
A religious Order could not possibly be instituted for
the purpose of fighting in any merely just war. War,
however just it may be, cannot possibly form an end of the
religious state. Although war may have in it a certain
moral goodness inasmuch as it is just, it is not an act
of divine worship, it is not a work of piety, and it does not
of itself contribute to the perfection of the soul. War is
in itself, on the contrary, exposed to many perils which,
unless counterbalanced by some end which belongs to
religion and to the common good, would prevent a life
of warfare from being chosen by a man who had at
heart the attainment of perfection.
Religious warfare, on the other hand, that is to say,
the waging of war in defence of the Catholic Faith,
of the Catholic Church, and of the innocent, is a fitting
end for which it is possible that a religious Order should
be instituted, with this as its proper scope and aim.
This is the judgment of St. Thomas, and his judgment
is confirmed by the practice of the Church. Military
Orders, recognized and approved as religious Orders,
have for many ages existed in the Church, in fact,
from the time of Urban II.
The vow of chastity is most excellently adapted to
the end of a military Order. The obligations of a
husband and father and the burdens of matrimony stand
Variety of Religious Life. 313
greatly in the way of freedom to expose one's life to
the perils of war without solicitude for wife or
children. Supposing celibacy, consecration of chastity
to God by vow is itself most well-pleasing to God,
and it avails to obtain from Him the protection
which is so specially necessary in so perilous a
life. The same or similar advantages are to be
found in a vow of poverty. In order that a man
may truly and from his heart consecrate himself to
military service for the sake of God, and seek therein
no temporal gain, there cannot be any better disposi
tion than that of his renouncing all temporal things,
and laying aside all affection for them. Otherwise there
might often be great danger of his fighting rather in
order to the increase of his fortune than for the sake
of his Maker.
Obedience, even apart from all question of religion,
is of itself most necessary in warfare. Without obedience
neither due order, nor exact execution, nor prudent
allotment of posts could be effected. On these, success
in battle and the happy issue of a campaign in great
measure depend. If therefore a warfare is religious
and is undertaken solely for God, it very greatly conduces
to the perfection of it that obedience should be conse
crated to God by vow. Superiors will then have it
in their power to give their orders with a freer con
fidence, and subjects will with greater reverence and
reverent promptitude at once obey.
The donation and delivery of oneself to the Order,
which is made in religious profession, is in special
accordance with the religious state in a military Order.
Such delivery is a preparation for perfect obedience, and,
at the same time, for poverty and the stripping oneself of
314 Elements of Religious Life.
all things. He who so delivers himself denies himself,
and in a manner abandons himself. He who professes
religious warfare places not only his actions, but his
life itself in the hands of his Superior. He thus delivers
himself in the most perfect manner which is possible, and
therefore in a manner which best becomes the religious
state.
The life of a Christian man is partly contemplative, and
it is at the same time partly active. By contemplation we
mean not speculation with regard to truths in general
or with regard to all kinds of truths, but contemplation of
those truths which concern God and the knowledge of
God. Even with regard to those truths we do not mean
by contemplation arid and barren speculation, which bears
no fruit in the will, and which does not in any way con
tribute towards the uprightness of the will. We mean by
contemplation that kind of speculation which so raises the
mind to the knowledge of God as to unite the whole soul
to God. By action we mean external works and occupa
tions which have regard not to any and to every secular
affair, but to the practice of virtue, and especially of the
virtue of mercy, which aims at relieving the miseries,
whether corporal or spiritual, of our neighbours.
There are in men two kinds of operations of grace
and sanctity, in which the supernatural life consists. One
of these operations belongs to internal consideration. The
other belongs to external operation. Since each of these
kinds of operation forms a life, there is rightly said to be
a twofold spiritual life. One spiritual life is fittingly called
the contemplative life. The other is called the active life.
This division is of faith.
Variety of Religious Life. 315
The distinction between the contemplative and the
active life is not to be understood as if the active life
excluded all contemplation, and as if the contemplative
life excluded all action. Each of the two lives is named
from that which in each is principally aimed at, and
which in each is predominant. By predominant we mean
not that which occupies the largest part of one's lifetime or
the longest portion of one's day, but that which is the END
for which all things else in that life are done, and to which
all things else in the leading of that life are subordinated.
An institute of .life, therefore, which of itself
primarily and principally has regard to works of
mercy, or similar works, as to its proper end and scope —
although it may include some amount of prayer and con
sideration in order that those works should be holily trans
acted, and done with a general view to the divine service,
— is, by reason of its end, called an active life. When, on
the other hand, perfection of contemplation is that which
is principally aimed at, and action and mortification
of the body are ordained as means towards that end,
and as ministering to contemplation — the life is properly
a contemplative life.
Both kinds of life are adapted for the acquiring of
perfection. Both are calculated for the perfecting of
charity. So far as is in them, both exclude all sins.
In those two things the substance of perfection consists.
Both lives, therefore, are meet to be embraced as states of
tending towards perfection, and as states to be conse
crated by means of religious vows.
Hence we find certain monastic Orders, which are
principally ordained for contemplation solely. If these
contemplative Orders share in action, it is simply in order
316 Elements of Religious Life.
to the individual perfection of the members of them,
or it is accidental to their state. We find, on the other
hand, Orders which have been instituted chiefly for
the exercise of acts of mercy towards their neighbours.
Although both contemplative and active Orders are at
one in their general end, which is that of their own
perfection, and of the divine service, they have never
theless different and proper proximate ends. It follows
that they must necessarily differ in the principal means
which they respectively employ towards their proper
proximate ends, while they have in common certain
general means, such as the three substantial vows, some
castigation of the body, prayer and similar exercises.
These Orders will necessarily differ, for instance, as
regards intercourse with their neighbours, on the one
hand, or separation from their neighbours, on the other, as
regards going from place to place or remaining always
within the cloister, as regards choir or study, and as
regards other similar matters.
The division of religious Orders into the contemplative
and the active, while it is an excellent division, is neverthe
less not entirely adequate. There is therefore to be
added, for the sake of clearness, to this division a third
member, namely, that of Orders the life of which is mixed.
The mixed religious life consists partly of contemplation
and partly of action. These two — contemplation and
action — are not contradictory, so that they cannot both be
principally aimed at at the same time, and that with great
perfection.
That mode of active life which not only does not
exclude contemplation, but requires contemplation as its
own sister-german, or which rather in a manner intrinsic
ally includes contemplation, inasmuch as it demands great
Variety of Religious Life. 317
internal consideration in him who gives himself to spiritual
ministrations in aid of souls, whether by preaching, hearing
confessions, private conversations or the like, may
rightly be distinguished as — a mixed life.
Preaching is contemplation given voice to by external
action. It raises not only the mind of the preacher, but
the minds of others up to God. It supposes, in order
to its being rightly exercised, lengthened prayer and medita
tion on the truths to be uttered. This again must be pre
ceded by reading, which also belongs to contemplative life.
Reading, as St. Thomas says, is, as it were, the first
beginning of the raising up of the mind to God. By
means of reading we learn and receive that which by
meditation we preserve and digest, and so by degrees the
soul is inflamed towards God. Reading is, to quote St.
Bernard, the first of the four steps of the cloister-stair.
These are reading, meditation, prayer and contemplation.
Although the last, as the most perfect, gives its name
to contemplation, strictly so called, the contemplative life
nevertheless embraces all the four. Reading seeks, as says
the same St. Bernard, meditation finds, prayer begs, and
contemplation relishes. He adds — Reading without
meditation is arid ; meditation without reading is exposed
to error ; prayer without meditation is tepid ; meditation
without prayer is unfruitful ; prayer with the devotion of
contemplation is acquisitive ; while the attainment of con
templation without prayer is either rare or miraculous. As
these exercises therefore are connected one with another, so
the contemplative state, as such, comprehends all of them
by way of beginning, middle, and end.
A religious Order which embraces both contemplation
and action may aim at both as at its END. This is specially
318 Elements of Religious Life.
true if it is one of those Orders which are ordained for that
part of the active life which consists in spiritual ministries
to others. We do not say that both lives — the contempla
tive and the active — are aimed at only inasmuch as they are
ends. It cannot be denied that the contemplative life is,
in such an Order, ordained as a means towards action.
Study, reading, and meditation have reference very frequently
to the service of others. Prayer itself and union with God
may be most rightly desired and procured for the sake of the
service of others as its end, since the greater a man's union
is with God, the more does that man become an apt instru
ment of God for the succour of souls. Nevertheless con
templation ought itself to be that which is also principally
aimed at even in such an Order. Contemplation is not
merely a means. It is itself most desirable yfr/' its own sake.
Moreover, in the mixed life it is one's own perfection which
is aimed at more even than is the perfection of one's neigh
bours, and one's own perfection consists chiefly in contem
plation, and is attained to thereby. A religious of an Order
which lives the mixed \\fe not only employs the contempla
tion which is necessary for him in order to the aiding of his
neighbour, but also enjoys that which is profitable for him
self. Hence, in order that he may rightly fulfil his func
tion, whenever it is not necessary that he should be
occupied with his neighbour, he will apply himself to con
templation, or to some act of the contemplative life, not for
the sake of action but because " love of the truth delights
in holy leisure."
It is certain that the purely active life is to be placed in
the lowest grade, as being less perfect in comparison with
either the contemplative life or the mixed life.
St. Thomas holds that an Order which, in virtue of its
Variety of Religions Life. 319
Institute, professes the contemplative life, and at the same
time descends to spiritual ministries for the benefit of
others, is to be preferred both in perfection and in dignity
to an Order which is purely or merely contemplative. The
MIXED life includes the whole of the perfection of the
contemplative life, and it in no way diminishes it. It
rather adds somewhat to the purely contemplative life, and
therefore absolutely the mixed life is the more perfect of the
two. We are supposing that in a mixed life the con
templative life is really arrived at and exercised. Other
wise that life would not be really a mixed life.
If actual contemplation of God is, as it must be, some
times to be interrupted, in no better and in no more fruit
ful manner can it be interrupted than by actions of charity
towards one's neighbours, and especially by spiritual
ministries for their benefit. These ministries are of far
greater merit than are all other acts whatsoever outside the
formal love of God. Hence, even if, by occasion of such
ministries, the interruption and occupation of time should
be somewhat greater than would ordinarily be caused by-
private actions of other kinds, yet this is counterbalanced
and compensated by the far greater excellence of those
ministries.
Ministries for the salvation of our neighbours are
external acts not only of the love of our neighbours, but
also and at the same time of our love of God. These
ministries are, therefore, of their own nature more meri
torious than is purely internal contemplation. By such
spiritual ministries the glory and honour of God are not
remotely but are directly and proximately sought, as His
glory and honour exist in those who glorify and honour
Him. The processes of enlightening and conversion by
men of their fellow-men are, therefore, truly and properly
320 Elements of Religions Life.
external acts of friendship and love of God. Morally
speaking, the more efficacious the love of God is, the
better and the more meritorious that love is. The love
which does not confine itself to internal acts but issues in
external effects, and these of the most perfect kind, is
the most efficacious of all kinds of love.
Our love of God is by the extension of it to our
neighbours perfected in itself. The love of our neighbours,
says St. Thomas, for the sake of God, is more perfect than
is the love of God alone. The love of our neighbour in
cludes the love of God Himself, and it adds thereto a love
of God for the service of the same God, and for the
fulfilment of His will. St. Thomas reminds us, by way ot
example, that it is a sign of greater love for a man to
serve other men also, for his friend's sake, than for him to
be willing to serve his friend alone.
When the mind of a purely contemplative religious
descends to compassion for his neighbour, and so to pray
ing for him, it does not fall from the most excellent way of
exercising or perfecting charity. It does not thereby with
draw from the perfect love of God, but it in a manner
widens and extends that love. The man also who for the
same motive descends to action is in no way hindered from
the perfection of charity. He is rather promoted therein.
Most excellent is the aid of prayer, but it is not
sufficient. It is necessary to add to prayer labour. God
has decreed to work out the salvation of men, not by
Himself alone, but by means of men. There must, there
fore, be not only those who pray to God, but those also
who co-operate or work with God. This co-operation is,
all things else being equal, more perfect, because it
makes a man more like to God, while it does not exclude
assistance by means of prayer.
Variety of Religious Life. 321
A contemplative Order is, of the nature of it, the most
safe and secure, the life in it being separated from external
actions which concern one's neighbours, and from their
society and conversation. Hence the practice of the
Sovereign Pontiffs which permits departure from other
religious Orders, even of the mixed life, and however per
fect the Orders may be, to the Carthusian Order, which is
a purely contemplative Order.
Nevertheless it remains true that a mixed Order, which
along with contemplation aims at spiritual action for the
salvation of others, is of its own nature better and more
perfect. The reasons are, because in the mixed life there
are more occasions for the exercise of, along with charity,
the most excellent of other virtues, and of a great number
of these. There is in the mixed life every means for
attaining to greater knowledge of God, and every opportu
nity for exercising charity towards God in the highest
manner, while at the same time there are more frequent
occasions for the endurance of labours or suffering for God.
Along with these advantages there is also found in the
mixed life sufficient provision for avoidance of spiritual
perils. Although the mixed life does not remove all
remote occasions of sin, it nevertheless provides means
against even the ordinary occasions of men's lesser
faults.
In comparing religious Orders, as regards the perfection
of them, we have to look not only to the perfection of
the END of a particular Order, but also to the perfection of
the means provided and used in order to that end. Even if
the end proposed by an Order should be very perfect, but
the means provided are not in proportion and adapted to
the exact and perfect attainment of that end, the state may,
X
322 Elements of Religious Life.
by reason of this disproportion, he less perfect than is a
state which sets before it a less perfect end.
In these means towards the end of perfection we may
distinguish two kinds of excellence. There is the excel
lence which means may have as they are acts of certain
virtues, such as temperance, penance, or the like. There
is another excellence which means may have simply
as they are means in order to the attainment of a special
end. This may be called their utility or usefulness. Sup
posing, therefore, the greater perfection of some particular
end, the greater perfection of a means is to be looked for
in this last perfection — its utility in conducing or aiding
towards the end in question.
Poverty is a means which is most excellently adapted
towards perfection, but within the limits of poverty a
greater measure of poverty may be better for one end,
while it may be less good for another end. If the end
aimed at is more perfect, and a less degree of poverty
would be more useful for the attainment of that end, this
less degree would in that case absolutely contribute more
towards greater perfection.
In the same way, austerity of life is an excellent means
towards perfection, by reason both of its own intrinsic value,
and of its utility for extrinsic ends. While greater
austerity, however, may be more useful for one end, a
modified austerity might be more useful for another end.
If therefore the end which is aimed at should be the more
perfect of the two, then that measure of austerity would be
absolutely the best which is most adapted towards attain
ment of that end.
Universally speaking, if two religious Orders are equal in
all things as regards the respective ends of them, and
as regards the utility and proportion with those ends of the
Variety of Religious Life. 323
means which they respectively employ, that Order will be
the most perfect of the two which observes the greatest
austerity of life, or which employs means which, while
equally useful as means, are at the same time better
/// themselves as they are themselves acts of virtue.
There are three terms, the ideas of which must be
distinguished one from the other — austerity — penance —
and strictness of Rule.
Austerity signifies a special roughness in the external,
ordinary and common treatment of the body, as, for
instance, with regard to food, by abstinence from flesh or
even from other meats, or by diminution of quantity, or by
more frequent fasting — with regard to clothing, by disuse of
linen, or by coarseness of habit, or by going barefooted —
with regard to repose, by hardness of bed, or roughness of
covering, or by sleeping on the ground.
Penance is more extensive than is austerity. Penance in
cludes secret and hidden actions, such as private disciplines,
use of hair-shirts, very prolonged watchings, extraordinary
toil for pious causes, and private macerations of the body.
Strictness of Rule does not consist in those things
merely, or even principally. Although a strict Rule does
not overlook sufficient austerity and penance, its strictness
consists principally in a rigid observance of the three vows,
and of all observances which may be reduced to those
vows, as means which are of themselves necessary in order
to a perfect observance of those vows, or to bearing the
fruits which may be expected from them.
5-
The religious state may be rightly divided into the
clerical and the monastic states. So distinct is the clerical
324 Elements of Religious Life.
state from the monastic state that of old monks were, as a
rule, not admitted, except for some special cause, to clerical
ordination and functions. A religious body of clerics is, of
its kind, more perfect than is a religious body of monks.
This is what is meant by St. Jerome, when he says — " So
live in the monastery, that you may become worthy to be a
cleric."
There has always existed in the Church of Christ a
religious state which was of itself, and of its own proper
institute — clerical, that is to say, constituted by the three
counsels and vows of perfection, and at the same time
destined for the ministries which are proper to clerics,
whether in the divine worship, or in procuring also the sal
vation of souls.
Such was the state of the Apostles. The Apostles made
the three substantial vows of religion, not in order to an
eremitic or to a monastic life, but in order to a clerical and
apostolic life. To profess this life they were called by Christ.
Hence we may rightly say that the first religious Order of
clerics was instituted, constituted and approved by Christ
Himself. It is sufficiently probable that this Order of
religious clerics did not perish with the Apostles, but was
preserved in a continuous series of their successors and
disciples. This Pope Urban signifies, when he says that
the common life flourished amongst Christians up to
his time, especially amongst those who were " chosen to
the lot of the Lord," that is, amongst clerics. Clement I.
says that common life is specially necessary for those who
desire to wage war for God without blame, and who have
the wish to imitate the life of the Apostles and of their
disciples. We read in the life of St. Augustine, that when
he was made a priest, he instituted a monastery within his
Variety of Religious Life. 325
church, and that he lived therein with the servants of God
according to the manner and Rule which was constituted
by the holy Apostles. Many of the learned therefore
suppose that the Order of Regular Clerics or Canons
Regular was not first instituted by St. Augustine. It was
either reformed by him, or introduced by him into Africa,
and furnished with a special Rule. Pius IV. maintains
that the Order of Regular Clerics was instituted by the
Apostles. Benedict XII. confirms this in his preface to
the Constitutions of the Canons Regular. There is no
question as regards the continuance of this particular
religious state, from the time of St. Augustine down to the
present day, although with great variety, so far as various
Institutes of it are concerned.
The first difference between those two religious states —
the clerical and the monastic — is this, that an Order of
clerics is in itself ordained for divine ministries. An Order
of monks is not so ordained, of its primary end. From
this difference in the end, there follows a second difference
in the means. The monastic state, since it does not in it
self require the clericate and the actions which are proper
thereto, so neither does it demand those studies which are
necessary for the right discharge of clerical functions, and
of which regular clerics stand in need no less than do
secular priests. Hence arises a third difference, namely in
habit. Religious who, in virtue of their Institute, profess
the clerical office, should in some way retain an appear
ance of the clerical habit, while monks wear the habit
or cowl which is peculiar to them, and which is common
to all monks. From the same source springs also a
fourth difference. The life of monks ought, of its very
nature, to be more austere than is the life of regular
326 Elements of Religions Life.
as clerics, in all that pertains to treatment of the body, such
food, clothing, and sleeping, along with other austerities.
As regards antiquity, the two religious states — of monks
and of regular clerics — seem to be about equal. Traces of
both states are found in the beginning of the Church. If
there is any preference, it must be given to the regular
clerics. It is more certain that the Apostolic college was
a religious community than it is certain that monasticism
began during the lifetime of the Apostles.
The purely monastic and the mendicant religious Orders
are primarily and principally distinguished one from the
other by reason of the distinct ends at which they severally
aim. The monastic state, taken strictly, is contemplative,
as we find it in the Carthusians, the Benedictines, the
Cistercians, the Camaldulese, and others. These, as hav
ing preserved the monastic state pure and simple, have
retained autonomastically the name of Monks.
Mendicant religious profess the state of the mixed life,
which consists partly of contemplation and partly of
spiritual ministries for the benefit of their neighbours, as in
the case of the Friars Preachers, the Friars Minor, the
Eremites of St. Augustine, and the Carmelites, to whom
this name was first given. In choir and in the divine
office these Mendicants give themselves to contemplation,
while in preaching, teaching and administration of the
sacraments they have their share in action.
A second and more special difference between Monks
and Mendicants is this, that Monks profess individual
poverty, along with possession of real property by them as
they constitute communities ; while Mendicants, in virtue
of their Institutes, embrace poverty not only as individuals
Variety of Religious Life. 327
but as communities. Both professions of poverty are
adapted to the proper ends of the two states respectively.
Monks, since they lead a sequestered life within their
cloisters, cannot fitly in accordance with their Institute
live by begging. Moreover, since Monks, as such, do not
minister to their neighbours, they have not so manifest a
reason or so good a title for demanding support at the
hands of their neighbours, and so rightly Monks do not
profess poverty as they form communities. For these
reasons the Monks, during the time when for the most
part they were laymen, and so long as they had no fixed
possessions or revenues for their support, lived rather by
the labour of their hands than on alms. This they did
not because it was not lawful for them to beg, but because
begging was not so clearly in accordance with the state of
life which they professed.
Mendicants, on the other hand, inasmuch as they
minister in spiritual matters to their neighbours, may
rightly live on their neighbours' alms. Since they live in
the midst of their neighbours and, as far as may be
necessary, associate with them, it is sufficiently in accord
ance with the end of their Institute that they should beg
from their neighbours.
The Mendicants may be subdivided into those whose
Institutes do not allow any ownership of goods, whether
immoveable, or moveable, or self-moving goods, either as
communities or as individuals, and those who, although
their Institutes do not allow possession of real property or
revenues, may nevertheless as communities possess move-
able goods. The first degree of poverty or mendicancy is
professed by the Friars Minor. They may be said to hold
the primacy among Mendicants, since they profess the
328 Elements of Religious Life.
greatest extreme of poverty with regard to ownership of
goods.
There are four principal and more ancient Mendicant
Orders, namely, the Friars Preachers, the Friars Minor,
the Eremites of St. Augustine, and the Carmelites. Others,
however, have been added to their number from among
the monastic Orders, such as, for instance, the Servites,
and the Minims of St. Francis de Paula, whom Pius V.
declared to be Mendicants. Among the Orders of Clerks
Regular, he declared the Society of Jesus to be a Mendi
cant Order. The Society did not then begin to be Mendi
cant when it received this favour from Pius V. It began
to be a Mendicant Order when it was first approved in its
Institute and primitive Rule by Paul III. The Society is
one of the Mendicant Orders, not because Pius V. de
clared it to be a Mendicant Order ; but he declared it to
be a Mendicant Order because it was already a Mendicant
Order. He declared it at the same time to be worthy of
having granted to it all the Privileges of the Mendicants
which had already in great part been granted to it, and
the grant of which he completed.
7-
The state of Clerks Regular may be divided into the
state of those who are religious absolutely, and the state of
those who are only partially religious.
A Congregation of Clerics who merely live together after
the manner of Regulars is not properly a religious Order ;
and this by reason of the absence of vows. In the case
of such Clerics, those things which are done by religious
in'virtue of their vows are done by them in virtue only of
a social obligation — or in virtue of a covenant as between
Variety of Religious Life. 329
men — or in virtue of private statutes which have emanated
from themselves. Even if in such communities vows are
made, they do not include an obligation of permanence in
the same condition of life. They suppose liberty to leave
it, and they bind only under condition, and so long as the
members choose to persevere. Such clerics are not
Regulars, although they more nearly approach religion
than do those who make no vows ; for, so long as they
persevere, and are members of such a Congregation, they
are bound by vow to observe poverty, chastity and
obedience.
True and proper religious Orders of clerics may be
divided into Orders of Canons, and Orders of simple Clerks.
Looking to the origin and first use of the word CANON,
it appears to have signified in the beginning simply a
•cleric who was living under rule, and observing common
life, after the manner of the Apostles, along with other
•clerics in an ecclesiastical college or community. The
Greek word Canon signifies a Rule, and so clerics who
followed a regular life, or a life under Rule, came to be
called Canons. In the beginning of the Church all the
faithful, or at least all the clergy, professed common life.
In process of time, however, many even of the clergy,
abandoning common life, began to live as private per
sons, and to possess property of their own. It was then
that those of the clergy who retained their former state
were, to distinguish them from the others, called Canons.
Those Canons seem to have been kept by the Bishops in
immediate attendance on themselves, and to have been
employed by them in the more principal ministries, and as
counsellors. They had also places of greater dignity
allotted to them in the assemblies of the clergy.
33° Elements of Religious Life.
Afterwards, however, the Canons themselves began to
forsake common life, and to divide the canonries and
prebends among themselves, still retaining, however, the
name of Canons. Thus it came to pass that those of
the Canons who persevered in religious and common life
were called Canons Regular. A Canonry is a spiritual
right, by reason of which a Canon has assigned to him
a stall in the choir of a particular church, and a place
in the Chapter of the clergy of that church. When
Canons are religious, their religious character is signified
by their name of Canons Regular.
Hence even a Canon who is a regular retains the office
and spiritual right of a Canon, for this is not subversive of
the substantiate of the religious state.
Just as among seculars there are clerics who are not
Canons, so among regulars there are religious clerics who
are not Canons, since, although they are both clerics and
religious, they do not possess canonries. Those only are
called Canons Regular who are attached to either a
cathedral or a collegiate church. Other religious clerics
whose church is neither one nor the other, but either is
parochial or is merely a church, are not Canons Regular.
They are simply Regular Clerks.
Our last general division of religious Orders may be
into Orders of men, and Orders of women. Both Orders
have place in the Church, and some differences exist
between the two.
It is certain that from the beginning of the Church
there were women, both virgins and widows, who were
consecrated to God by a vow of continence. It is also
certain that it was a most ancient custom to congregate
Variety of Religious Life. 331
women, who had been consecrated to God, and who fol
lowed the way of perfection, in separate houses or monas
teries.
What the institute of life and profession of women who
were dedicated to God was in the beginning, is uncertain.
It is uncertain whether it was in a proper religious state,
or whether it included only a vow of chastity. It is also
uncertain whether the religious state was always entered
on by women in monasteries and convents, or whether it
was sometimes practised in private houses. Further, it is
uncertain what habit they wore, and what was their manner
of life. It is most likely that there were various modifi
cations of the religious state in the case of women, not
only at different times and in different places, but also at
the same time and in the same place, as is the case in the
Church at the present day. Innocent II. at length
ordained that Nuns should live only in convents and
monasteries or communities. In the early times, when the
Church had but little peace and security on account of the
persecutions and tyrannies of heathen princes, monaste
ries of women could not be established in any number.
As soon as the establishment of them became possible,
the custom spread and became universal, and received
the approbation of Pontiffs and of Councils.
Monasteries of women were ordinarily, and almost from
the beginning, annexed and subordinated to monasteries
of men. The government of them was committed to
the Monks of their Order, but with dependence on the
Bishop. The Monk who was placed by his Abbot over a
monastery of Nuns had to be approved by the judgment
of the Bishop.
As the accessory follows the nature of the principal, so
33 2 Elements of Religious Life.
do Orders of religious women follow on the lines of
Orders of religious men, and differ or vary with them.
This subject, therefore, needs no special treatment, except
with regard to those matters only which are proper to
Nuns, by reason of their sex, or other matters which have
been specially ordained by law.
As regards the end of a religious Order there is, of
course, a greater diversity among men than there is among
women. Among women, for instance, the division of
religious Orders into Orders of laymen and Orders of
clerics has no place. All Orders of women, therefore,
follow rather on the lines of the Orders of laymen.
Further, the mixed life — which consists partly of contem
plation and partly of spiritual ministries for the salvation
of one's neighbours — does not belong to religious women.
Not only are women incapable of Sacred Orders but,
according to the Apostle, the office of teaching does not in
itself belong to them. As a rule, therefore, Orders of Nuns
profess the contemplative and monastic life. Their life of
action is ordinarily confined to labour. This is also
common to Monks, and especially to contemplatives, as
morally necessary in order to sufficiency of bodily exercise.
An active life in the practice of works of corporal mercy
is not so suited to an Order of women that they should
set it before them as their proper end and scope.
Although it is true that such works may be most fitly
done by women, as St. Paul says to Timothy — " Let a
widow be chosen, having a testimony of her good works,
if she have educated children, if she have exercised
hospitality, if she have washed the saints' feet, if she have
ministered to them that suffer tribulation, if she have
diligently followed every good work" (i Tim. v. 9-10),
yet, since such works cannot be done by Nuns for their
Variety of Religions Life. 333
neighbours without departure from the cloister, which is,
as a rule, not expedient for religious women, the practice of
external works is not an end which is suited for Orders of
women.
Suarez is treating only of religious Orders of women, strictly and
properly so called, that is, approved Orders of religious women who
make solemn vows, and who are bound by the law of Enclosure.
Besides the Congregations of Tertiaries, who make only simple vows,
and who are not bound to strict enclosure, there exist at the present
day innumerable Congregations of religious women who in this
resemble the Tertiaries. All such Congregations of religious women
who live in communities without strict enclosure and solemn vows,
whether they are Tertiaries, or Oblates, or belong to any other
Institute, are known under the general name of Conservatories. This
name was first given to Houses which were established for the preser
vation of the innocence of poor orphan girls. These were generally
governed by certain pious women who lived in community under a
Rule, but without enclosure or solemn vows. In course of time the
name of Conservatory was extended to all convents of women who
lived after the manner of Nuns, but without enclosure or solemn
vows. This acceptation of the term is now commonly received by
Canonists, and by the Roman Congregations. See Bouix, De fiirc
Regularium, torn. i. 328, et seq. 2nd ed.
Tertiaries are those who, with a promise of observance of the Rule
of some religious Order, made before its Superior, strive in their manner
after a more perfect life. It is not permitted to any Regular Institute
to annex to itself Tertiaries, except with leave of the Holy See.
Tertiaries are of three kinds. The first kind consists of men or of women
who are living together in community. Of these, the men enjoy the
Privileges of the Order, and are exempt from the power of the
Ordinary. Not so the women. These the Church leaves subject to the
local Ordinary, but not subject to the parish priest. A second kind of
Tertiaries consists of women only, who lead a celibate or a widowed life
at home, under a vow of chastity, and in the habit of the Order.
These receive the habit at the hands of the Regular, their Superior ;
but it belongs to the Ordinary to give permission for this, and con
sequently to examine into their fitness for it. They must be of
approved life, they must have at least entered on their fortieth year, and
334 Elements of Religions Life.
they must be able to live from their own resources. They enjoy the
Indulgences of the Order, but not exemption, being subject not only
to the Ordinary, but also to the parish priest. To him, therefore,
alone does it belong to minister to them Easter Communion, Viaticum
and Extreme Unction. The third kind of Tertiaries consists of those —
whether men or women, or married persons — who, without receiving
any habit, and without any vow of a more perfect life, profess a religious
Rule. This Rule in no way binds them under even venial sin. They
share in the Indulgences of the Regulars, but not in their Privileges.
See Zitelli, Apparatus Juris Ecclesiastici, page 233.
Boniface VIII. prescribed perfect enclosure as a necessary condition
of convents of women. The law of enclosure was renewed by the
Council of Trent. Pius V. forbade the existence of monasteries of
Nuns in which enclosure is not observed, and in which solemn vows
are not made. While this law — that profession of solemn vows should
not be separated from enclosure — remained in its integrity, it began
from the time of Innocent XII. to be tolerated that there should exist
Congregations of girls or women, living under a Rule, and making
simple vows. These were called Conservatories. They were said to
be tolerated, inasmuch as, although the Rule under which these women
were living was approved, the Conservatory or Institute itself was not
approved, for want of enclosure. Nowadays Apostolic approbation is
no longer refused to such Institutes. See Piallerini, Opus Theologicuvi
Morale, vol. iv. pages 1 8, 19.
It is the mind of the Apostolic See, at the present day, that Nuns
should make only simple vows in those countries in which, by reason
of the civil laws and other circumstances, the law of enclosure cannot
rightly be observed, even if those Nuns belong to Orders which have
been approved for the making of solemn vows. So Pius IX. decreed
in the case of the Nuns of the Visitation in the United States,
September 2, 1864. See Zitelli, Apparatus Juris Ecclesiastici, p. 234.
There is among Orders of women a variety which follows
the variety which obtains among Orders of men. Among
the Orders of women which are properly monastic, some
profess the Rule of St. Benedict, are called by his name,
and wear his habit. Others give obedience to the
Cistercian Order, under the name, and with the habit of
Variety of Religious Life. 335
St. Bernard. The Carthusians have no sisters subject to
them. This is either because their mode of life, and the
enclosure and solitude of that Order, is incompatible with
the government of religious women, or because their
manner of life could not well be adapted for women.
Not only the monastic Orders, but also the more ancient
mendicant Orders, have their own proper monasteries of
Nuns, who are included with them under the name of
Mendicants. It matters not that in profession of the
mixed life, which comprehends spiritual ministries, they
cannot be assimilated to the men of the same Order. It
suffices that in other conditions they should imitate the
Mendicant Order to which they are annexed. They do
this primarily and principally by their profession of its
Rule, under obedience to the Order, and in the habit of
the Order, and with its Constitutions and customs, and
especially by their profession and practice of that poverty
from which the name of Mendicant is taken.
There exist also some monasteries of Nuns who are
subject to the Canons Regular. They profess the Rule of
St. Augustine, and in a special manner imitate those
Canons by means of Choir and by painstaking in the
solemnities of divine worship.
There are some monasteries of Nuns to be found under
even the military Orders, and in their habit. Although
the end of a military Order seems at first sight to be
utterly incompatible with their sex, yet, inasmuch as the
military Orders consist not only of knights, but also of
clerics and monks, it is possible for Nuns to some extent
to share in their manner of life, and so to be included
within a military Order.
With regard to origin and antiquity the same is to be
336 Elements of Religious Life.
said of Orders of women, both in general and in particular,
as of Orders of men. The one generally began along with
the other. St. Basil, in his Rule, addresses both " Canons
and Cano/iesscs" that is — Religious or Regulars, both men
and women. St. Augustine founded his first monastery of
women in Africa, in the city of Thegasta. St. Dominic
founded a monastery of women in Rome. St. Francis,
along with his Rule for his friars, instituted a Rule for the
Sisters of St. Clare. This Gregory IX. approved, and
Urban V. afterwards modified it, and reduced it to a better
form, and one more adapted for women. Subject, more
over, to the same Order of men, there may exist Institutes
of religious women of more than one kind. The Order of
Friars Minor, for instance, has subject to it, besides the
Order of St. Clare, the Order of the Conception, which
professes a different Rule.
All that has been said with regard to the religious state,
or with regard to religious in general, applies with due pro
portion to the case of Nuns.
Nuns are not to be received into any convent beyond the
prescribed number, or beyond a number which can be
suitably supported from its revenues, or from the alms
which it is accustomed to receive, unless a Nun should
bring with her a dowry, which is sufficient for her support.
In this case the dowry may be reckoned among the alms,
and after her death among the funds of the convent.
Authority and power to receive a Nun resides in the
Convent itself, although there is required at the same time
the leave or consent of the Prelate to whom the Convent is
subject. Since her reception is to common life and
association with the Nuns, reason demands that the ad
mission of her should be a free and voluntary act on their
Variety of Religious Life. 337
part. Since, on the other hand, the admittance of
her is an act of jurisdiction, there must be the con
currence of a Prelate who is invested with proper
jurisdiction.
Not only virgins, but also widows may be received
in the same convent, as appears from the practice of the
Church from most ancient times. St. Augustine set
a widow over the monastery of virgins which he instituted
in Africa. St. Bridget, who was a widow, instituted an
Order of Nuns, of which she was Abbess, although her
subjects were virgins.
If a woman has fallen from virtue, and her fall has been
public, and with loss of her reputation, she is not, even
after her repentance, to be admitted to a religious society of
virgins. For such women there has therefore been devised
a special Order, called that of the Penitent Women, or
the Order of St. Mary Magdalene. Of this Order there
are many monasteries in Spain. They profess the Rule of
St. Augustine, and live under the care and obedience of
the Friars Preachers.
If, however, the fall of the woman has been hidden, and
she has not in consequence lost her reputation, there is
nothing, morally speaking, to hinder her reception. Some
times even if her fall has been public, but has happened
once only and through frailty, it might be counter
balanced by many circnmstances, with regard to herself
personally, to her family, and to her amendment of life,
so that she might not unfitly be admitted. The refusal
of such a person is, after all, a matter which belongs
merely to becomingness and respectability. She herself
lies under no incapacity, and there is no absolute prohi
bition to receive her, unless such a prohibition should
Y
338 Elements of Religions Life.
exist in the Constitutions of some particular monastery.
After reception, probation is necessary for an entire year
in the case of Nuns, as it is in the case of Monks. The
circumstances of the probation are the same in either case.
Similarly, when the period of probation has been com
pleted, either profession is to be given, or the novice
is to be dismissed, according to the law of the Council of
Trent, which in this case is common to religious of both
sexes. With regard to the profession all things, substantial
and general, must be observed which have been already
stated as necessary in the case of men. In the profession
of Nuns, moreover, it must be specially attended to that the
profession should be entirely spontaneous, and made with
their full free-will, as is cautioned in the ancient Canons.
Hence the Council of Trent ordains that before profession
none of the goods of the novice should be delivered to the
monastery, except for food and clothing during the period
of probation, lest on account of this she should be less
able or less free to depart. Her dowry, therefore, is not to
be made over to the monastery before her profession, but
is to be placed on deposit. In the case, however, of any
special necessity, or of greater advantage to the novice
herself, then by the judgment and with the leave of the
Bishop the dowry may be received by the monastery,
caution and undoubted security being given for the repay
ment of it in full, and that without any difficulty, in
the event of the novice wishing to depart before
profession.
The Council also ordains that before her profession the
Bishop should examine into the virgin's will, to ascertain
that it is both pious and entirely spontaneous. The
Council adds a censure on all who compel women to
Variety of Religious Life. 339
enter, and on all who hinder women from entering the
religious state.
Besides the will of the novice to enter, there must also
be the will of the monastery, along with the will of the
Abbess, to receive her. Not only is the consent of the
Prelate to whom the monastery is subject, necessary, but
it is in his hands that the profession is to be made, and it
is by him that it is accepted, since he alone possesses
jurisdiction.
In the case of Nuns, the Abbess, or Superioress of a monastery can,
by common law, admit her novices to profession ; and for this reason
that it is not an act of spiritual jurisdiction which belongs to the Keys
of the Church. It is an act of the superiority which the Abbess, with
the approbation of the Holy See, is invested with over her Nuns. It
is simply admitting in the name of the Order the obligation whereby
she who makes profession binds herself to the Order, and in return
binding the Order to her. Although the profession of Nuns is wont to
be made in the hands of the Ordinary — or of a Regular Prelate, if the
Nuns are subject to Regulars — yet if it is made in the hands of the
Superioress, with consent of the greater part of the Chapter, it will be
valid, since the Superioress can by herself alone with the said consent
receive it, unless there should exist any peculiar Constitution of the
Order which hinders this. By law. the reception of Nuns does not
belong to the Ordinary. It belongs to the Abbess and to the monas
tery. See Ballerini, Opus Theologituni Morale, vol. iv. p. 35.
Nuns are bound equally with Monks as regards the
substantial vows of religion, but this obligation is adapted
to their sex. Hence, in the matter of the vows, or in
matters which conduce towards the observance of their
vows, there are certain points which are proper to Nuns,
partly by way of relaxation, and partly by way of greater
rigour and observance. Although for some Orders of reli
gious men that kind of poverty is fitting which deprives not
only the individual members, but also the religious
340 Elements of Religious Life.
communities themselves of the ownership of goods, yet this
is not expedient for Nuns. Their respectability, as well as
their enclosure, could not be so entirely or so perfectly pre
served unless the necessaries of life were supplied to them
from the funds of their monastery. Hence, although the
Order of St. Clare was instituted at first with observance
of community poverty, Innocent III. shortly afterwards
dispensed this, permitting, however, rather than prescrib
ing, that community poverty should not be observed.
Later on, Urban V. decreed that their Rule should be
observed without this kind of poverty. Both Pius V.
and Gregory XIII. endeavoured by all means to provide
that monasteries of Nuns should possess somewhat for
their support, so that, if they stood in need of alms, these
should be procured rather through the providence of the
prelates to whom they are subject, than by means of their
own begging. Since experience, however, has proved
that this method is attended with many difficulties, and
that every other mode of mendicancy is surrounded
with dangers, it is absolutely more advisable for monas
teries of Nuns that they should possess common revenues
than that they should profess poverty as communities.
With regard to chastity, it has only to be observed that,
in order to preservation of it, the precept of Enclosure is
more strict in the case of Nuns than it is in that of
Monks.
With regard to the obedience of Nuns, three obligations
are chiefly to be noted. The first is their obligation of
obedience to the Prelate to whom they are subject, whether
he is the Bishop, or a religious Prelate of their own Order,
as the case may be, in accordance with the profession of
Variety of Religious Life. 341
their respective monasteries. There cannot exist a monas
tery of religious women which is not subject to some man,
since women are not capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
This obligation of obedience is founded, not only in the
vow of obedience, but also in proper spiritual jurisdiction.
A monastery of Nuns may indeed be exempt and subject
immediately to the Sovereign Pontiff, since that depends
upon the Pontiffs will, but the case is rare, since it rarely
happens that it is expedient. Even when the case does
occur, the Pontiff must necessarily appoint some man in
place of himself in order to exercise of jurisdiction.
A second obligation of Nuns is to obey the Abbess.
This obligation is necessary in order to the government
and good order of the monastery. An Abbess does not
possess proper spiritual jurisdiction, and so she cannot
make a law, properly so called, nor can she impose a pre
cept upon the whole convent, by which an act should be
constituted in the species of a special virtue, for this
belongs to power of jurisdiction. An Abbess, however,
has dominative power, that is, power to administer and rule
the monastery, both persons and goods. In virtue of this
power she can prescribe to the Nuns, and they will be
bound in conscience to obey her in virtue of their vow of
obedience.
A Superioress stands towards her Nuns in exactly the same position
as that in which a Superior of religious men stands towards his subjects,
and she is bound by the same laws in the administration of goods.
Besides this, there is a caution of Pontifical law that, in administrative
acts to be done by her or by the Chapter, there should intervene the
authority of the Prelate to whom they are subject, and as that Prelate
is their guardian. lie is to act not by way of disposal or pro
prietary right — a right which belongs to the community alone, to which
alone the goods belong — but by way of direction, which is the right
342 Elements of Religious Life.
which belongs to him. See Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, vol. iv.
p. 91.
The third obligation of Nuns is to observe their Rule
and Constitutions. Even if their statutes do not bind them
under sin, the Nuns can be compelled to observance of
them by the Prelate to whom they are subject. To such
observance Prelates should pay special attention in their
visitations. Visitations of monasteries of religious women
are made by the Bishop when these are subject to him,
and in the case of monasteries which are exempt from
the jurisdiction of the local Bishop, the visitations are
made by a religious Prelate of the Order to which the
Nuns belong.
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